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# AND OTHER ESSAYS

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# NOTE.

Of the six essays contained in this volume, the first three—much the larger—are historical; the last three, positive. The first of the series appeared in *The Monist* for January, 1903; the fifth in *Mind* of the same date. The rest have not hitherto been published.

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# APOLLONIUS OF TYANA.

A REFORMER of Greek religion from within, whose activity may have coincided with the first emergence of the Christian propaganda from Judæa, is undoubtedly an interesting historical figure. And both in ancient and in modern times Apollonius of Tyana has been made the subject of parallels which were probably never thought of by the author of his extant Life. The first of these parallels was by Hierocles, Proconsul of Bithynia under Diocletian; in which the attempt seems to have been made to show that the marvels attributed to Apollonius were better authenticated than those attributed to Christ. We do not possess this work itself; but we have the reply of Eusebius, Bishop of Cæsarea and ecclesiastical historian, written after the triumph of the new faith. The most elaborate modern parallel is that of F. C. Baur, first published in 1832.[1] Baur here attempts to show, not only that there are resemblances between the Life of Apollonius by Philostratus and the Gospels, but that Philostratus deliberately modelled his hero on the type set forth by the Evangelists. Though he was followed in this view by Zeller, it is now generally rejected; so that there is no need to enter into controversy on the subject. It remains, however, none the less interesting to try to determine the character of the reforming activity of Apollonius himself. Was his predominant aim to conduct the world along the path of intensified supernaturalism,

[1] Republished by Zeller with two essays on related subjects under the general title, *Drei Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der alten Philosophie und ihres Verhältnisses zum Christenthum*, Leipzig, 1876.

or was it to promote the growth of a more rational and ethical religion so far as this was possible without breaking with the past?

The materials for judging are contained in the Life of Apollonius written by Philostratus early in the third century, and in the extant letters ascribed to him, some of which Philostratus evidently knew. Whether any of these are genuine, it is impossible to be certain; and in any case the biography of Philostratus is clearly a romance. For the composition of it, the writer professes to have used the memoirs of Damis, a disciple of Apollonius; but he tells us that, as these were wanting in literary form, he has freely worked them up. Baur argues that the introduction of "Damis the Assyrian" is simply a literary device. The obvious anachronism by which Philostratus represents the Babylon visited by Apollonius as identical with the Babylon of Herodotus, he also holds to be intentional. It is not, he thinks, put before the reader for serious belief, but only to bring out the ideal attitude of a Greek philosopher confronted with Oriental ostentation. There is much to be said for this view. Philostratus, who was an accomplished man of letters, has nowhere the air of disclaiming credit for the skill of presentation shown in his narrative, while occasionally he disclaims belief in the stories narrated. He was, besides, an original art-critic, as is evident from the descriptions of real or imaginary pictures in another of his works; and he puts into the mouth of Apollonius æsthetic theories which he can scarcely have meant us to believe were not his own. He did not, of course, for a moment suppose that he was drawing up the documents of a new religion, and hence had no motive for concealing his methods. It was only necessary that they should not be obtruded. We have before us a highly mature work of literary art by an individual author who comes forward in his own name. If we cannot be sure in detail about the facts at the ground of the romance, we are saved from the labour of trying to extricate them from stratum on stratum of superimposed redactions. We know at least what type of reformer Philostratus conceived Apollonius to have been.

That Apollonius was a real person born at Tyana, there is no reason to doubt; nor is there any uncertainty about the general character of his life and teaching. He was in manner of life a Neo-Pythagorean ascetic, and taught what would now be described as a spiritualistic philosophy. The one mode of reforming activity ascribed to him with absolute consistency is

a vigorous campaign against animal sacrifices. Superhuman powers, especially those of prophetic insight and of clairvoyance, were attributed to him by common report. Dio Cassius,[1] as well as Philostratus, relates that he saw in a vision the slaying of Domitian. The fact that he had a quarrel with a Stoic philosopher named Euphrates, who is known as a historical personage,[2] is clear, though its causes can only be conjectured from the account of Philostratus. For the rest, there is no ground for supposing that Philostratus deviated in the general spirit of his representation from the authentic type of his hero; and he must have had sources of information open to him for the details, with whatever freedom he may have treated them. Other Lives of Apollonius, now lost, are known to have existed.

In the "Epistles of Apollonius," some of which, as has been mentioned, Philostratus had before him, the type is already individualised. A few points from these may be given as a preliminary to the more detailed biographical account which will follow.[3] The style of the most of them, it may be observed, is of the laconic brevity attributed by Philostratus to all the genuine letters of Apollonius. Two on the subject of sacrifices, addressed to the sacerdotal bodies at Olympia and at Delphi, may be quoted in full. "The gods need not sacrifices. What then might one gratify them by doing? By obtaining wisdom, as I think, and by benefiting worthy men to the extent of one's power. These things are dear to the gods; those are of the godless."[4] "Priests defile altars with blood; then some wonder whence cities are unfortunate, while they do ill in great things. Oh folly! Heraclitus was wise, but not even he persuaded the Ephesians not to wash out mud with mud."[5] The contrariety dwelt on between virtue and

[1] Lxvii. 18. See Baur, *Apollonius von Tyana und Christus* (*Drei Abhandlungen, etc.*, ed. Zeller, pp. 110-111).

[2] A laudatory reference to him in the Epistles of the younger Pliny (i. 10) is quoted by Baur, *loc. cit.*, p. 153n.

[3] The Epistles of Apollonius and the reply of Eusebius to Hierocles are appended to Kayser's edition of Philostratus, Vol. I. For Philostratus himself I have used Westermann's edition.

[4] Ep 26: τοῖς ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ Θεηκόροις.

[5] Ep. 27: τοῖς ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱερεῦσιν.

riches[1] may be passed over as a well-known philosophic commonplace; but the way in which love of family and country is brought into union with the widest cosmopolitanism seems to offer something distinctive of the philosopher who, having travelled over the known world, is said to have been always pleased when addressed by the name of his birthplace. While it is well, he declares, to think all the earth a fatherland and all men brothers and friends, as being children of God, of one nature; there being the same community of reason and of passions to each and all, barbarian or Greek: yet neither men nor even irrational animals can lose the memory of their home and native seat or find anything to replace it.[2] Men need cities next after the gods; and after the gods cities are to be honoured and their interests to be placed foremost by every rational being.[3] While he accepts (or is made to accept) as an honour the charge that his Pythagorean philosophy seeks to attain insight into the future by revelations from the gods—only given, as he contends, to those who are pure in life—he also claims for the Pythagoreans, as Iamblichus did afterwards, the idea of a demonstrable religion.[4] Against the credulity of the time, we find the reproof addressed to the Milesians that, while Thales is called their father, they in their folly accuse a philosopher who predicts an earthquake of causing it.[5] A distinctive point again is the protest against the exaggerated cynical strain in Stoicism. In an imaginary dialogue, Euphrates is made to reproach Apollonius with relieving pains and sufferings of the body (which are no evil, according to the rigorists). His answer is that the same charge might be brought against the god of healing.[6] Of actual miracles nothing is said; and

[1] See especially Ep. 35: *Ἀρετὴ καὶ χρήματα παρ' ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις ἐναντιώτατα, μειούμενον γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον αὔξει τὸ ἕτερον, αὐξανόμενον δὲ μειοῖ. πῶς οὖν δυνατὸν ἀμφότερα περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι; πλὴν εἰ μὴ τῷ τῶν ἀνοήτων λόγῳ, παρ' οἷς καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος ἀρετή.*

[2] Ep. 44.

[3] Ep. 11.

[4] Ep. 52. Among the things received from a Pythagorean teacher, Apollonius mentions, besides mathematical and medical science, *γνῶσιν θεῶν, οὐ δόξαν, εἴδησιν δαιμόνων, οὐχὶ πίστιν.*

[5] Ep. 68.

[6] Ep. 8: *τοῦτό που καὶ πρὸς τὸν Ἀσκληπιὸν κοινὸν τὸ ἔγκλημα.*

one who could utter the fine gnomic saying, "To lie is unfree (characteristic of the unfree), truth is noble (characteristic of a noble nature)," cannot well[1] have been a counterfeiter of miraculous powers. A piece of practical advice that may be regarded as a refinement upon this occurs in a letter to a sophist on literary composition: "Since the absolutely best mode of speech is hard to determine, speak in your own character rather than try to imitate what is best—or what you suppose to be best—if you have it not by nature."[2]

One letter obviously different in style from the others[3] is nevertheless interesting as bearing the mark of the period though not of the individual ideas of Apollonius. At the end there is an expression of Stoic pantheism, which, in the transitional phase of the time, was often presented in fusion or confusion with Platonism. Everything done or suffered in appearance by the individual is to be referred to the one first essence (*πρώτη οὐσία*)[4] as its cause, both active and passive. The teaching of Apollonius himself, so far as we can judge, though not without Stoic elements, laid stress rather on the transcendence of the supreme divinity. In the earlier part of the letter, what is supposed to be the Platonic or Pythagorean doctrine of immortality is asserted. Death and birth alike are only appearance. There is alternation between the visible and tangible of nature (*φύσεως*) and the invisible and intangible of essence (*οὐσίας*), but in reality nothing is created or destroyed. The process is conceived as taking place by condensation and rarefaction of matter; the former being the phenomenon of birth and growth, the latter of death. As may be seen, there is here no strictly defined immateriality of the soul, which is either identified with or very imperfectly discriminated from a fiery or ethereal influx such as the Stoics took to be the basis of life and thought. There seems to be nothing here specially characteristic of Apollonius; but it is clear that in the speculation of the time the Platonic metaphysic was in danger

[1] Ep. 83: *ψεύδεσθαι ἀνελεύθερον, ἀλήθεια γενναῖον.* This may have been a repudiation of the *γενναῖον ψεῦδος* permitted by Plato on occasion to his philosophic guardians of the State.

[2] Ep. 19.

[3] Ep. 58.

[4] *ἡ δὴ μόνη ποιεῖ τε καὶ πάσχει πᾶσι γινομένη πάντα διὰ πάντων θεὸ ἀΐδιος, ὀνόμασι καὶ προσώποις ἀφαιρουμένη τὸ ἴδιον ἀδικουμένη τε.*

of being swamped in a kind of eclectic animism. The metaphysical advance to a definitely formulated immaterialism as regards the soul itself had to wait for the Neo-Platonic development. Neo-Platonism was in some respects a return from a religious to a more scientific interest in Plato; whose critique of materialism had not hitherto been carried through so rigorously in point of expression that the idea of incorporeal mind and soul could not again be lost.

With this later development we are not at present concerned; and in the teaching of Apollonius himself, as presented by Philostratus, there is abundant interest on the side both of thought and of practice. For the phase to which he belongs, if unoriginal metaphysically, was in other ways marked by advances that proved the still enduring vitality of the ancient culture. It was not indeed by intrinsic decay that that culture disappeared, but by the invasion of alien forces. In the third century it still seemed possible to preserve with modifications the inherited type. The method which commended itself to the minds that were still in the ascendant was that of conservative reform. The imperial monarchy, which no one now dreamed of abolishing, was to be made the centre of institutions as republican as possible in spirit. The ancient religions were to be preserved in some form of union under the ethical direction of philosophy. Oriental cults, severely opposed in the second century, were in the third regarded with more favour if only their underlying community with those of Greece and Rome could be brought into view. The movement found its precursors, both political and religious, in philosphers of the first century; among whom, as we shall see, Philostratus makes it his special aim to assign the place of honour to Apollonius. In more than one respect the philosopher of Tyana was a hero better adapted to the needs of the time than men whose activity had been more characteristic of their own age. Speculative minds were now decisively turning away from Stoicism and seeking a more transcendental doctrine; and Apollonius had been a Pythagorean. The impracticable character of much of the Stoic resistance to monarchy during the first age of the empire was also recognised; and while no philosophy would have been listened to that did not repudiate the language of political absolutism, the need was felt of one which laid little stress on the external form of government. This need too was supplied by a Platonising Pythagoreanism which, while it had no more sympathy than

the other doctrines with Oriental kingship, assigned a high place among constitutions to a monarchy according to law. To us it is visible that the facts of the situation were making for a formal despotism, a monarchy by divine right, sanctioned by the theocratic Church, now rapidly growing under the surface of ancient life; but this at the time was seen or suspected by few. A still noble civilisation, lowered, as was confessed, in type though extended in range, but accompanied by many advances and possibilities of advance, both administrative and spiritual, seemed to thinking men worth preserving against disruptive forces whether from without or from within.

How far Philostratus was from insisting on the Oriental affinities of his hero may be seen at the opening of his first book, where he begins with an apology for them. Some, it appears, refused Apollonius a place among philosophers precisely on the ground that he was said to have put forward his doctrine and discipline as revelations from the gods. Philostratus therefore sets himself to show that, in spite of all that can be urged on that ground, he was a sane and philosophical cultivator of true wisdom as understood among the Greeks. Earlier philosophers also were believed to have been enlightened by divine revelations; and not only Pythagoras himself, but Democritus and Plato and others, had frequented Eastern and Egyptian sages and priests: yet they were not suspected of "magic." His "dæmonic sign" is not brought as an accusation against Socrates. Anaxagoras made meteorological predictions; and these are looked upon as instances of his wisdom. Why then should similar predictions of the future by Apollonius be ascribed to magical arts? Since, however, he is decried as a magician, and is not generally known in his true character, I have tried, says Philostratus, to bring together the facts from all accessible sources.

The memoirs of Damis, the disciple and companion of Apollonius, he proceeds to explain, were made known to the Empress Julia Domna (the wife of Septimius Severus) by a relation of Damis, and were committed by her to Philostratus, who was a member of her literary circle.[1] Damis, being an Assyrian by birth, was not a skilled writer;[2] but Philostratus has put into shape the materials supplied by him. These, we are to suppose, furnish the groundwork of the narrative.

[1] i. 3. [2] i. 19.

The story begins with some legends about the birth of Apollonius, agreeably and romantically told. Before his birth he was announced to his mother by "Proteus, the Egyptian god," as an incarnation of himself. "The country people say that he was a son of Zeus, but he calls himself the son of Apollonius."[1] At the age of fourteen he was taken by his father to be instructed by a distinguished rhetorician at Tarsus. Disliking the luxury of the city, he was permitted to migrate to the neighbouring Ægæ, where there was a temple of Asclepius. He gave attention to all the philosophies, but attached himself to that of Pythagoras. His Pythagorean teacher did not live according to the principles he taught; but Apollonius, while not ceasing to love his preceptor, aimed at practising the Pythagorean life in all its austerity. Beginning, as he said, like physicians, with discipline of the body, he gave up animal food, both as impure and as coarsening to the intellect. Wine also he gave up, not indeed as impure, but because it makes turbid the æther in the soul. He wore linen garments, rejecting those made from the skins or clothing of animals; went barefoot; let his hair grow long; and took up his abode in the temple. There, Philostratus relates, the god used to appear in person. Apollonius, with his approval, blames the offering beforehand of costly sacrifices, which seem to him to be in intention bribes; and bids the priest dismiss a wealthy suppliant, who is a wrongdoer, with his gifts. The gods, he observes, are most just, and will not consent to be bought off in this way. To another evil-minded suitor, he declines the office of mediator, telling him that the gods welcome the good without intermediaries.[2] When he had come of age, he returned to Tyana, having made the temple at Ægæ, says his biographer, a Lyceum and an Academy; for it resounded with all philosophy.

At home, he reformed a debauched elder brother; and when he received his patrimony, distributed most of it among his poor relations, reserving only a small portion for himself. Going beyond the famous precept of Pythagoras, that a man should be faithful to his wife, he resolved on a life of chaste celibacy, and kept his resolution even in youth. According to

[1] i. 6.

[2] i. 12 (1): "ξύστησόν με" ἔφη "τῷ θεῷ." ὁ δ' ὑπολαβὼν "καὶ τί σοι δεῖ τοῦ ξυστήσοντος," εἶπεν "εἰ χρηστὸς εἶ; τοὺς γὰρ σπουδαίους οἱ θεοὶ καὶ ἄνευ τῶν προξενούντων ἀσπάζονται.

the Pythagorean rule, he submitted to the probation of five years' silence. During this time, which he passed partly in Pamphylia and partly in Cilicia, he was able to calm factions about games by mere signs. This, says Philostratus, was not so difficult; for people who quarrel about dancers and horses are easily made ashamed of themselves. It was less easy to quell a tumult caused by a famine. This Apollonius did at Aspendus in Pamphylia, where the people were going to burn the prefect, though he had taken refuge by a statue of the Emperor. And at that time, which was in the reign of Tiberius, the Emperor's statues were more terrible and more inviolable than those of the Olympian Zeus. The prefect, on being questioned by signs, protested his innocence, and accused certain powerful citizens, who were refusing to sell corn and keeping it back to export at a profit. To them Apollonius addressed a note threatening expulsion from Earth, who is the mother of all, for she is just, but whom they, being unjust, have made the mother of themselves alone. In fear of this threat they yielded and filled the market-place with corn.

Having completed his probation, Apollonius visited the great Antioch. He found the people there not only wanting in mental culture, but luxurious and effeminate; and, to judge from the report of Philostratus, seems to have liked that "cradle of the Church" no better than Julian did afterwards. Philostratus here excuses himself for relating myths connected with the temple of Apollo Daphnæus. His purpose, he remarks, is not to mythologise,[1] but to explain how Apollonius came to utter the wish that the god would turn the "semi-barbarous and uncultivated" inhabitants, with their want of all seriousness, into trees, so that thus they might give forth some sound worth listening to. Visiting the temples, he sought to bring back the Hellenic rites to their primitive form: when the rites were alien, he tried to discover their original meaning and to get them corrected in accordance with it. His mode of exposition was not disputatious but magisterial, and this at least gave him some influence with the men of Antioch.[2]

From Antioch he set out with two attendants to visit the Brahmans of India, and, in the course of his journey, the Magi of Babylon and Susa. At Nineveh, Damis, a native of the

[1] i. 16 (2): *οὐχ ὑπὲρ μυθολογίας ταῦτα.*

[2] i. 17 (2): *καὶ ἐπέστρεφεν ἐς ἑαυτὸν ἀνθρώπους ἀμουσοτάτους.*

place, asks and obtains leave to become his companion. Among the Arabians, Apollonius acquires the knowledge they have of the speech of animals. Proceeding on his journey, he encounters a satrap of King Vardanes, the "Mede," who has lately recovered the empire, and whose officials are known as the King's "Eyes" and "Ears." Still, as in the days of Aristophanes, these Oriental titles seem adapted to produce an effect of the grotesque and to form part of the traditional picture of Western Asiatic despotism. We need not try to refer the whole account to the age of Apollonius, though chronologically the Parthian king Bardanes corresponds to the approximate date. The general representation is sufficiently conformable to the revival of the Persian monarchy under the Sassanidæ in the time of Philostratus himself, decked out with circumstances from the historical records of the ancient empire. The narrative is obviously written with a view to contrasting the simplicity and independence of the philosopher with the combination of despotism, luxury, and elaborate mechanical art that had distinguished the old civilisations of those regions. Nor is the conception, taken broadly, untrue. The difference of attitude here and in the description of the Indian journey which follows is notable. The Greeks by the time of Philostratus had accumulated some knowledge of India; and, vague as this must have been, it is evident that they had already detected the profoundly philosophical character of the Indian intellect. Thus we are told nothing of what Apollonius was able to learn from the Magi;[1] whereas in the account of his stay in India there is abundance of philosophical interchange of thought. A relatively high but unspeculative religion such as Zoroastrianism or Judaism seems never to have appealed to the Greek mind as did even merely general reports on the tenets of the Brahmans and afterwards of the Buddhists.

Among the decorations of the royal palace at Babylon, we are told, figures of Greek legend were to be seen, Orpheus appearing frequently. Perhaps it is his tiara and his Oriental dress that they are pleased with there: it is not the charm of his music and song. The capture of Athens was represented, and the Persian victory at Thermopylæ, "and things still more Medic, rivers diverted from their course, and the bridging of

[1] Questioned by Damis (i. 26), he says that they are *σοφοὶ μέν, ἀλλ' οὐ πάντα.*

the sea, and how Athos was cut through."[1] Apollonius refuses to do obeisance to the golden image of the King. The King, who knows him already by repute, is pleased to hear of his coming and sends for him. Being about to sacrifice a white horse to the Sun, he asks Apollonius to accompany him, but the Pythagorean philosopher replies: "You, O King, sacrifice in your own manner, and give me leave to sacrifice in mine." Then, having thrown frankincense on the flame, and uttered a prayer to the god, he departs, so as to have no share in an offering of blood.[2] When the King invites him to join in hunting the animals which the barbarians preserve in their parks or "paradises," he reminds him that he could not even be present at his sacrifices, and expresses disapproval of the pleasure taken in the hunting of wild animals kept for sport.[3] In accordance with the general spirit of the picture, he is represented as neither dazzled by the regal magnificence nor impressed by material marvels such as the tunnel under the Euphrates and the walls of Ecbatana. The King, when he takes leave, provides him with the means of continuing his journey to India; and Apollonius describes him to his companions as an excellent man and worthy of a better fate than to rule over barbarians.

Damis says that in crossing the Indian Caucasus he saw the fetters of Prometheus hanging from the rocks, though it was not easy to tell of what material they were composed. Apollonius frightened off a hobgoblin appearing by moonlight. Then, after these and other strange stories, there follows a remarkable disquisition on the inwardness of the Divine.[4] Apollonius questions Damis about the effect on his mind of ascending so high a mountain-range. Damis thinks that he ought to be wiser, passing over such a lofty and trackless spot: "For," said he, looking up at the summit, "you hear from our guide that the barbarians make it to be the house of the gods." Moreover, sages like Anaxagoras and Thales are said to have contemplated the heavens from just such elevations. "Yet," he confesses, "I, having ascended the loftiest height of all, shall go down no wiser than I was before." "Nor did they," replies Apollonius, "merely by such prospects, which display

[1] i. 25. [2] i. 31.

[3] i. 38: *καὶ ἄλλως οὐχ ἡδὺ θηρίοις βεβασανισμένοις καὶ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν τὴν ἑαυτῶν δεδουλωμένοις ἐπιτίθεσθαι.*

[4] ii. 5.

only bluer skies and larger stars and the sun rising from the night—sights visible also to shepherds and goatherds: but how the divinity cares for the human race, and how it delights in being served by it, and what is virtue and what justice and temperance, neither will Athos show those that climb it nor Olympus admired of the poets, unless the soul see through them, which, if it take hold of them pure and undefiled, darts farther than this Caucasus."

Indian nomads having furnished the wayfarers with palm-wine and honey, Damis thinks Apollonius can have no objection to tasting this wine, as it is not made from the grape. Apollonius proves to him that it is really wine, just as coins of bronze are no less money than coins of silver or gold. Moreover Bacchus, whose mountain of Nysa is close at hand, will not be angry with him for not drinking wine at all; but, if he refuses that which comes from the vine and yet drinks that which is made from dates, the god will be angry and think his gift disdained. And other wine, as well as that from grapes, intoxicates, as may be seen in the case of the Indians who drink it. This, however, has been said only to excuse himself, since he is bound by a vow. To his companions he does not wish to forbid wine, nor even flesh.[1]

They meet a boy riding on an elephant, and Damis wonders at his skill in managing such a huge beast. Apollonius by questioning brings out that the credit is due not so much to the boy's skill as to the self-restraint of the animal. Philostratus goes on himself to discuss the various accounts of the elephant, one of them by the Libyan King Juba. The general conclusion is that elephants are second only to man in practical sagacity.

King Vardanes has sent a letter to the satrap placed over the Indus, requesting him to conduct Apollonius on his way. He supplies him with the means of navigating the river, and gives him a letter to his own king. Here Philostratus takes occasion to compare the Indus with the Nile, expressing scepticism in both cases as to the snow which is said to lie upon the mountains and to augment the stream by melting.[2] At Taxila was the king's palace. The dress of the Indians is of linen and of "byssus," which comes from a plant.

Visiting the temple before the city-walls, the travellers find representations with metallic materials on brazen tablets.

[1] ii. 7. [2] ii. 18 (2).

These were comparable for expression to the works of the best Greek painters.[1] The defeat of Porus and the clemency of Alexander were among the subjects represented. In a dialogue on painting and imitative art generally,[2] Apollonius draws the attention of Damis to the shapes seen in the clouds, which appear to us like centaurs and other forms of living things, known and unknown. He educes the conclusion that while such shapes are casual so far as external nature is concerned, there is yet an imitative faculty manifested in our seeing them. This faculty is in us. For man is naturally imitative, even when he has not acquired the power of drawing with the hand; and it is this natural imitative faculty, spontaneously exercising itself, that makes us see such shapes. Nor can the faculty be absent in those who merely view pictures, at least if they are to take pleasure in them. To make possible the pleasure in artistic representations, there must be an active power of supplying something from ourselves. This is shown in the case of paintings in black and white. Draw correctly the features of an Indian in white, and he will appear to the fancy as dark; the colour being filled in from past experience. So likewise in viewing the picture by Timomachus of the madness of Ajax: he who is to regard it with admiration must bring to it some image of Ajax and some notion of the whole sequence of events of which his madness formed part. The figures on brass seen in the temple are to be classed, Apollonius proceeds, not under the head of mere metal-working (χαλκευτική), but as products of some art intermediate between that and painting in the special sense. It is an art, he concludes, most like that of Hephæstus in Homer's description of the shield of Achilles.

The king, whose name is Phraotes, invites Apollonius to stay for three days. Describing the construction of the city as viewed by the company, and in particular the temple of the Sun, Philostratus takes occasion to note the "symbolical manner" in which the statue of the god was fashioned,—a manner, he remarks, common to the sacred art of all the barbarians.[3] The Greek sage admired the modesty in the ordering of the palace as compared with the luxury of Babylon. In conversing with the king, Apollonius finds him to be a true philosopher. Phraotes, having dismissed the interpreter,

[1] ii. 20 (2). [2] ii. 22. [3] ii. 24.

requests Apollonius in Greek to let him join him at a banquet. On being asked why he puts his invitation in this form, he replies that it is because he regards wisdom as more kingly than his own rank.[1] At the banquet Apollonius asks him how he acquired Greek and came to be possessed of philosophy. The king smiling returns: "As the people of old times inquired of those who came to their coasts whether they were robbers, because that mode of life, though grievous, was common, so you Greeks seem to inquire of all who come in contact with you whether they are philosophers; so much do you think philosophy, though the divinest thing that can fall to the lot of men, to be the affair of every one. And indeed I hear that most of those who profess philosophy among you are in fact robbers; the reason being that, while you have laws to punish coiners of false money and such people, you have no law for trying those who claim to be philosophers and for excluding pretenders."[2]

He then proceeds to explain that in India there are few professional philosophers, and that these are carefully tested before they are allowed to enter upon the philosophic life. First their ancestors for three generations back must have done nothing disgraceful; this being ascertained from public records. In the next place the candidates, on offering themselves at the age of eighteen, are examined in respect both of their moral and intellectual fitness. The examiners[3] make use especially of the indications of physiognomy. For where philosophy is held in high honour, as in India, it is most necessary that those who profess it should be subjected to every kind of test. Next Phraotes relates how he himself came to receive a philosophical education. His grandfather was king before him; but his father, having been dispossessed during his minority, was sent for refuge to a foreign king. This king, who had a better realm than his own hereditary one, would have adopted him; but he preferred, as he said, not to contend with fortune, and obtained leave to devote himself to philosophy, so that he might bear his ills more easily. He afterwards married the king's daughter, and brought up his son Phraotes to follow the philosophic life. To this end, he taught

[1] ii. 27 (1): *τὸ γὰρ βασιλικώτερον σοφία ἔχει.*

[2] ii. 29.

[3] Described (ii. 30) as *σοφοί τε καὶ φυσικοὶ ἄνδρες.*

him Greek. The sages in consequence readily received him as a pupil at twelve, though this was earlier than the usual age; for they regard a knowledge of Greek as a preparation for training in philosophy.[1] Lastly, Phraotes relates how he came to be restored to his kingdom. Apollonius then asks him if the sages he has spoken of did not become subject to Alexander and appear before him to expound their physical philosophy. The King replies that Alexander indeed came in contact with some who profess wisdom of a kind, but who are really a race of warriors. The genuine philosophers of India are those who dwell between the Hyphasis and the Ganges, and to their country his expedition did not extend. Had he gone on, he could never have taken their tower, which, without preparation, they are able to defend by superhuman means.[2]

The next day at dawn the King comes to the chamber of Apollonius and rallies him on his water-drinking. Those who do not drink wine, he says, do not sleep well. Apollonius replying that they sleep more quietly than those who go to bed drunk, the King protests against the sophistry, and explains that his meaning was that those who drink wine in moderation sleep better than those who drink none at all. This leads to an argument in form. Apollonius contends that even moderate wine-drinkers, while not excited to hallucination, are yet liable to be affected by pleasing illusions, and that these too are troubling to the soul and sometimes prevent sleep. They that drink no wine at all remain always equable, neither elated by good fortune nor dejected by bad. Moreover, it is only to the soul untroubled with wine that true divinations come in dreams. Phraotes, having heard the argument, asks Apollonius if he will make him one of his company; but he puts the question by with the remark that it is good for kings to be conversant moderately with philosophy, but that a too exact and overstrained devotion to it would seem unbecoming and pedantic in their station.[3]

At the end of the visit, Phraotes sends Apollonius and his companions on their journey with new provisions and a letter to Iarchas, "the eldest of the sages." They arrive at the plain in which Porus is said to have fought with Alexander. Beyond the Hyphasis they come upon thirty altars inscribed by the

[1] ii 31. Here and later the question occurs, Is it possible that anything was known or conjectured as to the affinity between Greek and Sanskrit?

[2] ii. 33. [3] ii. 37.

Macedonian conqueror to his father Ammon, his brother Hercules, and the other gods. There is also a stele, they record, marking the place where the expedition stopped. This, Philostratus conjectures, was erected not by Alexander himself but by those beyond the Hyphasis, pluming themselves on his not having been able to go further.

The journey to the remoter regions is accompanied by more and more marvels, zoological and other, which however are related not without occasional touches of scepticism. At last we reach the Tower of the Sages; whom the Indians fear more than the King, because the King himself has to consult them about everything that is to be said or done.[1] A young man sent to meet Apollonius addresses him in Greek; at which the travellers are not surprised, since all in the neighbouring village speak Greek. He brings a message from the sages inviting—or rather commanding[2]—him to come. In the form of expression Apollonius recognises something Pythagorean.

Traces were still apparent of the rout of Bacchus, who with Hercules had once made an unsuccessful assault on the tower. The images of the gods were like the most ancient of those among the Greeks, and the rites observed were Hellenic. Apollonius himself, says Philostratus, has described the Brahmans. "They dwell upon the earth and not on it, and are fortified without walls, and possess nothing save the possessions of all men."[3] Out of this the biographer, on the authority of Damis, constructs an accouut of the Brahmans according to which they raise themselves in the air when they choose—not for the sake of vainglory, but to be nearer the Sun-god, to whom they pray—and are furnished with everything as a spontaneous gift of the earth. Perhaps the conjecture is permissible that we have here some real saying of Apollonius misapprehended by a disciple.

Iarchas addresses Apollonius in Greek, and gives proof that he has the minutest knowledge of his whole history. Going in choral procession to the temple, the Brahmans chanted an ode like the pæan of Sophocles which is sung at Athens to Asclepius. After the service of the gods, in which Apollonius

[1] iii. 10 (2).

[2] iii 12: *κελεύουσι γὰρ αὐτοί.*

[3] iii 15 (1): *εἶδον Ἰνδοὺς Βραχμᾶνας οἰκοῦντας ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῆς, καὶ ἀτειχίστως τετειχισμένους, καὶ οὐδὲν κεκτημένους ἢ τὰ πάντων.*

had taken part, he asks Iarchas if the Brahmans, knowing all things else, "know themselves." Iarchas instantly replies that it is in consequence of knowing first themselves that they know all things. "What then," asks Apollonius, "do you think yourselves to be?" "Gods" he answered; and, being asked why, "Because," he said, "we are good men." In answer to the question, what they think about the soul, he replied, "We hold the doctrine that Pythagoras handed down to you, and we to the Egyptians." Apollonius then asks whether, as Pythagoras declared himself to have been Euphorbus, Iarchas too can say that before he came into this body he was one of the Trojans or Achæans or some one else. Iarchas thereupon makes the observation that the Greeks are too much preoccupied with the Trojan war and its heroes, and neglect the greater number of more divine men whom their own land and the land of the Egyptians and that of the Indians bore. Then he says that he too will declare who he was. He proceeds to relate the history of an ancient Indian king named Ganges, who was the son of the River-god. In that he founded cities instead of destroying them, and drove back an invasion of the Scythians from beyond Caucasus instead of bringing the yoke of slavery upon another city,[1] this king was superior to Achilles. More of his deeds would Iarchas record if he did not shrink from praising himself. For he, at the age of four, revealed his identity by discovering seven swords embedded in the earth by King Ganges, and now sought for to fulfil a command of the gods. He then asks Apollonius if he also knows who he was formerly. Apollonius replies that he does, but that his position was an inglorious one. He was the steersman of an Egyptian ship. In that capacity, however, he once performed a just deed in refusing to betray his ship to Phœnician pirates. This leads to a question about the use of the word "justice," afterwards more fully discussed when Apollonius visits Egypt. Iarchas raises the problem by his criticism that the Greeks seem to think the absence of injustice equivalent to justice, whereas a positive conception is needed.[2]

During the visit of Apollonius to the dwelling of the sages, the King entered. He was not a philosopher like Phraotes, but

[1] iii. 20 (3): καὶ ταῦθ' ὑπὲρ γυναικός, ἣν εἰκὸς μηδ' ἄκουσαν ἁνηρπάσθαι.

[2] iii. 25.

came arrayed more in the fashion of the Medes, and full of pomp. While the sages themselves ate sparingly, abundance was provided for the King; though it is not lawful for him to partake of the flesh of animals in their presence. He approaches with profound respect the sages who keep their seats. For the repast, self-moving tripods come in, and there are automata to serve as cup-bearers. Apollonius asks Iarchas why he sees precisely eighteen Brahmans present, since eighteen is neither a "square number" nor any other of those that are in repute. Iarchas replies: "Neither are we slaves to number nor number to us."[1] Sometimes they are more, and sometimes fewer, according as there are more or fewer of sufficient wisdom and virtue to be chosen. Then he goes on to blame the Greek democratic mode of appointing to offices by lot, and the fixing of ruling bodies in the Greek cities at a particular number. The king interrupts the conversation by asking questions about the Greeks, of whom, however, he has a mean opinion; imagining, for example, that the Athenians had been enslaved by Xerxes. Apollonius corrects this impression. Xerxes, he maintains, was unfortunate in not having died as well as been defeated at the hands of the Greeks, who in that case would have instituted games in his honour, thinking as they do that it is a praise to themselves to praise those whom they have vanquished. The king explains that he had got his false opinion from the Egyptians, who abuse the Greeks as borrowers of everything from themselves, and as a race of lawless cheats. He invites Apollonius to be his guest, but the invitation is declined.

Iarchas and his associates, questioned by Apollonius as to their views on the constitution of the world, reply that they hold it to consist of elements (ἐκ στοιχείων). These are the four elements of water and air and earth and fire, together with ether as the fifth. No element came into being before the others, but all exist together as parts of the living whole. This is at once male and female, and is held in unison by love of itself. The parts of the world are governed by the mind that is in it. As bearing an analogy to this government of the fabric by mind, Iarchas describes a merchant-ship such as the Egyptians send to India. In the vessel of the world, the first place is to be assigned to God the begetter of this animated universe (θεῷ γενέτορι τοῦδε τοῦ ζῴου); the next to the gods who

[1] iii. 30 (2): οὔθ' ἡμεῖς ἀριθμῷ δουλεύομεν οὔτ' ἀριθμὸς ἡμῖν.

preside over the parts. Of such deities, following the poets, we may admit many, of sky and sea and springs and earth and under the earth. The place beneath the earth, however, since they sing of it as an abode of horror and destruction, does not, if it exists, belong properly to the world.[1]

As an illustration of the powers of the sages, some extraordinary cures are related. A woman comes and explains how her son is possessed by a dissembling and lying demon. One of the Brahmans gives her a formula of exorcism addressed to the demon.[2] A cripple, and a blind man, and a man with his hand paralysed are healed, and recipes are given to effect other cures.

According to his report, Damis was himself present at the dialectical discussions. The study of astrology and divination and sacrifices was pursued only by Apollonius with Iarchas. Philostratus mentions works of Apollonius on these subjects; but remarks that in his own opinion astrological prediction, with all such divination, is beyond the scope of human nature: whether anyone has attained to it he does not profess to know. The work of Apollonius on Sacrifices is in so many hands, and is so well and characteristically composed, that exposition of it is unnecessary.

Since Damis has given an account of a conversation on the strange animals and so forth of India, Philostratus, while declining to commit himself to the truth of the stories, will not wholly pass the subject by.[4] For the rest, the account of the Indian journey ends, as it begins, with enough of the marvellous. Philostratus was on the whole content to put into literary form the travellers' tales he knew; hinting sometimes to the less credulous his uncertainty as to what grains of truth might be found in the more extraordinary of them.

After a stay of four months, Apollonius leaves the Brahmans. A letter is given as from him in which he is made to say that he has received from them the power of going through the sky (διὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ πορεύεσθαι) and of conversing with them at a distance as if they were present.[5] He and his companions return to the region of the Indus, then put to sea, and sail up the Euphrates to Babylon. Returning to the Roman Empire, they

[1] iii. 34, 35. [2] iii. 38. [3] iii. 41 (2).

[4] iii. 45 (1): καὶ γὰρ κέρδος εἴη μήτε πιστεύειν μήτ' ἀπιστεῖν πᾶσιν.

[5] iii. 51.

go to Antioch; but, finding it as insolently indifferent as ever to Hellenic culture,[1] they put to sea again at Seleucia, and thence to Cyprus. From Cyprus they proceed to Ionia, where Apollonius is held in much honour.

When he came to Ephesus, we are told,[2] even the artisans left their work to follow him. He delivered a discourse to the Ephesians in favour of a voluntary community of goods; teaching by the example of a sparrow that came to call the others to join him in feasting on the corn spilt by a boy carrying a basket. He foresaw a threatening pestilence, but, as they did not heed his warnings, he went to the other parts of Ionia; continuing everywhere his reforming activity and his salutary discourses.[3]

A discourse at Smyrna is given[4] in which he exhorts the Smyrnæans to make themselves an object of pride even more than the beauty of their city. For although it is the fairest of all cities that are under the sun, and possesses the sea, and has the springs of the west wind, yet it is better for it to be crowned with men than with porticoes and paintings and greater abundance of gold. Buildings are seen only in that part of the earth where they are; but good men are seen everywhere and spoken of everywhere, and render the city they have sprung from as wide as the extent of land they penetrate. Cities that are fair externally are indeed like the Phidian image of Zeus at Olympia: but those that have men that reach every part of the world are like the Homeric Zeus, who is suggested to thought in various forms, and as moving through the heaven, and so is a more wonderful piece of work than the seated statue of ivory visible to the eye. Discussing politics with the Smyrnæans, he told them that a rightly ordered city has need of concord in variance.[5] That is to say, each must make it his ambition to be better than the rest in something. The ancient Spartans were wrong in their exclusive devotion to military affairs. Each ought to do what he knows best and can do best. If one gains distinction by becoming a popular

[1] iii. 58: *τῆς Ἀντιοχείας ξυνήθως ὑβριζούσης καὶ μηδὲν τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἐσπουδακυίας.*

[2] iv. 1.

[3] iv. 4: *διορθούμενος τὰ παρ' ἑκάστοις καὶ διαλεγόμενος ἀεί τι σωτήριον τοῖς παροῦσιν.*

[4] iv. 7. [5] iv. 8 (1): *ὁμονοίας στασιαζούσης.*

leader, another by wisdom, another by amassing wealth for the common good, and so forth, then the whole city will stand firm. This he illustrates by the example of a ship with its division of employment.

The plague having actually fallen upon Ephesus, the Ephesians sent an embassy to Apollonius. He was there on the instant—as Pythagoras was at Thurium and Metapontum at the same time—and stayed the plague by destroying a demon in the guise of an old beggar-man, revealed afterwards as a monstrous beast.[1] He decided on a voyage to Greece, but first visited the tomb of Achilles in the Troad. When they were afterwards sailing the Euboic Sea, Damis questioned him about his visit, and Apollonius recounted his conversation with the shade of the hero, which disappeared with a glimmer at cockcrow.[2] Arriving at the Piræus at the time of the Eleusinian mysteries, he was joined on his way to Athens by ten young men who were about to set sail to Ionia to see him. He offers himself for initiation in the mysteries; but the hierophant raises objection to him as an enchanter and as "not pure in respect of divine things." Made aware of the popular disapproval, he changes his tone; but Apollonius now declines initiation till another time; mentioning the name of the successor to the office, who, as he foresees, will initiate him. At Athens, in deference to the devotional spirit of the place, he first discoursed about sacrifices, thus refuting the calumnious and ignorant assertion of the hierophant.[3] A youth who interrupts a discourse of his with inane laughter he finds to be under demoniacal possession. The demon, being commanded to go out of him and to give a sign of his departure, says that he will throw down a statue on his way. This he does to the astonishment of the audience. The youth afterwards followed the philosophic mode of life.[4] Hearing of the frivolities with which the Athenians were now accustomed to celebrate the Dionysia, Apollonius rebuked them by reminding them of the exploits of their ancestors and of

[1] iv. 10.

[2] iv. 16 (6): *ἀπῆλθε ξὺν ἀστραπῇ μετρίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἀλεκτρυόνες ἤδη ᾠδῆς ἤπτοντο.*

[3] iv. 19: *τίς γὰρ ἔτ' ὠήθη τὰ δαιμόμια μὴ καθαρὸν εἶναι τὸν φιλοσοφοῦντα, ὅπως οἱ θεοὶ θεραπευτέοι ;*

[4] iv. 20.

their legendary connexion with Boreas, the most masculine of the winds. Another abuse which he arrested at Athens was the introduction of gladiatorial exhibitions,—which were going on, Philostratus tells us, at Corinth in his own day.

In a journey to Thessaly, Apollonius visited the tomb of Leonidas, which he all but embraced.[1] When his companions were disputing which was the highest mountain in Greece, he ascended the height where the Spartans had been overwhelmed by the Persian arrows, and said that those who died there for liberty had equalled it to Œta and raised it above many an Olympus. In the account of his residence at Corinth we come upon the original of the story of Keats's *Lamia*.[2] This occurrence, says Philostratus, was already well known, but only in general outline, and as having taken place in central Greece. He has given the details for the first time from the record of Damis. At Olympia, receiving an invitation to Sparta from a Lacedæmonian embassy which he observed to be full of luxury, Apollonius wrote to the ephors on the subject and brought about a restoration of the ancient manners. A conceited youth submitted to him a long panegyric on Zeus. The philosopher asked him if he had ever written in praise of his own father. He replied that he should have liked to do so, but found that he could not do it adequately. "Then," replied Apollonius, irritated as he was apt to be by vulgar pretence,[3] "If you do not think you can fitly praise your father whom you know, do you not see that, in undertaking to praise the father of gods and men and the fashioner of all that is around us and above us, you have entered upon a task beyond human powers?"

One incident of his visit to Sparta may be quoted for the light it throws on his general attitude as a reformer. A young man who was a descendant of Callicratidas, the Spartan admiral at Arginusæ, had an action brought against him because he had adopted a sea-faring life for gain, and because he took no part in public affairs. Apollonius succeeded in convincing him that in this he was derogating both from his ancestral traditions and from those of Sparta. He accordingly gave up his mercantile pursuits, and at the intercession of

[1] iv. 23 : *μονονοὺ περιέβαλεν.* [2] iv. 25.

[3] iv. 30 (3) : *δυσχεράνας οὖν ὁ Ἀπολλώνιος (τουτὶ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς φορτικοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔπασχεν).*

Apollonius was acquitted by the ephors. Superficially this may seem inconsistent with the discourse at Smyrna, but in reality it is part of the same general ideal. In that ideal, local diversity is included. Thus at Athens, as we shall afterwards find, Apollonius will allow no disrespect towards the sea-faring tradition; whereas here he reminds the descendant of Callicratidas that the Spartans lost their military power when they took to the sea.[1]

The humanitarian tendency which the reforming movement combined with its regard for antique ideals becomes evident when we are told expressly that Apollonius treated the slaves of his companions as a part of his philosophic community.[2] Passing over some intermediate incidents, we may follow him westward to Rome, where at this time Nero was persecuting philosophy.

The philosophic cloak, says Philostratus, was proceeded against in the law-courts as a disguise of diviners. Not to mention other cases, Musonius, a man second only to Apollonius, was imprisoned on account of his philosophy and came near losing his life. Before Apollonius and his company reach the gates, a certain Philolaus of Citium tries to deter them from proceeding. To Apollonius this seems a divinely-ordained test to separate the stronger disciples from the weaker (whom, however, he does not blame); and, in fact, out of thirty-four, only eight remain with him, the rest making various excuses for their flight at once from Nero and from philosophy. Of those who remained was the young man whom he had rescued from the transformed serpent.

He stigmatises the reigning tyranny as one so grievous that under it men are not permitted to be wise.[3] His discourses being all public, no accusations were made against him for a time. He did not seek out men of position, but welcomed them if they came, and discoursed to them exactly as to the common people.[4] At Corinth a Cynic philosopher named Demetrius had attached himself to him as Antisthenes did to

[1] iv. 32. Cf. v. 20.

[2] iv. 34 (2): *κοινὸν δ' ἐκάλει τοὺς θ' ἑταίρους καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἑταίρων δούλους· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκείνους παρεώρα.*

[3] iv. 38. (2): *τυραννίδος . . . . καθεστηκυίας οὕτω χαλεπῆς, ὡς μὴ ἐξεῖναι σοφοῖς εἶναι.*

[4] iv. 41.

Socrates. This man now came to Rome and brought suspicion on him of responsibility for the violent attacks he himself proceeded to make on Nero. A public protest against luxury delivered on a feast-day in a gymnasium which the Emperor was opening in person led to his expulsion from Rome by Nero's minister Tigellinus, who henceforth kept a close watch on Apollonius. His opportunity came at last when there was an epidemic of colds and the temples were full of people making supplication for the Emperor because he had a sore throat and the "divine voice" was hoarse. Apollonius, bursting with indignation though he was at the folly of the multitude, did not chide anyone, but tried to calm a disciple by telling him to "pardon the gods, if they delight in buffoons." This saying being reported to Tigellinus, he had him arrested under the *Lex majestatis*. On bringing him to trial, however, he found himself baffled, and in fear of his superhuman powers, let him go.[1]

An incident at Rome is recorded that was thought to be an illustration of those powers. A maiden who was about to be married had died or appeared to have died, and was being carried to the grave amid the lamentations of all Rome; for she was of a consular family. Apollonius, meeting the funeral procession, commanded them to set down the bier, and, saying something inaudible, restored the maiden to life; who then, like Alcestis brought back by Hercules, returned to her father's house. Whether he detected a spark of vitality that had escaped the notice of the physicians, or renewed the life that was extinct, Philostratus acknowledges to be beyond his own judgment, as it was beyond the judgment of those who were present.[2]

The next voyage of Apollonius was to the region of the Bætis in Spain. Philostratus here tells some anecdotes to illustrate the greater or less civilisation of the surrounding country. When a courier came to Gades to announce the triple victory of Nero at Olympia, the people there understood what was meant; but those of the neighbouring cities, who knew nothing about the Greek games, got the notion that the Emperor had been victorious in war and had taken captive certain "Olympians."[3] A tragic actor came to Hispalis.

[1] iv. 44 (4): "χώρει," ἔφη "οἱ βούλει· σὺ γὰρ κρείττων ἢ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἄρχεσθαι."

[2] iv. 45. [3] v. 8.

Where the people retained less of the antique barbarism in their manners, they were pleased with tragedy as a new thing; but here the mask, and the lofty elevation of the actor, and the portentous robes, and the resonant voice, terrified them till they fled as from a demon.[1] Apollonius was sought out by the prefect of the province. The subject of their conversations is unknown; but Damis conjectures that they plotted against Nero; for, when the prefect took his leave, the last words of Apollonius were, "Farewell, and remember Vindex." Philostratus reminds the reader that it was Vindex who first stirred up the peoples of the West against the Emperor when he was making his progress through Achaia; and mentions that he addressed to his soldiers an oration such as one inspired by the noblest philosophy might breathe forth against a tyrant.[2]

Apollonius and his companions proceed by way of Africa to Sicily. Hearing of the flight of Nero and the death of Vindex, Apollonius in an oracular utterance predicts the brevity of the reigns of the next three emperors (Galba, Otho, and Vitellius). Such predictions Apollonius made, his biographer insists, not as an enchanter, but so moved by a divine impulsion as to know what the fates had in store. Enchanters or magicians (*οἱ γόητες*), "whom," says Philostratus, "I regard as the most wretched of men," proclaim that by juggling artifice and by barbarian sacrifices they can change the purpose of the fates; and many of them, when judicially accused, have confessed that this is the nature of their wisdom. Apollonius, on the other hand, followed the decrees of the fates, and foretold what would come to pass of necessity. So far was he from all juggling that when he saw the automata in India he praised the ingenuity of the contrivances but did not care to learn the details of their mechanism.[3]

At Catana, the story is told that Typho is bound there, and that from him arises the fire of Ætna. Apollonius takes this occasion to lead his disciples to a more "physical" view of volcanic eruptions. He begins with a paradox on the fables of Æsop; that they are to be preferred to those of the poets, in

[1] v. 9.

[2] v. 10 (2): *λόγον. . . . ὃν ἐκ πάνυ γενναίας φιλοσοφίας ἐπὶ τύραννον ἄν τις πνεύσειεν.*

[3] v. 12.

respect of wisdom, precisely because they are not told with such colouring as to give the impression that they are literally true. The didactic purpose in them is thus made obvious; whereas the poets leave it to the intelligence of their readers to discover the truth. He himself relates a story about Æsop and Hermes, told to him as a child by his mother; the point of the story being that the god had suggested to Æsop a line of invention that was at least his own, if it was humble. As for the myth about the contention of giants with gods for the possession of heaven, this is madness to say or to think.[1] The cause of these outbursts of flame from volcanoes is in reality a mixture of bitumen and sulphur blown upon by subterranean winds in the crevices of the earth.

Revisiting Athens, Apollonius is initiated into the mysteries, as he had foreseen. The winter he spends in visiting the Greek temples. He projects a voyage to Egypt in the spring, and, going down to the Piræus, finds a ship. The owner refuses to let him go on board, because, as he is conveying a cargo of images of the gods, he is afraid to admit sea-faring company, which is usually bad. Apollonius reminds him—since he appears to be an Athenian—that the gods themselves when they went on board the ships and took part with Athens against the barbarians, had no fear of contamination from disorderly sailors. He also censures the traffic in images.[2]

At Rhodes he tells a newly-rich and uneducated youth who is building a fine house and collecting paintings and statues for it that he does not seem to possess the house, but the house to possess him.[3] Coming to Alexandria, he is treated with great reverence. Here an example was seen of his marvellous powers. Twelve men condemned for robbery were being led to execution. He perceived that one of them was innocent, and told the executioners to place this man last; meanwhile prolonging his speech so as to gain time, contrary to his custom of brief utterance. When eight had been decapitated, a horseman rode up with a reprieve for the prisoner on whose behalf Apollonius had interceded; his innocence having since been established.[4]

We are told of a dispute in the temple with an Egyptian priest regarding animal sacrifices, and of a discourse reproving the Alexandrians for the sanguinary quarrels that arose from their devotion to the contests of the hippodrome. At this

[1] v. 16. [2] v. 20. [3] v. 22 (2). [4] v. 24.

point of the narrative, Vespasian arrives in Alexandria from Judæa, aiming now at the Empire. The philosophers Dion and Euphrates bid the people rejoice. For, says Philostratus, the last fifty years had been a period of tyrannies so harsh that even the reign of Claudius, though he was better than the emperors before and after, had seemed to give no respite.[1] Apollonius was equally glad, but did not care to obtrude himself. Vespasian, however, sought him out, and first set forth to him alone his reasons for seeking the empire; though he had commended to him his fellow-philosophers also as advisers. Apollonius heartily approves of his purpose; and, to his astonishment, tells him that he is destined to rebuild the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus at Rome. He did not yet know that the temple had been burned down; but it was afterwards found that this was the case, and that the conflagration had been manifested to Apollonius sooner than if it had taken place in Egypt.[2]

The day after the private interview with Apollonius, the other philosophers are called in. Vespasian formally explains the motives of his action; describing the tyranny to which the Roman world has been subject from the reign of Tiberius, and pointing out that if Vitellius is allowed to rule, Nero will have come to life again. "You have learned how not to govern," said Apollonius, "from those who governed badly: let us now consider how a good ruler ought to act."[3] Euphrates, however, who has become jealous of the special attention paid to Apollonius, makes a long speech in Stoic phraseology: first remarking that it is premature to consider how one is to proceed in a certain course of action before it has been decided whether that is the right course. In the end he approves of the resolution of Vespasian to march against Vitellius, but advises that, if he is victorious, he should restore to the Romans the democratic form of government under which they were most prosperous, and gain for himself the glory of having begun an era of freedom. Dion partly

[1] v. 27. Tacitus also dated the beginning of improvement from the reign of Vespasian, to whose personal example he ascribes some influence in the return from excessive luxury to a simpler mode of living: "Nisi forte rebus cunctis inest quidam velut orbis, ut quem ad modum temporum vices, ita morum vertantur; nec omnia apud priores meliora, sed nostra quoque aetas multa laudis et artium imitanda posteris tulit." (*Ann.* iii. 55.)

[2] v. 30.

[3] v. 32 (3).

agrees and partly disagrees with the advice of Euphrates. He agrees in particular that Vespasian would have done better to let the Jews separate if they chose; political separation being appropriate to the singularity of their manners. Instead of spending his force in bringing them to subjection, and thus doing all that was in his power to preserve the empire for Nero, he ought to have straightway attacked him. At the same time he approves of the enterprise against Vitellius. A democracy, if inferior to an aristocracy (of Platonic type), is to be preferred to tyrannies and oligarchies: but he fears lest the Roman people, tamed as they now are by a series of tyrannies, should find the transition to liberty as unbearable as that from darkness to sudden light. Let Vespasian, however, put the question to the vote, and if the people choose democracy, grant it. In that case he will win fame universal and unparalleled. If, on the other hand, they choose monarchy, who should be Emperor but himself? Apollonius demonstrates at length the impracticability of all this. To him personally the form of political government is indifferent, since he lives under the gods; but he does not think that the human flock ought to be left to perish for want of a just and prudent pastor. As one man pre-eminent in virtue, when he becomes ruler in a democracy, makes that polity seem identical with the form of government in which the one best man rules; so the government of one, when it keeps steadily in view the good of the commonwealth, is in effect a democracy.[1] At Vespasian's request Apollonius, premising that the art of government is not a thing that can be taught, goes on to lay down some general maxims for the exercise of kingly power. The king is himself to be ruled by the law. Vespasian personally is advised not to let his sons take for granted that the empire will fall to them as his heirs, but to teach them to regard it as the prize of virtue. He is not to go too fast in repressing the pleasures to which the people have become accustomed; they must be brought to temperance by degrees. Governors of provinces should know the language of the provinces they are sent to govern. The disadvantage of not observing this rule he illustrates from the failure in the administration of justice when he was in the Peloponnese; the Roman governor, who did not know Greek, being at the mercy of those who had an interest in deceiving

[1] v. 35 (4).

him. Euphrates allows that further discussion would be idle, since the course to be taken has already been resolved on; but, with an allusion glancing at Apollonius, gives the future emperor the parting advice to embrace the philosophy that is according to nature, and to have nothing to do with that which professes itself inspired by the gods, liable as such claims are to be the source of deception.[1] Vespasian perceives his animus: and, when Euphrates afterwards hands him an epistle full of requests of presents for himself and his friends, he reads it aloud; thus giving Apollonius the opportunity of retorting on Euphrates by contrasting his readiness to ask for gifts from the emperor with his counsel to establish a democracy.

This, Philostratus tells us, is what he has been able to learn about the origin of the difference between the two philosophers. With Dion, Apollonius was always on good terms, though he thought Dion's philosophy too rhetorical. Euphrates, according to the story, was afterwards in favour under Domitian. When Vespasian as emperor revoked the liberty granted by Nero to Greece, Apollonius did not care to see him again; though he approved of his good administration generally. In connexion with the story of the philosopher at Alexandria, a strange tale is recounted of his detecting the soul of King Amasis in a tame lion.[2] He left Alexandria on a journey to Æthiopia, accompanied by ten disciples out of the number that had again gathered round him since the dispersal under the persecution of Nero.[3]

On the borderland between Egypt and Æthiopia a primitive system of barter was practised. This Apollonius praised for its moral superiority over the habits of commercial bargaining among the Greeks.[4] An Egyptian youth named Timasio, who had overcome a temptation similar to that of Hippolytus, guided the company to the celebrated statue of Memnon. Apollonius praises him for his continence, and regards him as of more merit than Hippolytus because, while living chastely, he nevertheless does not speak or think of the divinity of Aphrodite otherwise than with respect.[5] He and his com-

[1] v. 37 (1); *φιλοσοφίαν δέ, ὦ βασιλεῦ, τουτὶ γὰρ λοιπὸν προσειρήσεται, τὴν μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαίνου καὶ ἀσπάζου, τὴν δὲ θεοκλυτεῖν φάσκουσαν παραιτοῦ· καταψευδόμενοι γὰρ τοῦ θείου πολλὰ καὶ ἀνόητα ἡμᾶς ἐπαίρουσιν.*

[2] v. 41. [3] Cf. iv. 37. [4] vi. 2. [5] vi. 4.

panions, still guided by Timasio, arrive among the Gymnosophists, whom they have set out to visit. In consequence of a trick of Euphrates, who has sent his disciple, Thrasybulus of Naucratis, to prepossess them against Apollonius, they put off receiving him for some time. At length, after negotiations through Damis, who detects the trick, they consent to receive him, though still resenting his reported preference of the Indian wisdom to their own.

The eldest and chief of them, who is called Thespesio, delivers a long address, in which he seeks to place the aims of himself and his associates above those of the Indians; advising Apollonius to have no care about automata or wonder-working, but to choose rather the wisdom that goes with toil and simplicity of life. In his peroration, he reminds him of the pictures he must have seen of the Hercules of Prodicus. As in the Choice of Hercules Vice stands on one side luxuriously adorned, and Virtue poorly clad on the other, so let Apollonius think of himself as placed between the alluring wisdom of the Indians and the rugged discipline of the Egyptian Gymnosophists. Apollonius explains that he has not come thus late to make his choice between two philosophies. Surrounded as he was in his youth by the teaching of all the schools, he of his own accord adopted the Pythagorean discipline, in spite of the austerity which from the first it did not conceal[1]. Among the rewards it promises to its votaries is to appear more pleasing to the gods though sacrificing little than do those who pour forth to them the blood of bulls. The doctrine of Plato regarding the soul, divinely taught by him at Athens, Apollonius perceived not to have won general acceptance among the Athenians. He therefore sought out a city or nation in which one person should not say one thing and another the opposite, but the same doctrine should be confessed by all. First, accordingly, he looked to the Egyptians; but his teacher told him that the original fathers of this wisdom were the Indians. For the rest, he addresses to the Gymnosophists an apology on behalf of the arts and graces of life and the adornment of temples; pointing out that Apollo does not disdain to clothe his oracles in verse, and that self-

[1] Special stress is laid on the virtue of chastity. The Pythagorean philosophy is represented as addressing the neophyte: *κἂν ἀφροδισίων ἡττηθέντας αἴσθωμαι, βάραθρά ἐστί μοι, καθ' ὧν σοφίας ὀπαδὸς δίκη φέρει τ' αὐτοὺς καὶ ὠθεῖ.* See vi. 11 (5).

moving tripods are introduced by Homer at the banquets of the gods. Nor has any accusation yet been laid in heaven against Hephæstus for corrupting matter by his art. Every art will have a care for ornament; because the very being of arts was invented for the sake of ornament.[1]

The speech of Apollonius made a powerful impression on all, and especially on Nilus, the youngest of the Egyptians. Thespesio, though black, might be seen to blush. This, of course, is a reminiscence of Thrasymachus in the *Republic*, as it is likewise when we are told that he becomes reconciled with Apollonius. Requested by Nilus and Thespesio, Apollonius recounts his adventures. He and his companions are courteously entertained by Nilus at a repast. Nilus desires to become his companion; and, to show that this is no rash impulse on his part, relates his history. His father had sailed to the Indian coast, and had told him what he had heard about the sages in India. Informed by him also that the Gymnosophists were a colony from thence, he gave up his patrimony and joined them. He found them wise indeed, but not like the Indians; and had he not met with Apollonius, he would himself have sailed to India like his father. The eager and ingenuous Nilus also proposes that he shall try to persuade his elders of the inferiority of their wisdom: but this Apollonius discountenances; receiving him on condition that he will not make an attempt which would be of no avail.

Apollonius pays a visit to Thespesio, and asks him to instruct him in the Egyptian wisdom, so that he may communicate it to others, as he has communicated that which he received from the Indians. Thespesio signifies his readiness to answer questions. Apollonius begins by asking why the Egyptians represent the gods for the most part so absurdly; their sacred images being apparently made in honour of irrational animals rather than of divine beings. Thespesio parries this attack on zoomorphism by a similar question about the anthropomorphism of the Greeks. Did your Phidias and your Praxiteles ascend into heaven and copy the forms of the gods? And if it was not imitation that produced their art, what then could it be? An artist of more wisdom, answers Apollonius, namely, Imagination.[2] He who conceives the

[1] vi. 11 (17); *κόσμου γὰρ ἐπιμελήσεται τέχνη πᾶσα, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι τέχνας ὑπὲρ κόσμου εὕρηται.*

[2] vi. 19 (3): *φαντασία ταῦτ' εἰργάσατο, σοφωτέρα μιμήσεως δημιουργός.*

form of Zeus must see him in his mind's eye accompanied by the heaven and the seasons and the stars: the fashioner of a statue of Athena must think of armies, and of wisdom in counsel, and of the arts, and of how she sprang from the head of Zeus. Thespesio, on his part, contends that the Egyptians display more reverence to the gods in not audaciously trying to realise some conception of their forms, but using only symbol and suggestion. Apollonius replies that there is nothing to call forth reverence in the image of a dog or an ibis or a goat. If, as Thespesio says, that is regarded with more reverence which is only suggested to the mind, then the Egyptians should have had temples and rites indeed, but no images at all; leaving the mental representation entirely to the worshipper. "But you," he says in concluding, "have taken away from the gods both visible beauty and the beauty of suggestion."[1] "There was a certain Athenian named Socrates," is the retort of Thespesio, "an old man of no intelligence like ourselves, who used to swear by the dog and by the goose and by the plane-tree." "Not that he thought them gods," returns Apollonius, "but so that he might not swear by the gods."

Thespesio, as if changing the subject, inquires about the scourging of boys at Sparta. Do the Greeks endure such a custom? And did Apollonius not reform it when he was occupying himself with the affairs of the Lacedæmonians? Apollonius replies that it would have been madness to contend against a religious custom such as this. The scourging is performed in accordance with an oracle directing that the altars shall be sprinkled with an offering of human blood to the Scythian Artemis. This no doubt was originally a requirement of human sacrifice; but the Spartans, by subtly interpreting it, have at once evaded the obligation of putting a human victim to death and turned a rite which they could not get rid of into an exercise in fortitude. Thespesio, however, skillfully presses the point; ending with the remark that he has been speaking not against the Lacedæmonians but against Apollonius. If we thus rigorously investigate customary rites the origin of which reaches back to a grey antiquity beyond knowledge, and cross-examine divinities as to their reasons for delighting in them, not the Eleusinian nor the Samothracian

[1] vi. 19 (5): *ὑμεῖς δ' ἀφῄρησθε τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶσθαι καλῶς καὶ τὸ ὑπονοεῖσθαι.*

nor any other mysteries will be safe. We can always ask "Why this and not that?" and take offence at one thing or another. In these matters at any rate, if not in all, the Pythagorean silence is good. Apollonius accordingly, relinquishing further argument on behalf of the Spartans, consents to go on to another topic, and proposes that they shall discuss the nature of justice.[1]

Such a subject of discourse, Thespesio agrees, is suitable both for professional philosophers and for others. Apollonius then recalls the comment of the Indian sages on his notion that when, being in a former body, he had refused to betray his ship to pirates, he had performed an act of justice. They laughed at this use of the word, holding that justice involves something more than the absence of injustice. Rightly, answers Thespesio, for no virtue consists in a mere negation. And we must not expect to find men publicly rewarded for practising justice. In the cases of Socrates and of Aristides we rather find the opposite. No doubt it will seem absurd: but as a matter of fact Justice, being appointed by Zeus and the Destinies to prevent men from injuring one another, takes no measures to prevent herself from being injured. Imagine, however, that when Aristides returned from his apportionment of tribute among the allies of Athens, the proposal had been made by two orators to confer the crown upon him for his justice; and that one had assigned as the reason his returning no richer than he went, and the other his observance of due proportion to the capacity of each allied State, and his refraining from all excessive demands: would not Aristides himself have protested against the first orator for the inadequacy of his reason, and recognised that the second was aiming at the true mark? And indeed, in maintaining due proportion, he had regard to the advantage both of Athens and of the islands; as was seen afterwards when the Athenians, by imposing heavier burdens, brought about the revolt of their tributaries and the loss of their empire. He, then, is just who both acts justly himself and so orders things that others shall not act unjustly. And from this diffusive virtue—which is better than oaths taken on sacrifices[2]—will spring both other

[1] vi. 20.

[2] vi. 21 (7): *δικάσει μὲν γὰρ τοιόσδε πολλῷ δικαιότερον ἢ οἱ κατὰ τῶν τομίων ὀμνύντες.*

virtues and in particular those of the judge and of the legislator, which come peculiarly within the province of justice.[1]

To this account of the just man Apollonius assents. After some further discourse, he informs Thespesio of his intention to go in quest of the sources of the Nile. In the account of so remote a journey the geography and zoology as usual become mixed with the marvellous, though they are not wholly fictitious. We are told of the Androphagi and the Pygmies, who are of Æthiopian race, and extend as far as to the Æthiopic Sea, into which no one voluntarily sails. We also hear of cataracts haunted by dæmons; and there is a curious story about the taming of a satyr in one of the villages by Apollonius.

On his return, he signified his approval of the conduct of Titus after he had taken Jeruselem, in refusing to accept a crown from neighbouring nations.[2] Titus, now associated with his father in the government, invited him to Argos, and consulted him as to his future behaviour as a ruler. Apollonius says that he will send him his companion Demetrius the Cynic as a free-spoken counsellor; and Titus, though the name of the Cynic is at first disagreeable to him, assents with a good grace.[3] He is also said to have consulted Apollonius in private on his destiny.

Apollonius, says Philostratus at this point, made many more journeys, but only to countries he already knew. He remained always like himself; and this is for the sage even more difficult than to know himself. Before proceeding to the account of his acts and sufferings under Domitian, the biographer brings together a few miscellaneous anecdotes. One of these throws interesting light on popular beliefs in the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire. The cities on the left of the Hellespont, it is recorded,[4] being once troubled with earthquakes, certain Egyptians and Chaldæans were collecting money for a sacrifice, estimated at the price of ten talents, to Earth and Poseidon,

[1] It is noteworthy that the place here assigned to justice as a positive virtue coincides with that which it occupies in Dante's description of the spirits in the heaven of Jupiter, who are those of men that bore rule on earth.

[2] vi. 29: *μὴ γὰρ αὐτὸς ταῦτ' εἰργάσθαι, θεῷ δ' ὀργὴν φήναντι ἐπιδεδωκέναι τὰς ἑαυτοῦ χεῖρας.*

[3] vi. 31.

[4] vi. 41.

and declared that they would not perform the sacrifice till the money was paid down. Apollonius drove them away for their greed, and by due rites quieted the earth.

Since those who adopt the philosophic life are best proved by their attitude to tyrannies, the behaviour of Apollonius in face of Domitian has now to be compared with that of elder philosophers when confronted with tyrannies in their time. Philostratus proceeds to make the comparison in set form; maintaining the thesis that Apollonius showed his superiority to all others, high-minded as they had undoubtedly proved themselves. It is not his purpose to depreciate the rest, but it is his duty to show the greatness of his hero.[1]

Some of the sayings of Apollonius against the Emperor having been recorded, we are told that he fell under suspicion through his correspondence with Nerva and his associates Orfitus and Rufus. When proceedings against them were begun, he addressed to the statue of Domitian the words: "Fool, how little you know of the Fates and Necessity! He who is destined to reign after you, should you kill him, will come to life again."[2] This was brought to Domitian's ears by means of Euphrates. Foreknowing that the Emperor had decided on his arrest, Apollonius anticipated the summons by setting out with Damis for Italy. They arrive at Puteoli, and there fall in with Demetrius, who leads them to the seat of "the ancient Cicero," where they can converse privately. Demetrius tells Apollonius that he is to be accused of sacrificing a boy to get divinations for the conspirators; and that further charges against him are his dress and his manner of life and the worship that is said to be paid to him by certain people. He then tries to dissuade him from staying to brave the anger of a tyrant who will be unmoved by the most just defence, and who is undistracted by that devotion to the Muses which, when Nero was singing and playing on the lyre, gave the world some relief. Damis, who till now has been unaware of the purpose of his master in coming, seconds the argument of Demetrius. Apollonius holds this timorous counsel excusable on the part of Damis, who is an Assyrian and has lived in the neighbourhood of the Medes, where tyrannies are adored; but as for Demetrius, he does not know how he will make his apology to philosophy. He himself intends to remain; and in justification

[1] vii. 1, 2. [2] vii. 9 (1).

he sets forth the arguments that this is the only course worthy of his character. Of despotisms he allows that that is the most dangerous kind which, like the tyranny of Domitian, proceeds under forms of law. All the more, however, is he bound to appear and answer the charge against him: to flee from a legal trial would have the appearance of self-condemnation. And whither shall he flee? It must be beyond the limits of the Roman Empire. Shall he then seek refuge with men who know him already; to whom he will have to acknowledge that he has left his friends to be destroyed by an accusation which he has not dared to face himself? Perhaps Demetrius will tell him to go among those who do not know him. But here too, as he makes impressively clear, starting from the use of the word by Euripides in the *Orestes*, the power called conscience (σύνεσις) will follow him, and will allow him no peace whether awake or asleep.[1] At the end of this address, Damis recovers courage, and Demetrius, far from continuing his opposition, cannot sufficiently express his admiration of Apollonius.

The *præfectus prætorio* at that time, the narrative continues, was Ælianus, who had been acquainted with Apollonius in Egypt. As a diversion in his favour before he arrives, he argues to the Emperor that the "chattering sophists," having nothing to enjoy in life, deliberately try to draw death upon themselves at the hands of those who bear the sword. Perceiving this, Nero could not be brought by Demetrius to give him the death he desired, but let him go, not as pardoning him but out of contempt.[2] On the arrival of Apollonius as a prisoner, Ælian uses his authority to submit him to examination in secret. When they are alone, he gives expression to his friendly feeling, but explains the necessity of proceeding with caution. Apollonius asks him what he is accused of. Ælian repeats the heads of accusation already mentioned; informing him that the most serious charge is precisely that which he himself knows must be false, but which the Emperor is most disposed to believe true: namely, that Apollonius slew

[1] vii. 14 (8-10). This passage is of high interest philosophically, as showing how fully the ethical conception of conscience had already been brought into view. The psychological conception of consciousness (sometimes expressed by the same word) was not so completely formulated till the Neo-Platonic period, with its more definite direction to abstract thought.

[2] vii. 16.

an Arcadian boy for sacrifice to encourage Nerva in aspiring to the empire; the offering being made at night by the waning moon.[1] In answering the charge, however, let Apollonius avoid a contemptuous attitude. The interview being at a end, Ælian calls in the guards, and, with simulated anger, consigns him to custody among those who are awaiting their trial.

In prison, he is derided by a military tribune, who tells him that *he* knows what he is accused of if Apollonius does not. He is accused of being worshipped by men and thinking himself worthy of equal honours with the gods.[2] As a test, let them go outside the walls, and he will try to cut off the head of Apollonius with his sword. If he succeeds, Apollonius is innocent of the claim to divinity. If he is terror-stricken and the sword falls from his hand, that is a proof at once of the divinity of Apollonius and of his guilt.

Here the histories are given of some of the other prisoners, who are deploring their fate The philosopher, in accordance with his professional character, calls them together and addresses to them a consolatory discourse which gives them fortitude and hope. Telling them first not to despair before their cases are decided, he proceeds in a more elevated strain. During the whole of our life, the body is the prison of the soul; and those who dwell in palaces are more under this bondage than those whom they put in bonds. Nor is a savage mode of life a protection. The Scythian tribes are no freer than we are; but are surrounded with hardships by rivers impassable save when frozen over by the cold of winter, and shrink even within the shelter of their wagon-huts. And, if it is not puerile to recur to the fables of the poets,[3] one might tell of gods who are said to have been bound in chains, both in heaven and on earth. Think finally of the many wise and blessed men who have suffered at the hands both of licentious peoples and tyrannies, and resolve not to be surpassed by them in courage.

The next day, an emissary of Domitian comes in the guise of a much-dejected prisoner, but Apollonius sees his purpose

[1] vii. 20.

[2] vii. 21 (1): *τὸ γὰρ προσκυνεῖσθαί σε ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαβέβληκεν ὡς ἴσων ἀξιούμενον τοῖς θεοῖς.*

[3] vii. 25 (5): *εἰ δὲ μὴ μειρακιώδης ὁ λόγος.*

of entrapping him, and discourses to his fellow-prisoners only of his travels. On the evening of the fifth day, one from Ælian brings him the message that he is to be led before the Emperor on the morrow; renewing the advice not to be contemptuous, and describing Domitian's appearance and manner of speaking. The fact that Apollonius had come forward to undergo danger on behalf of others, Philostratus here remarks, made a favourable impression even on those who before were prejudiced against him. While he is being led under guard to the Emperor's presence, he rallies his Assyrian disciple on the mortal terror he is in. Damis—who ingenuously confesses how terrified he is—is not admitted; and Domitian insists that the philosopher shall defend himself alone from the charges, and not Nerva, Rufus, and Orfitus, who are already condemned. Apollonius, nevertheless, declares them innocent, and protests against the injustice of assuming their guilt before their trial. Domitian, now telling him that as regards his defence he may take what course he likes, has his beard and his hair shorn, and puts him in fetters such as are reserved for the worst criminals. A letter attributed to Apollonius in which he supplicatingly entreats the Emperor to release him from his bonds, Philostratus pronounces to be spurious.[1]

When Apollonius has been lodged in his new dungeon for two days, a Syracusan who is "the eye and tongue of Domitian," visits him under the pretence that he is a well-wisher and has gained access to him by payment. After much feigned commiseration he reveals his drift; hinting that Apollonius can easily obtain his release by giving information about the supposed conspiracy against the Emperor. The Syracusan having gone away without result, Apollonius tells Damis that he was once that Pytho of Byzantium who came from Philip on a mission to the Greeks, and whom Demosthenes withstood at Athens. He also predicts that they will suffer nothing more than they have suffered already; and, to show that his submitting to bondage is voluntary, frees his leg from the fetter and then replaces it.[2]

These things, says Philostratus, the more foolish sort ascribe to magic; against the efficacy of which he again takes up the argument. Successful events attributed to charms or sacrifices

[1] vii. 35. This letter is not among the extant epistles.

[2] vii. 38.

may be more rationally explained by chance coincidence. Nothing, however, will persuade those who have recourse to such arts that success does not result from performance of the prescribed rites, while failure is to be attributed to the omission of some detail the importance of which was overlooked. Others, he adds, have ridiculed the art at large; but if the young will follow his advice, they will have nothing to do with things of the kind, even in sport.[1] As is evident, he would willingly have ascribed the superhuman powers he conceived Apollonius to have possessed to some deeper knowledge of natural causation. Imperfect as the science of the time was, and credulous as opinion was becoming, philosophic culture repudiated in theory the anti-natural conception of miracle.

Apollonius is at last set free from his bonds, and conducted back to his former prison. His fellow-prisoners welcome him on his return, and he devotes himself unceasingly to giving them counsel. Damis he now sends to Dicæarchia (Puteoli) to expect with Demetrius his appearance after he has made his defence.

When the philosopher is brought to the imperial judgment-seat to be tried, Domitian is to be figured as vexed with the laws because they invented courts of justice.[2] The court was decked out as for a festival oration, and all the illustrious were present. Apollonius, on entering, so disregarded the monarch as not even to glance at him. The accuser therefore crying out to him to "look towards the god of all men," he raised his eyes to the ceiling: thus indicating, says the biographer, that he was looking to Zeus; and thinking him who was impiously flattered worse than the flatterer.[3]

He had prepared an oration in case this should be necessary; but Domitian merely put to him four brief interrogatories. Those he triumphantly answers, and the Emperor acquits him amid applause; telling him, however, to remain so that he may converse with him in private. Apollonius thanks him; but adds a stern reproof. "Through the wretches who

[1] vii. 39 (3): *ἐμοὶ δ' ἀποπεφάνθω μηδ' ἐκείνοις ὁμιλεῖν τοὺς νέους, ἵνα μηδὲ παίζειν τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἐθίζοιντο.*

[2] viii. 1: *ἀνατυποῦσθαι δὲ χρὴ οἷον ἀχθόμενον τοῖς νόμοις, ἐπειδὴ εὗρον δικαστήρια.*

[3] viii. 4: *ἐνδεικνύμενος μὲν τὸ ἐς τὸν Δία ὁρᾶν, τὸν δ' ἀσεβῶς κολακευθέντα κακίω τοῦ κολακεύσαντος ἡγούμενος.*

surround you," he exclaims, "cities are destroyed, the islands are filled with exiles, the continent with groans, the armies with cowardice, and the senate with suspicion." Then he suddenly disappears from among them.[1]

Since Apollonius composed a speech which he was not allowed to deliver, Philostratus thinks that this too ought to be set before the reader. What he gives is an elaborate defence in which the philosopher repudiates all magical arts and all claims to divinity, except so far as good men may be said to participate in the divine. His life, pure from blood-sacrifice and other pollutions, brings him nearer to the gods, and the lightness of his diet enables him to form presages and hence to be of service to men. In turning men's souls from their vices he is of use to their rulers also, who find them more governable. This being so, if the people did think him a god, the deception would be a gain to the master of the flock.[2] They did not think him a god, however, but only held the ancient opinion that by virtue men can participate in the divinity. A man who has something of divine order in his own soul can by wisdom draw away the souls of others from over-vehement desires of pleasure or wealth. For such an one, it is perhaps not impossible to withhold them from contact with murders: "but to wash them clean," adds the Pythagorean, "is possible neither for me nor for God the Maker of all."[3] He is made to refer to some of the wonders recorded in the biography; but he disclaims the possession of power to keep a dying friend in life or to recover him from the dead. Had it been in his power to do either, he would have done it.[4] In the part of his apology referring to the accusation of having said that if the Fates have determined that a certain man shall reign, then, though the Emperor kill him, he will come to life again, Apollonius points out that such assertions are of the hyperbolical kind adapted to produce conviction in those who find things that are put consistently with the appearance

[1] viii. 5 (6).

[2] viii. 7 (21): *ὥστ' εἰ καὶ θεὸν ἡγοῦντό με, σοὶ κέρδος ἡ ἀπάτη εἶχε· ξὺν προθυμίᾳ γάρ που ἠκροῶντό μου, δεδιότες πράττειν, ἃ μὴ δοκεῖ θεῷ.*

[3] viii. 7. (26): *φόνων γὰρ ἀνασχεῖν μὲν αὐτὰς μὴ προσάπτεσθαι οὐκ ἀδύνατον ἴσως ἀνδρὶ τοιούτῳ, ἀπονίψαι δ' οὔτ' ἐμοὶ δυνατὸν οὔτε τῷ πάντων δημιουργῷ θεῷ.*

[4] viii. 7 (46).

of reason incredible.[1] The implied view is obviously that of the Stoic determinism. If the predetermined event is infallible, its conditions are in reality equally necessitated. Unconditional fate is an abstraction; though it is an impressive and a moralising abstraction. In conclusion, he quotes the lines of Sophocles in the *Œdipus Coloneus* on the revolutions of human life—

*μόνοις οὐ γίγνεται*
*θεοῖσι γῆρας οὐδὲ καθανεῖν ποτε,*
*τὰ δ' ἄλλα συγχεῖ πάνθ' ὁ παγκρατὴς χρόνος.*

Let the Emperor remember how ephemeral is good fortune, and put an end to the oppressions through which he has been made hateful to all, as all things have been made hateful to him.

When Apollonius, as has been related, strangely disappeared,[2] the tyrant did not break out into a rage, as most expected, but rather gave signs of trouble. This having taken place at Rome before noon, Apollonius appeared in the afternoon of the same day at Puteoli to Damis and Demetrius, as he had promised. He came to them when they were beginning to despair of ever seeing him again; and convinced them by having a tangible body that he had not returned from the shades. After he has slept, he tells them that he is about to sail for Greece. Demetrius is afraid that he will not be sufficiently hidden there: to which he replies that, if all the earth belongs to the tyrant, they that die in the open day have a better part than they that live in concealment.[3] To those in Greece who asked him how he had escaped, he merely said that his defence had been successful. Hence when many coming from Italy related what had really happened, he was almost worshipped; being regarded as divine especially because he had in no way boasted of the marvellous mode of his escape.

Of this residence in Greece one singular adventure is related. Apollonius desired to visit the cave of Trophonius at Lebadea in Bœotia. The priests refused to admit him; making excuses to him personally but alleging to the people as their ground his being a sorcerer. He went, however, in the

[1] viii. 7 (53): *τὰς γὰρ ὑπερβολὰς τῶν λόγων ἐσαγόμεθα διὰ τοὺς τοῖς πιθανοῖς ἀπειθοῦντας.*

[2] viii. 8: *δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ ῥᾴδιον εἰπεῖν τρόπον.*

[3] viii. 14.

evening with his companions and forced his way in. In this he did what was so pleasing to the god that Trophonius appeared to the priests and rebuked them. To the inquiry of Apollonius, what philosophy he regarded as the best and purest, he replied by allowing him to carry off a book containing the Pythagorean precepts. This book, says Philostratus, is now at Antium ; and his own opinion is that it was brought with some of the epistles of Apollonius to the Emperor Hadrian, and left in the palace there.[1]

A concourse of disciples from Ionia joined with those of Hellas to surround the philosopher ; and rhetoric lay neglected as an art that can teach only language. He kept his disciples away from the forensic orators (*τοὺς ἀγοραίους*) ; having always been hostile to them, and now, since he had seen the Roman prisons, regarding them and their money-making art as more responsible for the state of things there than the tyrant himself.[2]

About this time a crown (*στέφανος*) was seen around the sun obscuring its rays. The portent was fulfilled when Stephanus plotted the death of Domitian, then fresh from the murder of Flavius Clemens. Stephanus, says Philostratus, being the freedman of his wife—who was, like Clemens himself, a relation of Domitian, though not his sister, as Philostratus has it —avenged his death by attacking the tyrant with a spirit equal to that of the most freeborn Athenians. He proceeds to give an account of the tyrannicide, which, as we see, he approves in entire consistency with classical ethics. While this was taking place at Rome, Apollonius—having returned to Ionia after a stay of two years in Greece—was speaking at Ephesus. Interrupting his discourse, which had gradually become troubled, he stepped forward three or four paces and cried out, "Strike the tyrant, strike!" Then he told his audience that Domitian had been slain at that hour ; and this vision of his from the gods was afterwards confirmed circumstantially.[3]

[1] viii. 19, 20.

[2] viii. 22. Cf. Tac., *Dial. de Oratoribus*, 12 : "nam lucrosae huius et sanguinantis eloquentiae usus recens et malis moribus natus, atque, ut tu dicebas, Aper, in locum teli repertus."

[3] viii. 26.

Near the end of Nerva's brief reign (96-98) he disappeared from among men, in some way that is not precisely known; for he sent Damis away when the expected time approached, on the pretext of entrusting him with a confidential letter to the Emperor. Damis does not even tell his age, which some make to have been eighty, some over ninety, and others more than a hundred. According to Philostratus, his statues in the temple at Tyana showed him to have possessed in a pre-eminent degree the charm which is sometimes found to accompany old age. Several legends are related of the manner in which he was called from earth.[1] He always taught the immortality of the soul, but did not encourage the indulgence of curiosity about its future. To a disputatious youth who, even after his departure, continued to argue against immortality, he appeared in a vision and delivered an oracle. If the verses[2] are by Apollonius, he would seem to have anticipated the attitude of Kant at the conclusion of his *Träume eines Geistersehers*. Philostratus lastly tells us that he has found no tomb or cenotaph of Apollonius anywhere, but that everywhere he has met with marvellous stories.

The effect of the work of Philostratus on cultivated opinion was decisive. Apollonius was henceforth recognised as at least a philosopher and perhaps something more. Not that the marvels related produced this effect. No school was led by them to call itself after the name of Apollonius, and no one appealed to his wonder-working as evidence of the truth of the doctrines attributed to him. The feeling seems to have been—and, as we shall see, an adherent of the new religion was not entirely exempt from it—that here was undoubtedly a genuine moral and religious teacher. When, however, the struggle between Christianity and the established polytheism reached its critical point, it occurred to one advocate of the old religion to select the Life of Apollonius as containing wonders better authenticated than those appealed to by the Christians. The argument of Hierocles, so far as it can be gathered from Eusebius, was this: "You proclaim Jesus a god on account of a few prodigies recorded by your evangelists. We have writers of more education than yours and with more care for truth, who relate similar wonders of Apollonius; and yet we, showing more solid judgment, do not make him a god

[1] viii. 30. [2] viii. 31 (3).

on account of them, but only regard him as a man found pleasing to the gods." This is practically all that Eusebius tells us about the contents of the work written by Hierocles under the title *Philalethes*. Everything else in the book, he asserts, has been urged by others and has been already replied to. The parallel between Apollonius and Christ is all that is new, and this only will be taken up. What seems especially to have stung the father of ecclesiastical history is the taunt of Hierocles about the "heedlessness and lightness" (εὐχέρεια καὶ κουφότης) of Christian belief, to which he recurs again and again. A brief analysis of his argument will not be uninstructive.

He will waive, he tells us, such points as this,—that the coming of Christ alone was foretold by the wise men of the Hebrews under divine inspiration, and that to this day devils are cast out by the power of his name, as the writer can testify from experience.[1] Of the biographers referred to by Hierocles —namely, Maximus of Ægæ, Damis the Assyrian, and Philostratus the Athenian—it will be sufficient to consider the last. From his trustworthiness, that of the rest may be judged. Accordingly the method of Eusebius is to examine in succession the eight books of Philostratus, pointing out in each the inconsistencies and incredibilities of the narrative. I have no objection, he says, to placing Apollonius as high as any one likes among philosophers. But when his biographer, be he Damis the Assyrian, or Philostratus, or any one else, represents him, under cover of Pythagoreanism, as going beyond the bounds of philosophy, then he is really made out to be an ass in a lion's skin, a juggling quack instead of a philosopher. There are limits set to human powers which no man may transgress; though a higher being may condescend to the conditions of human nature.

Was Apollonius then a divine being? If so, let the biographer preserve consistency through the whole narrative. He is said to have been announced to his mother before his birth as an incarnation of the god Proteus, and swans are said to have sung him into the world. Whence did the writer get this? It cannot have been from a disciple who joined him long after in Nineveh.[2] In one place he is made to describe himself as

[1] *Adversus Hieroclem*, 4: εἰσέτι καὶ νῦν τῆς ἐνθέου δυνάμεως τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιδείκνυται μοχθηρούς τινας καὶ φαύλους δαίμονας ψυχαῖς ἀνθρώπων καὶ σώμασιν ἐφεδρεύοντας ἀπελαύνων διὰ μόνης τῆς ἀρρήτου προσηγορίας αὐτοῦ, ὡς αὐτῇ πείρᾳ κατειλήφαμεν.

[2] *Ibid.*, 8. Cf. 12.

knowing all languages without learning them. Yet he is said to have acquired the Attic mode of speech by discipline and attention, and not by nature, and to have been taken by his father to a rhetorician at Tarsus. Many things related of him, Eusebius allows, are credible as belonging to the history of a wise and good man. It is the attempt to ascribe to him a nature more than human that gives ground for blaming both the author and the subject of the biography.

Passing from the first to the second book, Eusebius points out inconsistencies in the account of the journey to India and the meeting with King Phraotes. He then dwells on the marvellous tales about India related in the third book. Behold, he exclaims, the incredibilities in which "Philalethes" glories; preferring Philostratus to our divine evangelists not only as a man of highest education but as careful about truth![1] Iarchas, the chief teacher among the Brahmans, is represented as sitting, in the manner of a satrap rather than of a philosopher, on a more elevated and more adorned seat than his fellows. This outward distinction by the marks of tyrannic privilege was a fitting mode of doing honour to the teacher of divine philosophy.[2] The account by Philostratus of the vegetative growth like wool that enables the philosophers to dispense with clothing made from materials furnished by animals seems to require that we should think of them as labouring at the loom,—unless we are to suppose that this substance of its own accord changes into their sacred raiment.[3] That Apollonius praised the automatic mechanisms of the sages is inconsistent with his not caring to know of them in detail or to emulate them.[4]

Not till the return of Apollonius from India does the biographer, in the fourth book, make him begin his wonderful works. Yet, had he been of a diviner nature than that of man, one would say that he ought to have begun them long before, without need of communicating with the Arabians and the Magi and the Indians. Eusebius then scornfully comments on the account of his destroying the plague of Ephesus. The story about the ghost of Achilles, he proceeds, is also full of absurdities and inconsistencies. The ghost appears at dead of night and disappears at cockcrow; circumstances which would be appropriate enough in the case of evil demons, but are out

[1] *Adversus Hieroclem*, 17. [2] *Ibid.*, 18.

[3] *Ibid.*, 23. [4] *Ibid.*, 25.

of place when related of the soul of a hero. The "heedlessness" of the writer in his accounts of the casting out of a demon from a young man, and of the chasing away of the lamia, does not need much elaboration of proof; for this, as they say, is a casting out of demons by demons.[1] The raising of a maiden from death to a second life is most incredible, and to Philostratus himself seems a marvel to be explained away.[2] Had such a wonder really been performed by Apollonius at Rome, it would hardly have escaped the attention of the Emperor and of all his subordinates, and especially of the philosopher Euphrates who at that time was there, and who would not have failed afterwards to include this among his accusations of magic.

In his interviews with Vespasian, this steersman of an Egyptian ship—for such Apollonius told the Indian sage that he had been in a former life—gives himself the airs of a god and of a kingmaker. He commends Euphrates to Vespasian; and afterwards, when he is at variance with him, speaks of him to Domitian as the worst of men. How does Philostratus reconcile this with the prescience he attributes to his hero? Evidently, if the wonders related by the writer actually took place, Apollonius performed them by the aid of a demon. Had the superhuman insight he displays on some occasions been of a divine character, he would have displayed it always, and would never have needed to inquire about anything. The fact that he foreknows some things and not others is best explained by the theory of demoniac assistance.[3] As was said above, he could drive away a demon like the lamia by a more powerful demon.

From the accusation of magic that was brought against Apollonius his biographer is anxious to defend him. The incident in the dungeon, however, by which Damis is said to have been first convinced of his superhuman powers, if true, plainly confirms the charge. The explanation here suggested by Eusebius is that an impression made on the imagination of Damis by his master's associate demon (*ὑπὸ τοῦ παρέδρου δαίμονος*)

[1] *Adversus Hieroclem*, 30; *δαίμονας γὰρ ἀπελαύνει ἄλλῳ ἄλλον, ἢ φασι, δαίμονι.*

[2] *Ibid.*: *ἀπιστότατον καὶ αὐτῷ δόξαν τῷ Φιλοστράτῳ παραιτητέον.*

[3] *Ibid.*, 35; *ὅρα δὴ οὖν, ὡς ἔφην, τὴν πᾶσαν αὐτῷ παραδοξοποιίαν, ὡς διὰ δαιμονικῆς ἀπετελεῖτο ὑπουργίας.*

caused him to see the fetter apparently removed and then replaced.[1] Apollonius, it is here evident, did not know the future; for he prepared a long defence which, in the event, was not needed. Moreover, if we examine that defence, we shall find a sufficient justification of the charge of magic by merely comparing his own definition of a sorcerer as a professor of false wisdom (ψευδόσοφος) with the things recorded of him by Philostratus. In what he says to Domitian about the words he had uttered on Necessity, he evades the true charge that he had predicted his end; and is thus placed before us as a flatterer and a liar and anything rather than a philosopher. Perhaps, however, the falsehood comes from his biographers. In that case, where are the "men of highest education" of "Philalethes"? The splendour of the truth has convicted them as plainly liars and uneducated men and jugglers.[2]

Lastly, says Eusebius, arriving at the culmination, Philostratus, having thrown doubt on the place and manner of his departure from life, will have it that Apollonius went to heaven bodily, accompanied by an unexpected song of maiden voices.[3]

Selecting now, as an example of his false doctrine,[4] the utterances attributed to him on the certainty of fate, Eusebius ends with some commonplace libertarian declamation:[5] remarking finally that, should any still think fit to place Apollonius among philosophers, he does not object, if only they will clear him of the false ornaments affixed to him by the writing under examination; the real effect of such additions being to calumniate the man himself under the guise of raising him to divinity.

The moral of the Bishop of Cæsarea's tract is, it may be hoped, too obvious for comment. We may go on now to consider briefly an interesting problem raised by the reforming activity of the philosopher or prophet of Tyana.

Eusebius does not suggest that Philostratus himself had either a hostile or a friendly intention with regard to Christianity. Yet it seems likely that, living when he did, he had

[1] *Adversus Hieroclem*, 39.

[2] *Ibid.*, 43: ψεύσταs ἐναργῶs καὶ ἀπαιδεύτουs καὶ γόηταs τῆs ἀληθείαs τὸ φέγγοs διήλεγξεν.

[3] *Ibid.*, 44. [4] ἡ ἐν δόγμασι ψευδοδοξία τἀνδρόs. [5] *Ibid.*, 45-48.

some slight bias one way or the other. One passage might be adduced in support of the former view. The declaration of Apollonius, that not even the supreme Deity can wash away the stain of murder, if it were found in Julian, could safely be set down as pointed against the Christian ecclesiastical doctrine. To Philostratus, however, it probably appeared as simply a re-affirmation of the higher ethical view, at once poetic and philosophic, against the imaginations of the multitude that by prayers or ceremonies the necessary expiation to be undergone by the soul itself—perhaps in a series of lives—can be dispensed with. This idea of an inflexible moral order, not to be derived from arbitrary volitions, severe or indulgent, was an important part of the Hellenic conception of an ethically reformed religion ; but, to bring it into relief, no contrast was needed except that which Plato had drawn between the philosophic thinker on religion and the popular "medicine-man." The aim of Philostratus, in spite of his introduction of marvels, was to make it quite clear that Apollonius was not this kind of person ; and indeed the position about sacrifices which by universal consent was his, ought to be of itself sufficient to prove that he was not.

While there is thus nothing to show hostility to Christianity on the part of Philostratus, there is some slight evidence of a not unfriendly intention. The Syrian emperors of the third century, for whom he wrote, were themselves favourably disposed to the new religion. And in representing Apollonius as accused of perpetrating a ritual murder, may he not have meant to hint at the absurdity of the vulgar accusations against the Christians? This seems at least possible. That Christianity should become the exclusive religion of the State he would certainly not have desired. What he hoped for was, we may judge, a system of toleration accompanied by ethical reform of the local cults wherever such reform might be needed. Of Christianity itself he probably knew little. He was not one of those who had caught a glimpse of the theocratic aims of the Church.[1] Indeed Themistius the Peripatetic,

[1] In spite of its defective information on the detail of Jewish antiquities, there is evidence in the fifth book of his *Histories* that Tacitus had gained some real insight into the spirit of intolerant theocracy which, at once dislodged and liberated by the destruction of Jerusalem, was shaping for itself a new embodiment in the incipient Catholic hierarchy. See especially c. 5. On the support furnished by theocracy to monarchy, compare what he says about the Hasmonæan kings, "qui mobilitate vulgi expulsi,

and Ammianus Marcellinus the military historian, had scarcely appreciated those aims in the latter part of the fourth century. Even after the victory of Christianity they seem to have still cherished dreams of a mutual toleration; taking the ground natural to sensible men of the world imbued with secular culture who saw the general agreement of all the organised doctrines, philosophic or religious, on practical morals. They could hardly have imagined that what must have seemed to men of their type so moderate and obvious a solution would have to wait, not for its triumph but for a mere beginning of its effective recognition, to the time of Locke.

The *régime* of "religious liberty," desirable as it must always have seemed to statesmen who were not bigots, has not always been practicable for governments sincerely anxious to uphold freedom of opinion. The repression of the rising Christian Church in the second century was probably, in its inception, a policy similar to the legislation of modern States against the reactionary conspiracies fomented by Catholic organisation in its death-struggle; though the exact degree of knowledge of those who attempted it, and the degree of harshness in the method used, may be for ever impossible to discern through the cloud of ecclesiastical legend. An attempt to show how a more clearly conceived policy of the kind, aided instead of thwarted by accident, might have been successful in throwing Christianity back on the East, has been made by M. Renouvier in his *Uchronie*. According to M. Renouvier's hypothetical reconstruction of history, the official Stoicism retains the direction of opinion; the extra-legal power of the Emperor is gradually reduced with a view to the restoration of the Republic; slavery is brought to an end by legislation under the continued Stoical influence, instead of being left, as it actually was, to be slowly extinguished in the Middle Ages through economical causes unassisted by directing ideas. The process of return from the type of society initiated by the Cæsarean revolution being thus accelerated, Europe about the ninth century is a little in advance of what actually became its condition in the nineteenth. The empire of the West has in the meantime been resolved into a system of national republics

resumpta per arma dominatione fugas civium, urbium eversiones, fratrum coniugum parentum neces aliaque solita regibus ausi superstitionem fovebant, quia honor sacerdotii firmamentum potentiae adsumebatur" (*Hist.* v. 8).

in friendly alliance. The Christian propaganda is re-admitted when the force of the Catholic idea has spent itself in the East in mutual massacre and abortive crusading. Thus, in the hypothetical reconstruction, formal toleration of all sects, religious or philosophic, becomes at length the official system, as it is in the actual modern world after a far more wasteful struggle.

It is tempting to take this sketch as a basis and to make modifications in it by giving a more definite part than M. Renouvier does to the Neo-Pythagorean and Neo-Platonic movements. To bring about, for example, the abolition of the customs of animal sacrifice and of divination by inspection of victims, the ideas of a reformer like Apollonius were necessary; Stoicism having somewhat derogated from its philosophical character by defending the official religion as a whole. Again, to an idealist the Neo-Platonic metaphysics ought to seem an advance on the Stoic materialism. And indeed it seems clear that, in the absence of Christianity, Neo-Platonism and not Stoicism would finally have assumed the direction of opinion in the Empire. Had this been the course of events, Græco-Roman civilisation would have preserved its organic continuity, and the barbarian attack would doubtless have been thrown off. In the latter part of the second century the conservative patriotism of Celsus foresaw that, as things were, the latent civil war kept up by the *imperium in imperio* of the Church would be fatal; that, unless the Christians could be persuaded to yield the required allegiance to the State, the whole fabric would sooner or later go down under the shock of invasion. He did not indeed foresee the recovery; but expressed the apprehension that the religion of the Christians itself, as well as true philosophy, would be submerged in universal chaos. This, as we know, did not in the end come about; though the prospect might seem near being realised in the dark centuries of the West between the end of antiquity and the beginning of new life in the Middle Age. What then would have been the result if the break-up had been averted? Would Western civilisation have assumed a fixed form analogous to those of the East though superior,—combining, let us say, the political order of China with the higher speculative thought of India and with a legal system that recognises rights as well as duties, but never developing new forms of freedom or new lines of art and thought? Or would there have been such accelerated progress as M. Renouvier has imagined?

A progressive movement might be conceived as starting

from interaction between the Roman Empire and the free but undisciplined tribes of the North, when these, kept at length within their own boundaries, settled down to a life of comparative peace and began to draw their higher culture, as they would have done, from the old civilisation of Europe. We might then suppose an ethnic republic arising in the North—say, in Scandinavia—and, by offering to the South a new type for imitation instead of the city-republic of the past, leading to a system of independent national States. As the imperial absolutism, according to the hypothesis, remains unconsecrated by a new hierocracy, we should naturally suppose a transition from the monarchical to the republican form less violent than the French Revolution. Thus we should come round to M. Renouvier's result in a different manner. It would be easy to fill in details and, by selecting factors with a view to the required product, to show how every distinctive element in modern civilisation might have been evolved.

M. Renouvier himself, however, at the conclusion of his "apocryphal sketch," has sufficiently indicated at once the possibilities and the limitations of this kind of reconstruction; and the scientific interest of any such attempt cannot, of course, be in its positive result—since the result is necessarily unverifiable—though it may suggest new ways of looking at the actual process of history. We are led to see that in the complexity of real circumstances factors intervene which from time to time make continuous progress impossible.[1] Perhaps it is irrational even to desire that there should have been continuous progress; as Heraclitus thought Homer irrational for giving utterance to the aspiration "that strife might be destroyed from among gods and men"; since this would mean the destruction of the cosmic harmony itself. It is still possible to apply the teleological idea in Kant's sense to the historical process. That is to say, we may use it as a "regulative idea" to interpret history as it was; though we may not use it to inform us as to what history in general must have been. Taking it in the first sense, and using the terms of post-Kantian metaphysics, we might regard the pseudo-synthesis of Athanasius and Augustine and the rest, itself entirely without

[1] A recent example of this kind is the overgrowth of industrialism throughout the civilised world. It is remarkable that two poets so unlike in many respects as Wordsworth and Shelley foresaw the imminent evil of plutocracy in the early years of the nineteenth century.

human value, as the obstacle posited by the world-soul in order to rise more explicitly to the idea of spiritual freedom. This is not of course to deny that there are gleams of borrowed light in their Kingdom of Darkness; but it is to deny the too anthropomorphic teleology of Comte, with its insistence that the Catholic ideal, as one expression of the "human providence," must have been a progressive phase in the history of humanity.[1] The immanent reason in things, being cosmic and not simply human, works in the affairs of man also through pauses like night and winter.

Such seasons, we know, bear the germs of the future; and the future is more than simply a return to a vanished past. To historical Christianity may be assigned on one side the merit of partially appropriating the idealistic metaphysic which was the legacy of Hellenic thought; and, on the other side, of preserving, in the documents to which it appealed for its authoritative dogma, elements of ethical culture which, when cleared of their dogmatic superstructure, could be seen to contain something emotionally unique. In the Hebrew prophets there is a more ardent, though not a purer and certainly not a nobler, morality than that of classical antiquity even in its final stage; and the teaching of the Gospel has become, when dissociated from a creed which was always extraneous to it, the inspiration of a more impassioned, though not of a wider, philanthropy. The first modern to bring out clearly the permanent ethical value of the Christian as well as of the Hebrew documents was Spinoza, who was enabled to do it by having discarded more systematically than any one before him the whole framework of rabbinical and ecclesiastical dogma. Since, however, the problem of making a new synthesis of the elements of ethical and intellectual culture still remains, there seems to be some advantage in returning for inspiration to more than one source. The movement of moral and religious reform from within the Hellenic world failed, owing to the circumstances of the time, as much through its merits as through any shortcomings that may be ascribed to it. Its philosophical idea of divine justice, as we have seen, was opposed to the doctrine of vicarious punishment distilled by Christian theology from the lower paganism. And for a time

[1] Comte predicted results almost purely beneficent from modern industrialism; though it must be allowed that his disciples have no more love for the present hypertrophy of commerce than other philosophers.

the original Christian teaching, such as Bibical critics now suppose it to have been, failed more tragically than the Hellenic movement. Græco-Roman civilisation indeed was broken up ; and the Christian Church conquered : but, on the other hand, the genuine Hellenism has been easier to rediscover than the teaching of Jesus,[1] which, in its association with the ecclesiastical system, became distorted almost if not quite beyond recognition. In the endeavour after restoration, may not the "Hebraist" and the "Hellenist," in the true sense of both terms, regard themselves as co-operating to a common result?

[1] Since writing this, I have made a more special study of Christian origins, and have come to the conclusion that no personal Jesus is to be discovered as the beginner of the teaching. Still, we may continue to speak of an ethical "Teaching of Jesus," as we speak of the "Mosaic Law" or of the "Orphic Theology." This teaching, whether having its beginning in a personal founder or not, was at any rate in its characteristic part an outgrowth from the Hebraism of the prophets and not of the priests, and thus essentially separable from the ecclesiastical system which appropriated it. And for a long time, as is known, the claim to be the depositaries of the genuine traditional teaching was maintained by the "Ebionites," who were repudiated as heretical by Catholic Christianity.

# CELSUS AND ORIGEN

RECENT historians of antiquity have shown how narrowly Greece, at the opening of its great period, escaped falling under the dominance of a theocracy on the Oriental model, started by the dissemination of a religion at once new and archaic, and proclaiming itself revealed.[1] The inference was perhaps too obvious to draw, that what Orphism failed to do was done by the Christian hierarchy seven or eight centuries later. In the meantime a distinctively European ideal had been determined in outline by the temporary efflorescence of republican States, and by the growth of philosophy as a power not subordinated to popular religion, but claiming to satisfy the highest aspirations of the individual after speculative insight and a moral rule of life. Thus it remained possible long afterwards to break again the spiritual dominion of the East over the West. The ambition of those who represent the system that dominated European life in the middle period is nevertheless still active. Some even think that, skilfully directed and taking advantage of the ever-renewed reaction starting up from a past embodied in institutions, it may yet prevail. Though this view seems to take too little account of the critical work of the last century, by which the whole historical basis of the old spiritual edifice has been irremediably sapped, a comparison with the situation near the close of the ancient world may show it not to be altogether chimerical. In the treatise of Origen against Celsus, we have the ablest defence that could be made in the third

[1] See Ed. Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums*, vols. ii. and iii. ; and compare the view of Prof. J. B. Bury in his *History of Greece*.

century against the attack of a well-informed opponent of Christianity in the second. Of the weight of that attack we can only judge from the fragments preserved by the apologist; but these suffice to prove that, where learning was approximately equal on the two sides, the advocates of the new creed were at a distinctly lower level of rationality than its antagonists. Yet the religion of the "barbarians," for all that reason could say against it, triumphed. The event was made possible fundamentally by the social conditions of the age. It may, therefore, be worth while for educated moderns to consider how far the economic order, for example, which they allow to go on, favours a revival of outworn orthodoxies that would bring with it again something like the old Eastern structure of life. The Byzantine age furnishes a warning as to the mode in which this could return and overgrow a new world that appeared to have transcended it once for all.

In Celsus and Origen we must not expect to meet with the two ideals in what seems to us their purity. Celsus represents the particular compromise between social authority and individual freedom arrived at by the governing classes in the Roman Empire during the second century of the Christian era; that is, at a time when the transition on the secular side was more than half accomplished. This attitude is philosophically liberal and politically conservative, as against revolutionaries whose aim is by no means to go back to a freer past, but to establish a new authority extending beyond action over all human thought. We must bear in mind that we are confronted with the anomaly, as it began to appear to liberal thinkers in the nineteenth century, of a civilisation running down. The chief problem for the men that cared most for the slowly accumulated results of the thought before them was to preserve what remained. Thus we do not find in Celsus hopes for a higher order of things in the future of the world. For him as for Marcus Aurelius and *Ecclesiastes*, "the thing that hath been, it is that which shall be." Or, if there is a difference, it belongs only to the different phases in a cycle. Origen, on the other hand, holds that a true religious faith, formerly limited to a small people, has now been enlarged, and is to prevail over the whole earth. This presents a kind of likeness to the modern ideal of progress. But, as we can see plainly enough even in his more conciliatory version of it, his creed, while continuing the breaking down of local custom which had been begun by the cosmopolitan empires, Asiatic and European, was bound

to be fatal to that unrestricted liberty of philosophising which for later antiquity was an accepted part of the inherited order. Like Eusebius afterwards, he is fully conscious that he represents the "barbarians" as against the "Greeks." If his philosophical learning enables him to take much from the great Hellenic thinkers, it is to serve a cause which could never have been theirs.

A lately published research of Prof. Gunkel[1] seems to show that the root-idea of the spiritual transition must be traced back finally to Babylonia. The imagination of a priest-king who is to establish his dominion everywhere, and to make one religion prevail universally, cannot at first have sprung up in a small tribal group: it must have originated in a great empire. The Jews were only the bearers of the Messianic idea, though it became strongly Judaised in the process. Now, in whatever way Christianity arose, it was, as Gunkel has shown, from the first a highly syncretistic religion. Some of the Eastern ideas it contains may not have come to it by way of Judaism: though actual Judaism was much more composite than it appears in its canonical Scriptures. In the case of this idea, however, there is no difficulty in understanding the historical process. For, as we know, the Judaised conception of world-wide theocracy was especially that of the powerful "Catholic" groups among the early believers. Thus (drawing again an obvious inference) we may say that the theocratic ideal migrated from Babylon to Rome, through the Messianic Jews first and then the Catholic Christians. The old civilisation which had become for the apocalyptists the symbol of the secular world-state was the original source of their own dream of all-embracing religious dominion. And the new empire of the West, having already succumbed to the Eastern institution of absolute monarchy, was the necessary recipient of the ideal which for their successors took the form, no longer of a "New Jerusalem," but of the universal "City of God."

Here we have one far-reaching illustration of Dr. Tylor's theorem regarding the immense potency of "survivals in culture." Fortunately, ideals new as well as old can be revived, and the human race has some control over the circumstances that give a field for their growth. The conceptions of the republican

[1] *Zum religionsgeschichtlichen Verständnis des Neuen Testaments* (Göttingen, 1903). Also published in translation in the *Monist* for April, 1903.

state and of the liberty of philosophising were restored after they had gone into latency; and they have gained a larger scope. What kind of conditions the modern world is providing for their further development is a practically important question the discussion of which would lead far. If civilisation should continue to be based on the existence of a huge mass with no instruction except what is of utility for material needs, then it seems clear that culture of a rational type will not permanently retain even such directing power as it has.[1] This remark, however, is made only in passing. My object at present is, not to bring into view all the complex issues, but to give a straightforward account, mainly from the intellectual side, of a particular controversy which throws light on the perennial strife of ideals.

This account I have not subordinated to a thesis, though it might serve to illustrate more than one. What I propose is to set forth the debate itself in some detail, but with no pretention of exhausting its interest. Thus I have not attempted a complete reconstruction of Celsus, or a special study of his whole view, on the lines of Keim[2] or of Pélagaud.[3] If C. J. Neumann's promised reconstruction in Greek had already appeared, I might not have set myself to go through the treatise of Origen in full; but, having made a study of it, I find that there is room for a supplement to other work.[4] The terse and classical style of Celsus does not admit of condensation; though Origen calls his occasional restatement of a position tautology, and makes this the excuse for lengthy new dissertations of his own. Abbreviation of his argument can thus only be by selection. Origen, on the other hand, though sufficiently readable, has the patristic verbosity. It is quite practicable to put the whole substance of many arguments in less space than they occupy. If they do not usually gain in the process, that, I am afraid, is the fault of the arguments. I do not think the statement of them will be

[1] Meyer's remarks on the rise of capitalism in the Greek world are in this relation of extreme interest. He points out that its evil effects were for a time masked by the rapid political and economic advancement of the State. See *Geschichte des Alterthums*, iii. §305, and compare v. §884: "Wie zu allen Zeiten gehen auch in Griechenland der Sieg des Capitalismus und die Proletarisirung der Massen Hand in Hand."

[2] *Celsus' Wahres Wort* (1873). [3] *Etude sur Celse* (1878).

[4] Patrick's *Apology of Origen* (1892) is on different lines.

found to be unfair. In summarising a Father of the Church, "difficile est satiram non scribere."

The edition I have used is the new one by Koetschau.[1] From Koetschau's introduction I give the facts it is necessary to bear in mind as to the time and place of composition. The treatise was composed probably at Cæsarea in Palestine. Its date (as established by Neumann) is 248. Celsus wrote his work against the Christians sometime between 177 and 180. Origen's reply, we learn from the dedication, was written in response to a request of his friend Ambrosius, who sent him a copy of the work of Celsus, entitled the *True Word* (Ἀληθὴς Λόγος). Who Celsus was, Origen himself does not know. He would like to identify him with an Epicurean of the same name who wrote against magic, and to whom Lucian dedicated his exposure of Alexander the "false prophet;" but he discovers by degrees that this conjecture has too little plausibility, and at length ceases to make his points dependent on it. Celsus was in fact a Platonist. As Origen was of the group of Fathers who, in their borrowings from philosophy, found most that seemed to their purpose in Plato, the opponents have to this extent something in common. Both for this and for other reasons, the apologist does not find it possible to keep up consistently the tone of contempt which he assumes in his "Proem" towards the assailant of the faith.

Of Origen's reputed heterodoxy little appears in the treatise before us. Those who wish to know exactly how he mitigated his creed by a philosophic doctrine of "world-periods," or by the theory of a "restitution of all things," must consult his *Principles*. We find now and then hints of a less damnatory eschatology;[2] but this does not seem to affect the position that, to whomsoever salvation comes, it must in the end be through acceptance of Jesus Christ as the Saviour. From the first it is obvious that the contest is not between rival philosophies, each to be rationally maintained. Origen assumes that Christianity is a revelation to be received by faith. Greek

[1] *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte herausgegeben von der Kirchenväter-Commission der Königl. Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.* Origenes, I., II., Leipzig, 1899.

[2] See in particular *Contra Celsum*, vi. 26. It is not without danger, says Origen, to commit what is meant clearly to writing (ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀκίνδυνον τὴν τῶν τοιούτων σαφήνειαν πιστεῦσαι γραφῇ). The mitigation cannot safely be brought to the knowledge of the multitude, hardly held in check as it is even by the fear of eternal punishment.

philosophy, so far as it claims independence, is treated as a hostile power, not indeed without persuasiveness to those who are grounded in its principles, though precisely for that reason an apostolic warning (Col. ii. 8) was necessary against it. The Old and New Testaments are held unquestioningly to be the inspired word of God. If the limit between canonical and uncanonical matter was still indeterminate, that in no way affects the general principle. When Celsus speaks of "inspired" poets or philosophers, his language has not much more in common with Origen's in reference to the Scriptures than the modern literary sense of "inspiration" has in common with the sense it conveyed to a text-quoting theological disputant of the sixteenth or seventeenth century. The difference is that in the early centuries of our era the man of ecclesiastical authority was the man of the future, while the man of liberal and rational culture was the man of the past.

The opening of the treatise gives us an insight into the fanaticism with which the ancient world was being assailed. Celsus brings against the Christians the ordinary charge of holding unlawful assemblies. A civilised man finding himself among Scythians and unable to escape, replies Origen, would rightly live in secret in his own manner with any whom he could persuade to do likewise. Now what is lawful among "the nations" regarding statues and "godless polytheism" is as bad as the customs of the Scythians or anything more impious than these. Similarly those would do well who should secretly conspire against a tyrant that aimed at destroying their city. Thus the Christians are right in making compacts forbidden by the law against that tyrant whom they call the Devil.

Celsus remarks that although the doctrine is of barbarian—that is, Oriental—origin,[1] he does not blame it on this ground, for the barbarians have shown themselves competent to make discoveries; but the Greeks are better at judging and confirming and putting in practice the things discovered. So they can do in the case of Christianity, was the reply: but it is to be added that the Christians have a diviner mode of proving their doctrine than the Greek dialectic;[2] namely, by "spirit

[1] i. 2: *βίρβαρον ἄνωθεν εἶναι τὸ δόγμα.*

[2] *Ibid*: *οἰκεία ἀπόδειξις τοῦ λόγου, θειοτέρα παρὰ τὴν ἀπὸ διαλεκτικῆς Ἑλληνικήν.*

and power," as the Apostle said, or, in other words, from the fulfilment of prophecy and from miracles.

Early in the treatise the difficult question is raised as to the precise grounds assigned for the repression of Christianity.

Celsus expresses approval of the conduct of the Christians in so far as they cannot be brought to renounce doctrines they have sincerely embraced;[1] but observes that, if they have had to undergo persecution, this is only what has happened to philosophers like Socrates.[2] In other passages also he speaks in the same tone; but on the other hand he treats some that have been punished as merely executed criminals. These no doubt were they who (as he mentions) publicly insulted statues and abused the gods. We must remember that the Christians in the end conquered, and that they had no scruple in exercising control over the sources of information. Not a single book directed against them has been allowed to reach us, except, like this of Celsus, in the fragments preserved by an opponent.

Origen in a later passage puts it on record that up to this time (that is, near the middle of the third century) extremely few Christians have suffered death for their opinions.[3] He ascribes this of course to supernatural protection. The genuine dislike of a government not yet theocratic for anything that savoured of religious persecution, even when it seemed politically necessary, was quite unintelligible to him. The respect of Celsus for the martyrs he supposes to be artfully assumed. Here, he says, Celsus conceals his Epicureanism, and speaks as if he believed in a divine element in man.[4]

The ethical teaching of Christianity and its condemnation of images, Celsus points out, is not new. Origen partly agrees: for if these teachings had not been written under the form of "common notions," in the hearts of men generally, how could God justly have punished them for their sins?[5]

The accusation of relying on the utterance of names and magical formulæ, he finds to contain an allusion to the Christian exorcists. But, he replies, these cast out devils not by the power of enchantments but by the name of Jesus and by

[1] i. 8. [2] i. 3.

[3] iii. 8: *ὀλίγοι κατὰ καιροὺς καὶ σφόδρα εὐαρίθμητοι ὑπὲρ τῆς Χριστιανῶν θεοσεβείας τεθνήκασι.*

[4] i. 8. [5] i. 4, 5.

declaring the histories concerning him.[1] So powerful is that name that even bad men can sometimes cast out devils by it. Celsus indeed knows this, for he asks why the Saviour condemns those that have done works like his own.

To the charge of keeping the doctrine secret[2] he replies that the chief Christian doctrines, — the Virgin-birth, the Crucifixion, the Resurrection, the Judgment,—are better known than those of the philosophers. For the rest, the philosophers too have the distinction between exoteric and esoteric discourses.[3] And the mysteries in general, whether of Greeks or barbarians, have not been attacked for their secresy. Then why whose of Christianity?

Celsus commends rational method, apart from which those who receive dogmas by faith are subject to every kind of deception. "And he compares with us those that believe without reason in the begging priests of the Mother of the gods and in observers of signs, in divinities like Mithras and Sabazius, and anything anyone has met with, apparitions of Hecate or of some other demon or demons."

"He says that some, willing neither to offer a rational account nor to answer questions about the object of their faith, make use of the phrases, 'Do not examine, but believe,'[4] and 'Thy faith will save thee,' and 'Evil is the wisdom in the world, but folly is a good.'" To this Origen replies that doubtless acceptance of doctrines as the result of examination is the ideal; but it is impracticable except for the few. Among the Christians not less than among others there are those that examine; that is, as he explains, who are skilled in the interpretation of what is "symbolical" in the prophets and the gospels. The Christian inculcation of doctrines to be received by faith has raised the multitude to a higher moral life. And, as a matter of fact, the ordinary adherents of philosophic schools accept the doctrines of their own teachers without systematic comparison with those of others. All human things

[1] i. 6: *οὐ γὰρ κατακηλήσεσιν ἰσχύειν δοκοῦσιν ἀλλὰ τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ μετὰ τῆς ἀπαγγελίας τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἱστοριῶν.*

[2] i. 7: *κρύφιον τὸ δόγμα.*

[3] Misunderstanding of this phrase had begun. The *ἐσωτερικοὶ λόγοι* were not a secret doctrine reserved for adepts. (See Grant's *Ethics of Aristotle.*)

[4] i. 9: *μὴ ἐξέταζε ἀλλὰ πίστευσον.*

depend on faith. To act, men must have faith in the recurrence of harvest after seed-time, and generally in the prosperous result of an event where the issue is doubtful. Is it not then more reasonable to have faith in God?[1]

Why, he asks, does Celsus, in asserting a community of reason among the nations, omit the Jews and treat their historians alone as unworthy of credence?[2] His refusal to allow of an allegorical interpretation of Moses is comparable to the procedure of the Platonic Thrasymachus in refusing permission to Socrates to define justice as he likes.[3] In the assertion that there have been many conflagrations and deluges he tacitly associates himself with those who say that the world is ungenerated (*ἀγένητον εἶναι τὸν κόσμον*). Let him demonstrate this. If he puts forward the dialogues of Plato, we shall tell him that it is permitted to us for our part to believe that the divine spirit dwelt in the pure and pious soul of Moses, who rose above everything generated and attached himself to the artificer of the whole, whose works he made manifest more clearly than Plato and the others. If he asks us the reasons of such faith, let him first give the reasons of that which he has asserted without demonstration.[4]

Celsus argues, Why cannot we Christians confess the one God under any customary name? Why this stress on the name of Adonai or Sabaoth as distinguished from Zeus or any other by which the supreme Deity has been called in various nations?[5] Origen replies by an appeal to those philosophers (*viz.*, the Stoics and Epicureans) who contend for a natural element in the giving of names, in opposition to those who hold, with Aristotle, that words are merely conventional signs. Moreover, the adepts in a secret philosophy are aware of the peculiar efficacy of certain angelic names (Michael, Gabriel, Raphael). So also the name of "our Jesus" has visibly displayed its efficacy in the casting out of myriads of devils. And

[1] i. 11: *πῶς δ' οὐκ εὐλογώτερον, πάντων τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πίστεως ἠρτημένων, ἐκείνων μᾶλλον πιστεύειν τῷ θεῷ;*

[2] i. 14. Celsus had somehow arrived at the view that the books of Moses were a late compilation from widely-diffused pagan myths, such as that of a Flood. Cf. i. 21, and, among later passages, iv. 42: *εἰ μὴ ἄρα οὐδὲ Μωϋσέως οἴεται εἶναι τὴν γραφὴν ἀλλά τινων πλειόνων· τοιοῦτον γὰρ δηλοῖ τὸ 'παραχαράττοντες καὶ ῥαδιουργοῦντες τὸν Δευκαλίωνα,' κ. τ. λ.*

[3] i. 17. [4] i. 19. [5] i. 24.

those who are skilled in charms report that they lose their power when translated into another language.[1]

The coming of Jesus, objects Celsus, is recent. How wonderful, then, replies Origen, have been the results of his teaching in so short a time; so many rescued from degradation by it. Such has been the moralising effect of what Celsus and those who agree with him call a "word injurious to human life" (λόγον λυμαινόμενον τὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίον) that some have even gone so far as to abstain from lawful sexual intercourse.[2] The word could not have spread everywhere against the opposition of rulers and peoples alike, unless it had been the word of God. And Celsus himself admits on occasion that it has not been received, as he would make out elsewhere, by the ignorant only.[3]

From this point onward Origen changes his mode of reply.[4] Hitherto he has tried to bring the objections of Celsus under heads and to indicate briefly the answers to them, with a view to making in the end an organic unity of the discourse. Henceforth, "to spare time," he will put them down as they occur in the book and grapple with them as he goes on. This procedure, while no doubt lengthening the treatise of Origen (according to the well-known literary rule), has been of advantage to modern readers, who are thus in a position to know approximately how Celsus ordered his argument. But for the change of plan, as Koetschau remarks, reconstructions such as have been or are to be attempted, would have been out of the question.

It appears from Origen's next chapter[5] that Celsus early in his work brought forward an imaginary Jew as opposing the supernatural claims of Jesus. The reason of this is evident if the Græco-Roman would had no trace of an independent

[1] i. 25. With this may be compared the very ingenious argument in the *De Mysteriis* vii. 4, 5, on the mystic virtue of "barbarian" as distinguished from Greek names in religious invocations. (Koetschau draws attention to the parallel in a note to *Contra Celsum* v. 41, where the idea recurs.)

[2] i. 26. If Origen here and in other passages did not dwell so strongly on this point, it might seem unfair to recall his practical interpretation of Matt. xix. 12, recorded in Church-history. The distinctive Catholic doctrine is stated in the sequel (viii. 55): ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄγεσθαι γυναῖκα ἐπέτρεψεν ἡμῖν ὁ θεός, ὡς οὐ πάντων χωρούντων τὸ διαφέρον τουτέστι τὸ πάντῃ καθαρόν. Ecclesiasticism and its effects will seem to many a verification rather than a disproof of the phrase thrown out by Celsus.

[3] i. 27. [4] See Proem, 6. [5] i. 28.

tradition about the events to which Christianity appealed. In that case, what was more obvious than to consult the Jews as to the ground there might be for the Christian assertions? For the new religion did not conceal its dependence on Judaism. That Celsus really obtained the substance of this portion of his attack from Jews with whom he had conversed is established by the traces of similar hostile stories which have been brought to light by students of the Talmud.[1] Jesus ben Pandira can hardly be other than a variant of Jesus the son of the Roman soldier Panthera. The interesting question for us is, whether any Jewish tradition about Jesus, even hostile, is really independent of Christian sources. Now, in what Celsus ascribes to the Jew, there is to be found, on the positive side and apart from acute negative criticism of the evidence, only an obvious conjectural attempt at naturalistic explanation of alleged supernatural events. The apologetic view that Panthera is merely an anagram on the word "Parthenos" is sufficiently plausible.[2] Thus, Origen is securely entrenched when he says that, the gospels being the only evidence, opponents, Jewish or heathen, have no right to pick out what lends itself to a bad construction and refuse to believe the rest. Yet he must have had an obscure feeling that the argument might recoil. At any rate, he thinks it important that Josephus, not being a Christian, should have testified to the reality of personages in the Christian legend like John the Baptist and James the Just (*Ant.* xviii. 5, 2 and xx. 9, 1).[3] The passage on Jesus (*Ant.* xviii. 3, 3) was clearly not in the text when he wrote; for he does not mention it, though it would have been more to the purpose. Both of the other passages, of course, may be Christian interpolations dating from before his time. The second has been manipulated since he wrote; the present text of Josephus not agreeing with his account.[4]

[1] For an exhaustive recent inquiry into this subject, see Herford, *Christianity in Talmud and Midrash* (1903).

[2] I have not followed this view to its sources, but take the statement of it from Patrick, *The Apology of Origen*, p. 23 n. 1.

[3] i. 47. Origen, however, mentions (i. 48) that the Jews do not connect John the Baptist with Jesus.

[4] About the passage referring specially to Jesus there ought never to have been any doubt in the minds of European scholars since the treatise of Origen against Celsus was in their hands. Yet, although the silence of Origen corroborates the plain marks of forgery in the passage itself, it has been the subject of volumes of controversy, and has hardly been officially abandoned till our own days.

Celsus himself was firmly convinced that all claims to the possession of an authoritative supernatural revelation were founded in illusion or imposture. This was fundamentally his attitude, not merely to Christianity, but to the other new gospels that were then wandering over the world. He believed in philosophy as the true "wisdom," and defended the established system of mutually tolerant civic and national cults, partly on the ground that they did no harm. This philosophic attitude went along with a certain positive attachment to them on patriotic and æsthetic grounds. The gods of the civic religions were also the gods of literature. Why should their worship—a defender of the old order might say—give place to barbarian rites and myths, whose claim to possess greater truth was only the expression of a more sophisticated stage of popular religion, in which it begins to pass over from spontaneous natural fancy into deliberate organisation by jugglers and fanatics? But the remark applies perfectly to Celsus that the educated world of antiquity, through the development of its own culture, had ceased to understand the religions by which it was surrounded.[1] Still less were the more archaistic forms of religious belief intelligible. Celsus, it is true, has a keen eye for analogies, both Greek and Oriental, to the Christian story, such as miraculous births and descents into Hades and resurrections; but he cannot penetrate to its origin because he cannot penetrate to the origin of these. He apparently supposes them to have been tales devised by the men themselves who came to be revered as gods, or fabrications by their followers, or at best half-sincere fictions having their beginning in visual hallucinations. Modern criticism long attempted explanations on similar lines. If, however, in comparative mythology as in the other sciences, truth is the daughter of time, then the outlook has been changed. For, according to what now seems an established position, no human hero ever becomes one of the great gods,—a God such as Jesus was for undoubtedly early Christians.[2] Many of the heroes, on the contrary, were them-

[1] Cf. Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums* ii. §11.

[2] See Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums* ii. § 277. The case of deified kings, as Meyer says, is essentially different. So also, it might be added, is the representation in India of particular persons as avatars of divine powers. The application to Christianity is not pointed out; but a very significant passage in relation to Christian origins may be quoted from vol. iii. § 85. The historian is speaking of Gaza in the Persian time. "Ein

selves gods brought down to earth. The ancient god (solar or other) who had descended into the underworld, and risen again, became, as for example in the typical case of Orpheus, a human hero of whose life this adventure formed part. The process of myth-formation not being understood, a new story of this type would necessarily be found elusive so far as the question of origin was concerned, however absurd it might appear philosophically. Thus, as we might expect, Celsus is at his strongest in showing the intrinsic irrationality of the new supernatural story. The attempt by the Jewish spokesman at a reduction of the life of Jesus to natural events, is on the whole of less interest. Still, there are some points on both sides of the controversy worth bringing out.

On the sacrifice of Christ, Origen takes the view which was also that of the Eastern Gnosis. A similar view of the meaning of sacrifice was no doubt latent in the Chthonian religion of Greece. And the position is not limited by Origen to the one sacrifice which is for his Christian belief central, but is applied to the case of every just man who has voluntarily offered himself for the sake of humankind. There is something, he holds, in the nature of things, which exacts this kind of offering in order to avert the evil worked by certain dark powers:[1] the sacrifice is not conceived as a piacular offering to the supreme God. Mythological though the passage is in expression, it is worth dwelling on for a moment in contrast with the petrified creeds.

Unfortunately there is not much that has this kind of speculative interest. In proximity to the passage cited, we meet with the argument so familiar to eighteenth century apologists: Whence came to the disciples of Jesus, if they had not witnessed their master's resurrection, the strong motive they must have had for setting themselves against the laws at once of the Jews and of other nations? Again: Where, if the disciples had not the power of working miracles, could they have

grosses Völkergemisch fand sich hier zusammen; aber das Uebergewicht haben die Aramaeer: der Hauptgott von Gaza heisst jetzt Marna, d. i. aramaeisch 'unser Herr.'" Marna, the Syrian "Lord" of the cosmopolitan Phœnician town, at once suggests *μαρὰν ἀθά* (*ὁ κύριος ἥκει*), the early Christian password. [See MARANATHA in *Ency. Bib.*]

[1] i. 31: *εἰκὸς γὰρ εἶναι ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων κατά τινας ἀπορρήτους καὶ δυσλήπτους τοῖς πολλοῖς λόγους φύσιν τοιαύτην, ὡς ἕνα δίκαιον ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀποθανόντα ἑκουσίως ἀποτροπιασμοὺς ἐμποιεῖν φαύλων δαιμονίων, ἐνεργούντων λοιμοὺς ἢ δυσπλοΐας ἤ τι τῶν παραπλησίων.*

gained the courage to preach an innovating doctrine, when they had no skill in dialectic, like the Greek sages?[1] Origen has anticipated more recent theologians in appealing to the zoological fact of parthenogenesis in support of the Virgin-birth.[2] He adds that if, as is the opinion of many of the Greeks also, the world had a beginning, the production of the first men must have been more paradoxical than the birth of Jesus, "half in the manner of other men." He then brings in the story that Plato was in reality the son of Apollo by a virgin birth, as a proof that the Greeks too thought it appropriate to regard a great man as not begotten by a human father. The introduction of "the Greek fables about Danae and Melanippe and Auge and Antiope," he dismisses as buffoonery. Incredulity in relation to these, however, could not be declared out of character in a Jew.

The Jew of Celsus asks: What trustworthy witness saw the dove descending on Jesus, or who heard the voice?[3] After a prologue on the difficulty of demonstrating the truth of histories, especially when mixed with marvels, as in the case, for example, of the siege of Troy, Origen here finds fault with the "personification." If the person asking the question had been an Epicurean, or a Democritean, or a Peripatetic, it would have been in character. Attributed to a Jew, who himself believes greater marvels than that of the Holy Spirit descending in the form of a dove, it is out of place.[4] The reply of some might be, that the account was not written down from report, but through inspiration of that Spirit which taught Moses the history older than his own time. One who understands the spiritual meaning can show why the appearance was in the form of a dove and in no other.[5] If the Jew asks for a proof of the mission of Jesus, let him first supply a proof of the mission of Moses.[6] Traces of that Holy Spirit once seen in the form of a dove are still preserved among the Christians, who charm away demons and accomplish many cures, and sometimes have visions of future things according to the will of the Word.[7]

Of the argument that the prophecies said to refer to "the things concerning Jesus" may fit other matters, he admits the plausibility;[8] but he thinks he can furnish a satisfactory

[1] i. 38. Cf. 46.
[2] i. 37.
i. 41.
[4] i. 43.
[5] i. 44.
[6] i. 45.
[7] i. 46.
[8] i. 50.

answer. He mentions, for example, the existence of the *cave* in Bethlehem, shown by the inhabitants as the place where Jesus was born, and held to be such even by those alien to the faith.[1] The rejection of Jesus by the Jews, though he manifestly fulfilled the prophecies, is explained by the innate conservatism of human nature, especially as regards dogmas.[2] The suffering Christ, Origen argues, was predicted in Isaiah liii. He mentions, indeed, that the Jews interpret this as referring to the people of Israel, but contends that it is not fully explicable unless referred to a person, as by the Christians. Celsus and his Jew and all those that have not believed in Jesus fail to recognise that the prophecies speak of two comings of the Christ among men, one in which he is subject to human affections, and the other in which he is glorified.[3] He wonders why Celsus does not say anything about the star in the East, but volunteers an explanation of what is related. First, it was a new star, of the nature of a comet. Such stars, as is generally held, appear on the eve of extraordinary events. He thinks he can make the Greeks understand the visit of the Magi. The demons to whom they owed the virtue of their accustomed incantations were quelled by the greater power born into the world. Hence they desired to seek this out; and, possessing as they did the prophecies of Balaam which Moses also wrote down, they guessed the meaning of the star (Num. xxiv. 17).[4] Next he undertakes to refute the incredulity of the Jew regarding Herod's massacre of the children. Herod was moved by the Devil, who from the beginning was plotting against the Saviour.[5]

Replying to a description of the apostles as ignorant and disreputable tax-gatherers and so forth, Origen contends that the choice of unlettered men was appropriate, since the Gospel was to be preached as a divine revelation, not to be advocated as a mere philosophical doctrine with the aid of dialectic and rhetoric.[6] Perhaps, he remarks, support for the attack on the character of the Apostles was found in the Epistle of Barnabas (v. 9), where it is said that Jesus chose for his own apostles men lawless beyond all lawlessness (*ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν ἀνομίαν ἀνομωτέρους*).[7]

[1] i. 51 : *καὶ τὸ δεικνύμενον τοῦτο διαβόητόν ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς τόποις καὶ παρὰ τοῖς τῆς πίστεως ἀλλοτρίοις, ὡς ἄρα ἐν τῷ σπηλαίῳ τούτῳ ὁ ὑπὸ Χριστιανῶν προσκυνούμενος καὶ θαυμαζόμενος γεγέννηται Ἰησοῦς.*

[2] i. 52.
[3] i. 56.
[4] i. 60.
[5] i. 61.
[6] i. 62
63

But Jesus came, he replies, to save sinners; and what greater manifestation of his power to heal was possible than to raise such men into patterns of pure life? Philosophy tells of a case or two like the conversion of Polemo; but what are these to the work that has been done by Christianity? With their boasted care for the public good, its accusers ought at least to offer a tribute of thanks to the utility of the new method, if they cannot acknowledge its truth.[1]

If Jesus was a god, asks Celsus or the Jew, why was it necessary that he should be taken away to Egypt to save him from death at the hands of Herod? Origen answers that he was of composite nature,[2] at once God and man, and had not, as Celsus appears to think that he ought to have had, a body like those of the Homeric gods, shedding ichor instead of blood.[3] Incongruously, as Origen thinks, the Jew is made to ask, as if he was an educated Greek, what great thing Jesus has done comparable to the deeds ascribed to Perseus, Amphion and others, who were said to be of the seed of the gods. He replies partly by reference to the miracles of healing and so forth, still worked in the name of Jesus; partly by an appeal to the mild and philanthropic disposition produced in those who have accepted the Christian doctrine in reality and not hypocritically for the sake of a livelihood or of human necessities.[4] To the Jew's charge that the impression Jesus made was due to magic, he replies that it is not the way of magicians to use their arts in order to turn men from evil to good.[5]

Celsus makes his Jew accuse the Christians of deserting the law of their fathers. This Origen takes to imply a misunder-

[1] i. 64.

[2] i. 66: *σύνθετόν τι χρῆμά φαμεν αὐτὸν γεγονέναι.*

[3] Elsewhere (ii. 36) Origen says, in answer to the question whether there was any such manifestation of divinity at the crucifixion, that it is to be found in the "blood and water" of John xix. 34.

[4] i. 67: *καὶ ἔτι γε τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἐκστάσεις μὲν διανοίας ἀνθρώπων ἀφίστησι καὶ δαίμονας ἤδη δὲ καὶ νόσους, ἐμποιεῖ δὲ θαυμασίαν τινὰ πρᾳότητα καὶ καταστολὴν τοῦ ἤθους καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν καὶ χρηστότητα καὶ ἡμερότητα ἐν τοῖς μὴ διὰ τὰ βιωτικὰ ἢ τινας χρείας ἀνθρωπικὰς ὑποκριναμένοις ἀλλὰ παραδεξαμένοις γνησίως τὸν περὶ θεοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐσομένης κρίσεως λόγον.*

[5] i. 68. This was urged by Philostratus in his defence of Apollonius of Tyana against the accusation of magic. (Koetschau is of opinion that Origen had read the Life of Apollonius, and that he intentionally ignored it.)

standing, on the part of Celsus, of the real position of the Jewish Christians, to whom the accusation must be assumed to be addressed. The Ebionites, as they are called, do not depart from the Jewish law.[1] A later passage, however, proves that Celsus knew of the Ebionites.[2] Of course they were not necessarily Jews by race; nor according to the apostolic legend, which he may have thought himself entitled to follow, did Jewish converts to Christianity necessarily continue the practice of the law.

Here as in many other places the apologist exercises himself, not without a touch of vanity, in trying to show that he has a more accurate knowledge than his adversary of the shades of difference among Jews and Christians. However this may be in particular cases, the very effort is a tribute to the extensive information that Celsus had acquired. That he had gone beneath the surface appears sufficiently from the nullity of Origen's reply to the argument, again assigned to the Jew, that the Christians in their teaching about "the resurrection of the dead, and the judgment of God, and a reward for the just and fire for the unjust," have introduced nothing that was not already familiar,—that is, to the Jewish apocalyptists.[3] "Our Jesus," he immediately answers, "seeing the Jews doing nothing worthy of the doctrines contained in the prophets, taught them by a parable that the kingdom of God should be taken from them and given to those from the nations." A proof of this transference of the kingdom to the Gentiles is the fact that the Jews have now no prophets or miracles to show, whereas some of the signs that are still found among the Christians are even greater than the former (as promised in John xiv. 12).[4]

To the objection that the predictions assigned to Jesus were feigned after the event, Origen replies by simply (or rather doubly) begging the question. He points to the fulfilment, after the time of Jesus, of his predictions of (1) persecutions for the mere profession of Christianity, (2) the preaching of it to all nations, (3) the destruction of Jerusalem. These prophecies, he says, could not have been written after the event: for it is not to be supposed that the hearers of Jesus handed down the teaching of the Gospels as a

[1] ii. 1. [2] v. 61. [3] ii. 5.

[4] ii. 8: *καὶ εἰ πιστοί ἐσμεν λέγοντες, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἑωράκαμεν.*

mere oral tradition and left their disciples without written memorials.[1]

In order to remove, in the eyes of "unbelievers," the improbability of the resurrection of Jesus, he gravely quotes from the *Republic* the story of Er, the son of Armenius, who was revived at so long an interval as twelve days after his death.[2]

What is meant by the "threefold and fourfold and manifold" rewriting of the Gospel, attributed to "some of the believers,"[3] he professes not to understand. He knows only of heretics who have altered the Gospels, and this is a reproach not to the Word but to the falsifiers. True Christianity is no more to be blamed on account of those who have perverted it than philosophy on account of the Sophists or the Epicureans or the Peripatetics,[4] or any who may hold false opinions. But, as has been pointed out,[5] the phrase *τριχῇ καὶ τετραχῇ* evidently indicates a distinction between the first three canonical Gospels and the fourth. In this notable passage, all are treated by the Jew as late writings derived from a more and not less apparently fabulous beginning, and even as having for their aim to make the story less open to hostile criticism than it was at first.

The Jew dwells on the slightness of the supposed prophetic tokens by which it is thought to be established that Jesus was God and the Son of God. The Son of God ought to have manifested himself by some clear light, like the light of the sun, first showing forth himself and then illumining all other things.[6] For once, Origen lays hold of a real causal relation; which he proceeds to invert into a proof that Christianity must have been supernaturally revealed. There was such a manifestation, he replies, for a peace-preserving world-empire was

[1] ii. 13. [2] ii. 16.

[3] ii. 27: *τινας τῶν πιστευόντων . . . ὡς ἐκ μέθης ἥκοντας εἰς τὸ ἐφεστάναι αὐτοῖς μεταχαράττειν ἐκ τῆς πρώτης γραφῆς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τριχῇ καὶ τετραχῇ καὶ πολλαχῇ καὶ μεταπλάττειν, ἵν' ἔχοιεν πρὸς τοὺς ἐλέγχους ἀρνεῖσθαι.*

[4] At this period Aristotle was so far from being the idol of the Church that he was not even included among the relatively orthodox philosophers.

[5] See the opening of the article on "Gospels" in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*.

[6] ii. 30: *θεὸν δὲ καὶ θεοῦ υἱὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκ τοιούτων συμβόλων καὶ παρακουσμάτων οὐδ' ἐξ οὕτως ἀγεννῶν τεκμηρίων συνίστησιν. . . . ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἥλιος, φησί, πάντα τὰ ἄλλα φωτίζων πρῶτον αὐτὸν δεικνύει, οὕτως ἔχρῆν πεποιηκέναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ.*

the necessary condition if the way was not to be barred to the universal preaching of a mild doctrine that did not even permit self-defence against enemies: accordingly the Roman peace under a monarch had been established by Augustus, in whose reign Jesus was born.

To several things that the Jew is made to say, he objects that they are not in character. A Jew would not have assented to the Christian position that the Son of God is the Word.[1] He would not have been likely to quote the *Bacchæ* of Euripides.[2] To the objection, however, that the governor who condemned Jesus suffered no punishment such as befell Pentheus when he had imprisoned a Deity, Origen replies that Pilate was not so much to blame as the Jewish race; which, by the judgment of God, has been rent and scattered over the whole earth worse than Pentheus.[3]

The recurrent argument against the divinity of Christ from his sufferings and death is met by the reply that those were necessarily related to the end of his coming. To try to get rid of a real crucifixion, with the succeeding death and burial, is to deny the postulate of the Christian system. This, of course, was precisely what opponents did deny.

Celsus, in the person of the Jew, points out the inconsistency of the appeal to miracles in proof of one doctrine with the condemnation of them when they are used to prove another.[4] Origen can only appeal to ultimate success; remarking that that which causes men to lead better lives cannot be deception.[5] If the claims of rival propagandists in the Empire are ever referred to, it is assumed that these can have nothing to say for themselves ethically. The existence of false miracles worked by magic power, he goes on to argue, proves that there must be true ones worked by divine power. To

[1] ii. 31.

[2] ii. 34: *οὐ πάνυ μὲν οὖν Ἰουδαῖοι τὰ Ελλήνων φιλολογοῦσιν.* Origen might have remembered Philo, to whom he refers elsewhere as remarkable for Hellenic learning; but by the third century, through the intensification of sectarian divisions, the Jews had no doubt closed themselves in more.

[3] ii. 34: *ὅπερ καταδεδίκασται ὑπὸ θεοῦ σπαραχθὲν καὶ εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ὑπὲρ τὸν Πενθέως σπαραγμὸν διασπαρέν.*

[4] ii. 49: *πῶς οὖν οὐ σχέτλιον ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔργων τὸν μὲν θεὸν τοὺς δὲ γόητας ἡγεῖσθαι;*

[5] ii. 50.

infer from the former the non-existence of the latter is as if one were to infer from the existence of a sophistical dialectic the non-existence of a dialectic leading to truth.[1] Then he shows that for a Jew to adopt the line of argument ascribed to him by Celsus would lead to rejection of the prodigies recorded in his own sacred books equally with those recorded in the gospels. Moses, as well as Jesus, gives warnings against being led astray by the miracles of prophets who shall teach another doctrine.[2]

A very stringent criticism of the resurrection story in the Gospels is quoted, in which it is compared to similar stories among Scythians and Egyptians and Greeks. "Or do you think that the relations of the others both are and appear fables, but that with you the catastrophe of the drama has been devised becomingly or persuasively?"[3] As this is assigned to the Jew, Origen replies again by putting him on the defensive. What plausibility is there in the statement of Moses that he alone drew near to God, while the rest of the people stood afar off? The Jew cannot apologise for what Moses relates of himself without at the same time involuntarily apologising for what is related of Jesus. The cases of the Greek and other heroes, cited by the Jew but not appropriate in his mouth, are not comparable to that of Jesus. They indeed could withdraw themselves from men's eyes and then, when they returned, feign that they had been in Hades. Jesus could not, since he died publicly on the cross. And his disciples would not have faced danger and death in order to bear witness to a resurrection of which they had fabricated the account.

A Jew could not consistently question whether it was possible for one who had really died to rise up with the same body; for he would have remembered the children whom Elijah and Elisha brought back to life. "And I think that for this cause also Jesus dwelt with no other nation than the Jews, accustomed as they had become to marvels; so that by setting the things they held in belief side by side with the things that had come to pass by him and were narrated about him, they might receive it as true that he who had been the centre of greater events and by whom more marvellous deeds had been accomplished was greater than all those of old."[4]

[1] ii. 51.

[2] ii. 53. Origen, it is perhaps worth noting, takes for granted (c. 54) that Moses wrote the account of his own death in Deut. xxxiv.

[3] ii. 55. [4] ii. 57.

Some of the objections Origen admits to be well taken and not altogether easy to dispose of. But, he says, the notion of an illusory appearance might account for a dream (ὄναρ), but not for a waking vision (ὕπαρ), except in the case of madness or melancholy. Celsus indeed, in an allusion to Mary Magdalene (γυνὴ πάροιστρος), insinuates that this might be the cause; but the written history does not prove it, and he has only this to go upon.[1]

If, it is said, Jesus really willed to show forth divine power, he ought to have been seen after his resurrection by those that had treated him despitefully, and by him who had condemned him, and in short by all.[2] Origen replies that Jesus after his resurrection appeared only to his disciples, and to them only at intervals, because only to the few who were spiritually prepared, and to them not always, could the vision of his glorified body be revealed. The revelation was given to such as could comprehend it.

To the question, "What God becoming present to men meets with disbelief?"[3] Origen replies that, in spite of all the miracles they had seen performed in Egypt and in the wilderness, the Jews themselves disbelieved and fell into idolatry. Thus, with their conduct as recorded in the Old Testament the behaviour of their descendants in rejecting Jesus was quite consistent.

Jesus, the objector urges, being unable to persuade, uses threats and denunciations.[4] So also, replies Origen, does the God of the Old Testament, and even divine powers among the Greeks. The Sirens persuade with flattery and pleasant words.

Leaving the personification, Celsus now states it as his own opinion that nothing can be idler than the contest between the Jews and the Christians about the Messiah.[5] The Christians, he maintains, were in the beginning simply a faction of the Jews as the Jews were of the Egyptians.[6] Here of course he has adopted, like Tacitus earlier, the inventions put forward by the Egyptian annalists to give a different turn to the legend of the exodus. On this ethnological point Origen, who knew Hebrew, is able to furnish, here and elsewhere, a satisfactory refutation.

[1] ii. 60. [2] ii. 63.

[3] ii. 74: τίς θεὸς παρὼν εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἀπιστεῖται;

[4] ii. 76. [5] iii. 1. [6] iii. 5.

The Jews, he proves as far as it can be proved by the test of language, belong to an ancient and distinct ethnical group.

The Christians, says Celsus, few in number and united at the beginning, now that they are many are split up into sects.[1] Origen replies, first, that divisions had already appeared in the apostolic times, as is proved by the documents. Then he remarks, with some liberality, that differences of opinion only manifest themselves about things of high value;[2] citing the cases of medicine and of philosophy. Unfortunately, the toleration seemingly indicated in this passage was really of a very limited kind; as is evident from the tone towards both philosophy and "heresy" in passages where Origen speaks more conformably to the general spirit of the Church.

We now come to a very interesting group of statements by Celsus which, if examined closely, may reveal a rather complex ritual as the hidden core of the earliest Church-life. He speaks successively of "fabricated terrors,"[3] and of "highly superstitious worships abounding in mysteries."[4] Further, he is described as "likening the inner and mystic things of the Church of God to the cats or apes or crocodiles or he-goats or dogs of the Egyptians."[5] And this, as is shown by another citation, had some kind of reference to the "relations about Jesus."[6] Origen professes not to know what is meant; asking what there is of all this in the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, which Celsus also desires should be preserved, or in the Gospel story (which perhaps he means) of Christ crucified. The ground, of course, is uncertain; but does it not seem as if we are here brought into contact with the Mystery Play which has been conjectured to underlie the story in its present form? We might even be tempted to infer from a later passage, comparing the Christians to those who

[1] iii. 10.

[2] iii. 12: *οὐδενὸς πράγματος, οὗ μὴ σπουδαία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τῷ βίῳ χρήσιμος, γεγόνασιν αἱρέσεις διάφοροι.*

[3] iii. 16: *δείματα συμπεπλασμένα.*

[4] iii. 17: *θρησκεῖαι μάλα δεισιδαίμονες καὶ μυστηριώτιδες.*

[5] iii. 21: *ὁμοιοῦντος τὰ ἔνδον καὶ μυστικὰ τῆς ἐκκλησίας τοῦ θεοῦ τοῖς Αἰγυπτίων αἰλούροις ἢ πιθήκοις ἢ κροκοδείλοις ἢ τράγοις ἢ κυσίν.*

[6] iii. 19: *εὐήθεις δ'εἶναι μηδὲν σεμνότερον τράγων καὶ κυνῶν τῶν παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις εἰσάγοντας ἐν ταῖς περὶ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ διηγήσεσι.*

bring forward terrifying apparitions in the Bacchic mysteries,[1] that the drama in its original form included a representation of the descent into Hades. The comparison which Celsus makes with the eclectic cult which in Egypt had gathered round the name and fate of Antinous[2] tends to confirm some such theory. As, however, Church organisers had long been engaged in systematically regulating the rites and removing scandals, we must not expect to get a very clear vision of the earliest cult. Into the process of regulation the first Epistle to the Corinthians gives some insight.

In what Celsus says about men who have become gods among the Greeks, Origen finds an artful ambiguity: he would have liked him to say clearly what is his own opinion about the divinity of the Dioscuri.[3] With Celsus, however, the stress of the argument is on the more recently recorded cases of men who have gained a reputation for some supernatural power; who have even been reported divine; and for all that have not become, or have not long remained, the object of a cult. The story, for example, is quoted from Herodotus (iv. 14, 15), that Aristeas of Proconnesus, who mysteriously disappeared from among men and afterwards reappeared, was declared to the Metapontines by Apollo's oracle to be a proper object of worship: and yet no one now thinks him a god.[4] This seems to Origen an evidence by contrast, of the power of Jesus. He has been accepted by multitudes as divine, although the demons whose power he came to destroy, instead of announcing him as a god, stirred up their votaries against him.[5] Then, after referring to some more cases mentioned by Celsus, he can only suggest that "certain evil demons" brought it about that such stories should be written, in order that the things prophesied about Jesus and spoken by him should either be classed as inventions like the rest, or, not being regarded as pre-eminent, should be in no way admired.[6]

[1] iv. 10: *ἐξομοιοῖ ἡμᾶς τοῖς ἐν ταῖς Βακχικαῖς τελεταῖς τὰ φάσματα καὶ τὰ δείματα προεισάγουσι.*

[2] iii. 36.

[3] iii. 22.

[4] iii. 26: *τοῦτον οὐδεὶς ἔτι νομίζει θεόν.*

[5] iii. 29. Pagan oracles, however, came to be quoted as testifying to Jesus.

[6] iii. 32.

After some more reference to the oracles, he formulates the alternative. Either Celsus sees nothing divine or dæmonic in prophets like Amphiaraus, who are said to have been raised from the dead to the rank of gods, in which case he dissents from the religion of the Greeks and is a confessed Epicurean; or he has no right to reject what is related of Jesus on no worse evidence. If he accepts it, he will be obliged to go further and admit that Jesus is more powerful; since none of the others forbids honour to the rest, whereas Jesus condemns all of them as evil demons.[1]

Although, for the reasons already indicated, he could not explain it, we see that it struck Celsus as a paradox needing explanation, that among the Christians a man who had actually lived and died should have come to be worshipped as a great god, or even as God himself. In speaking of the cult of Antinous, he says that the Egyptians would not endure to hear him called a god in the same sense as Apollo or Zeus.[2] This Origen, without reason given, declares to be false. The ceremonial he finds to be merely a case of the usual deceiving mysteries of the Egyptians, brought into relation with a particular person.[3] Of course for Celsus this was the very point of the comparison. The only moral he could draw from it was that the Christians were more credulous than other men in raising a human being to the height of divinity.[4] Yet this cannot altogether have satisfied him, for he never ceases to express his astonishment at such exalted deification of a man recently dead. With the phenomena he saw around him, he would have had no difficulty in understanding the rise of a minor cult.[5]

After some remarks on the relation between faith and

[1] iii. 35. Origen himself appears to be ashamed of this argument: *ἐβουλόμην δὲ πρὸς τὸν οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως τοιαῦτα λέγοντα τοιαῦτά τινα πρεπόντως αὐτῷ ἀδολεσχῆσαι.*

[2] iii. 37: *κἂν παραβάλῃς αὐτῷ τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα ἢ τὸν Δία, οὐκ ἀνέξονται.*

[3] iii. 36.

[4] This was reinforced afterwards by Hierocles with new illustration from the Life of Apollonius.

[5] A curious point in Origen's demonology may be noted in passing. He tells us (c. 37), as part of the higher knowledge of "esoteric" Christians, that, as there are many men who think they possess truth in philosophy, so there are among separated souls and angels and demons, some that are falsely persuaded they are gods.

prejudice, he went on to accuse the Christians of appealing in public only to the ignorant and servile,[1] and of underhand proselytising among boys and weak women.[2] Of their secret propaganda in households he gives a graphic account. They tell youths not to regard their parents or lawful instructors, but to listen only to them. If the father or teacher or any person of knowledge comes on the scene, their reduction to silence or whispering contrasts with their volubility in corners where there is no one to oppose them. Thereupon they will lead off the children with their playmates to some conventicle, promising to give them perfect instruction; and in this way they succeed in persuading them.

Origen affects to treat all this as abuse. So far as public appeals are concerned, the philosophers would be glad to draw such multitudes together if they could. Some of the Cynics have attempted something of the kind, and when it is a question of teaching philosophy, instead of Christianity, to ignorant popular audiences, Celsus and his like have no objection to raise, but consider the attempt philanthropic.[3] Far from being peculiarly indiscriminate in their appeals, the Christians put those who are willing to hear them through a preliminary examination, and exercise strict discipline over them afterwards.[4] The deeper parts of their doctrine they reserve for those who have made progress.[5] Why should they be blamed for appealing to slaves? The philosophers pride themselves on having turned slaves as well as others to the virtuous life. Is that permissible to "you, O Greeks,"[6] while "we," the Christians, are to have no credit for our philanthropy? In private, Christian propagandists have no wish to draw away pupils from grave preceptors or studies.[7] To the complaint that they will not speak out in the presence of the fathers of boys whom they are trying to proselytise, Origen replies

[1] iii. 50. Cf. 18: *πάντα μὲν σοφὸν ἀπελαυνόντων τοῦ λόγου τῆς πίστεως αὐτῶν μόνους δὲ ἀνοήτους καὶ ἀνδραποδώδεις καλούντων.*

[2] iii. 55.

[3] iii. 50.

[4] iii. 51.

[5] iii. 52.

[6] "Greek" here, as so often, means an adherent of philosophic culture or "Hellenism." Origen is himself described as a Greek by race.

[7] iii. 56.

that they are only too glad to open themselves before elders who are serious-minded.[1] Would not philosophers similarly mask themselves before the frivolous?

Celsus expresses himself as willing to apologise if he has said anything too harsh; but, to show that he has spoken under compulsion of the truth, he proceeds to quote the calls to every one who is sinful, unwise, and so forth, to come and be received into the kingdom of God. Does not the "sinful" mean the unjust, the thief, the poisoner? What different class would a robber call to his company? In the other mysteries, the call is to those only who are pure of hand and just and of good conscience.[2] Origen does not here venture to make explicit his usual assumption that the ethical element was absent from all cults except the Christian, but replies by distinguishing between the general multitude whom the Christians receive to make them better, and those who are admitted to the peculiar mysteries of the religion. These are reserved for the just and pure not less but more rigorously than any other mysteries.

We are told, continues Celsus, that God will receive the unjust man who humbles himself through baseness; but the just man who has practised virtue and looked up to him from the beginning he will not receive. When he is represented as having to be moved by loud lamentations over past misdeeds, he is made to judge not in response to truth but to flattery. Origen of course meets this by asserting the impossibility of sinlessness for man; but here he does no more than restate in Pauline language a concession made by Celsus in words perhaps cited by him from the Book of Job (xv. 14, xxv. 4).[3] Celsus explains his meaning more fully by the observation that to change the nature completely is very difficult, and that those who (in an ordinary sense) are free from fault, are better for the fellowship of life.[4] And Origen is in the end obliged to admit that he may have represented the faith of the less rational Christians correctly in saying that they regard God as

[1] iii 58. [2] iii. 59.

[3] iii. 63: *τοῦτο μὲν ἐπιεικῶς ἀληθές, ὅτι πέφυκέ πως τὸ ἀνθρώπινον φῦλον ἁμαρτάνειν.* The equivalent, however, is to be found in Isocrates, 89B: *ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἅπαντες πλείω πεφύκαμεν ἐξαμαρτάνειν ἢ κατορθοῦν.*

[4] iii. 65: *φύσιν γαρ ἀμεῖψαι τελέως παγχάλεπον · οἱ δ' ἀναμάρτητοι βελτίους κοινωνοὶ βίου.*

an unjust judge who lets off the bad if they bewail themselves and appeal to his pity, and rejects the good if they do not.[1]

The charge of hostility to knowledge is one of those to which Celsus constantly returns. The Christians, he says, teach directly that "knowledge is an evil."[2] The wise, in their view, turn away from their doctrines deceived by wisdom.[3] He brings all this to a head by declaring that they thus insult the God of the universe "to the end that they may lead worthless men astray by light hopes and persuade them to despise the things that are better."[4] Origen replies by a distinction between true and false wisdom. None who have true wisdom reject Christianity when explained by a competent instructor. Any philosophy that leads men to reject it must be false.[5] A little later, he attacks all the four recognised philosophic schools,—the Epicureans, the Peripatetics and the Stoics by name, and the Platonists by implication.[6] Are any of these the skilled physicians from attention to whom Celsus accuses the Christians of withdrawing ignorant minds? The Platonists Origen does not care to condemn by name, because he is engaged in adapting their doctrine of immortality to Christian teaching. With those who teach the permanence of the soul, he says, we have some things in common. He reserves for a more suitable occasion the proof that the blessed life to come will be only for those who accept the religion of Jesus and allow no regard for generated things to contaminate the purity of their theism.[7] By this contamination he means the permission of statues; in which, as he maintains elsewhere, all the philosophic schools alike have rendered themselves accomplices with the crowd, thus falling under the guilt of idolatry.

Having finished three books, the apologist at length begins to be conscious of the seriousness of his task, and, at the opening of the fourth, invokes divine assistance. What he has to deal with now is a concentrated attack on the idea of a special revelation to a particular people or to their self-constituted successors. The refutation, Celsus holds, of those

[1] iii. 71. [2] iii. 75. [3] iii. 72.
[4] iii. 78. [5] iii. 72. [6] iii. 75.

[7] iii. 81: *πρὸς οὓς κοινά τινα ἔχοντες εὐκαιρότερον παραστήσομεν ὅτι ἡ μέλλουσα μακαρία ζωὴ μόνοις ἔσται τοῖς [τὴν] κατὰ τὸν Ἰησοῦν θεοσέβειαν καὶ εἰς τὸν τῶν ὅλων δημιουργὸν εὐσέβειαν εἰλικρινῆ καὶ καθαρὰν καὶ ἄμικτον πρὸς ὅτι ποτ' οὖν γενητὸν παραδεξαμένοις.*

Jews or Christians who say that some God or Son of God has come down or is to come down to earth as a corrector of things here, does not need a long discourse.[1] Origen finds that the defence needs one of some length.

Does God, the claimants of authority from the revealer are asked, come down to learn what is going on among men, as if he did not know all? Or does he know, and yet not set things right, because he cannot do this by his divine power, without sending a deputy? Or does he leave his own seat because, being unknown among men and feeling himself neglected, he wishes to make trial of those who believe and those who do not, like the newly-rich exhibiting themselves in their grandeur? To say so is to lay to his charge a stock of very paltry desire for signs of honour.[2] Or, if they say that the coming down is for the salvation of men, how is it that God first thought of correcting human life after so long a period of negligence?[3]

The question why God does not set human affairs right if he knows them, replies Origen, may be retorted on Celsus if he is a believer in providence.[4] In our view, God's method of working is to be always sending those whose office it is to introduce corrections. Of old the revelation how he is to be served was committed pre-eminently to Moses and the prophets. Now Jesus has come, not to be the Saviour merely of those in "one corner" of the world, but so far as depends on him (*τὸ ὅσον ἐπ' αὐτῷ*), of all men everywhere.[5] One reason for divine revelation is that unbelievers may have no excuse.[6] It was not delayed: there were friends of God and prophets in every generation.[7] A particular race no doubt was preferred: "the Lord's portion is his people; Jacob is the lot of his inheritance" (Deut. xxxii. 9). But this, the preparation for the coming of Christ, is a mystery too profound for the

[1] iv. 2: *ὅτι δὲ καὶ Χριστιανῶν τινες καὶ Ἰουδαῖοι, οἱ μὲν καταβεβηκέναι [λέγουσιν,] οἱ δὲ καταβήσεσθαι εἰς τὴν γῆν τινα θεὸν ἢ θεοῦ υἱὸν τῶν τῇδε δικαιωτήν, τοῦτ' αἴσχιστον, καὶ οὐδὲ δεῖται μακροῦ λόγου ὁ ἔλεγχος.*

[2] iv. 6: *πολλὴν [γοῦν] τινα καὶ πάνυ θνητὴν φιλοτιμίαν τοῦ θεοῦ καταμαρτυροῦσι.*

[3] iv. 7.

[4] Celsus, we shall see, had a philosophical theory to meet this.

[5] iv. 4.

[6] iv. 6.

[7] iv. 7.

popular hearing,[1]—a matter for deep searching of Scripture on the part of those who "philosophise."[2] The many, for their part, must be content simply to put their trust in God and the Saviour and his *ipse dixit* (*αὐτὸς ἔφα*).

The flood and the last judgment, Celsus contends, are fables having their source in misunderstanding of what the Greeks and others have told about deluges and conflagrations that occur in concomitance with certain periodic states of the universe.[3] "We," replies Origen, "attach neither the deluge nor the conflagration of the world to cycles and periods of the stars, but say that the cause of both alike is sin."[4] As for the "coming down" of God, to which Celsus makes repeated reference, this is figurative; a reply which may serve also for the mockery that, according to the Christians, "God will come down bringing fire, like a torturer."[5] When God visits the world, he comes to purge sin. The "refiner's fire" (Mal. iii. 2) is a metaphor.

To the argument that God, being perfect and unchangeable, cannot become of the nature of mortal man, Origen replies first that the Scriptures say so too; and then points out that, according to the Christian doctrine, God the Word ceases not to exist continually in the same perfection through having taken upon him a human body and soul.[6] And yet this assumption of a human body and soul is not merely apparent, as Celsus argues that it must be,—and therefore, as deceptive, must be unworthy of God,[7]—if the divine is not to become of inferior nature.[8] Are "the Greeks," Origen asks in the course of the argument,[9] to be allowed to interpret metaphorically what is said of the tearing in pieces of Dionysus by the Titans and his coming to life again, while the Christians are not to be allowed to bring out the logical implications of their own Scriptures?

On the recriminations between the Jews and the Christians, an extremly contemptuous passage of Celsus is preserved; in which he compares them to assemblies of bats or ants or frogs or worms declaring that the God of the universe busies himself solely with them and their affairs, that they rank next to him, and that all things—earth and water and air and stars—have been subjected to them.[10] And the worms—that is,

[1] iv. 8. [2] iv. 9. [3] iv. 11. [4] iv. 12.

[5] iv. 13: *ὅτι ὁ θεὸς καταβήσεται δίκην βασανιστοῦ πῦρ φέρων.*

[6] iv. 15. [7] iv. 18: [8] iv. 19. [9] iv. 17. [10] iv. 23.

says Origen, "we,"—are made to say: "Now, since some among us offend, God will come, or will send his Son, that he may burn up the unjust and that the rest of us may have eternal life with him." These things, Celsus added, would be "more tolerable from worms and frogs than from Jews and Christians quarrelling with one another;" meaning evidently that the arrogant claim to be exclusive objects of divine care is less worthy of rational than irrational animals.

For Origen, the question is settled in advance by the destruction of Jerusalem and the ruin of the "race of all Jews," at the end of "one whole generation," after what Jesus had suffered at their hands. If any one wishes to refute the assertion that they did thus draw upon themselves the wrath of God, let him show it to be false that they are now in this condition.[1] The fact that the piety of Christian believers is so steadfast as not to be overcome by the persuasiveness of rational arguments, ought, Origen thinks, to contribute to the proof that they are not to be compared to worms.[2] The comparison—which, however, he will not imitate Celsus by making—would apply better to the philosophers who try to contemplate the nature of the universe and of the soul without divine revelation.[3]

Though insisting that the Jews are now for ever rejected from divine favour, Origen has still to contend for the illustrious character of their race. One evidence is that there was no painter or sculptor in their State[4]: so rigorous were they in rejecting idolatry. That they were not merely fabling for themselves an illustrious ancestry in tracing back their pedigree to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, he tries to show by appeal to the fact that these names conjoined with the name of God, are used in prayers and exorcisms not only by members of the nation but by those in general who occupy themselves with enchantments and magic.[5] This was no doubt the fact on

[1] iv. 22.

[2] iv. 26: *ἡ τηλικαύτη εὐσέβεια, οὔθ' ὑπὸ πόνων οὔθ' ὑπὸ κινδύνου θανάτου οὐθ' ὑπὸ λογικῶν πιθανοτήτων νικωμένη.*

[3] iv. 30.

[4] iv. 31: *οὔτε γὰρ ζωγράφος οὔτ' ἀγαλματοποιὸς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ αὐτῶν ἦν.*

[5] iv. 33: *ὧν τοσοῦτον δύναται τὰ ὀνόματα συναπτόμενα τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ προσηγορίᾳ, ὡς οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθνους χρῆσθαι ἐν ταῖς πρὸς θεὸν εὐχαῖς καὶ ἐν τῷ κατεπᾴδειν δαίμονας τῷ ὁ θεὸς Ἀβραὰμ καὶ ὁ θεὸς Ἰσαὰκ καὶ ὁ θεὸς Ἰακὼβ ἀλλὰ γὰρ σχεδὸν καὶ πάντας τοὺς τὰ τῶν ἐπῳδῶν καὶ μαγειῶν πραγματευομένους.*

which Celsus relied in maintaining, as he seems to have done, that the names were those of certain deceivers of old who were in great repute for their arts, and from whom therefore the people desired to trace its descent. Origen takes the same fact as a proof of the holiness of the ancient men whose names were thus used. In the eyes of modern comparative mythologists, it will tend to confirm the theory that the names were at first those of ancient gods of the Semitic race, and that only later did they become those of its heroes and ancestors. A similar, though not quite identical, conclusion is suggested by what Origen tells us about the use of the angelic names Michael, Gabriel and Raphael, and, it may be added, of the name of Jesus. All were at first names of gods; and how much of the supernatural character remained, or how much could be restored, depended on obscure circumstances only traceable in an imperfectly preserved literary tradition.

Celsus went on to describe the stories in Genesis of the fashioning of man by God from the earth, and of his fall, as clumsily put together by the Jews in a corner of Palestine, where they had never heard that these things had been sung long ago by Hesiod and innumerable other inspired men.[1] This gives Origen an opportunity to make one of his rhetorical points. Can it really be the Epicurean Celsus who calls the poets "inspired men" (*ἄνδρας ἐνθέους*)? Such mythologisers as Homer and Hesiod, the Christian Father holds, were rightly expelled by Plato from his ideal State; but of course Celsus is a better judge than Plato![2] The account in Genesis, he proceeds, is maliciously turned into ridicule by Celsus, who does not even consider the possibility of an allegorical interpretation, though in the sequel he says that the more reasonable-minded Jews and Christians try to allegorise things they are ashamed of.[3] Then, provoked by the reference to the formation of woman out of a rib of the first man, he quotes from the *Works and Days* the account of the fashioning of Pandora by Hephæstus at the command of Zeus. And this ridiculous myth, he exclaims, is to be treated as a philosophical allegory! So also, it seems, are the stories

[1] iv. 36.

[2] The Hellenic Platonists respectfully dissented from their master on this point.

[3] iv. 38: *καίτοι γε ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς λέγων ὅτι οἱ ἐπιεικέστεροι Ἰουδαίων τε καὶ Χριστιανῶν ἐπὶ τούτοις αἰσχυνόμενοι πειρῶνταί πως ἀλληγορεῖν αὐτά.*

told by Egyptians and other barbarians. The right to allegorise is to be refused to none but those who interpret the Jewish authors.

He then tries to show the allegorical nature of the occurrences in the Garden of Eden by comparing the Platonic myth of the birth of Eros. This, he thinks, may have been borrowed by Plato when he was in Egypt from those who knew something of Judaism. He complains that the attack ignores the more edifying things in Genesis. When, however, Celsus, referring to the plot of Rebecca and Jacob against Esau, declares it absurd that God should be represented as dwelling nearest to such as these, Origen finds here no exception to the beauty and strength which he sees in the recorded actions of the friends of God.[1] If, as Celsus objects in the ancient spirit of contempt for interested morality, God is made to reward the just by abundantly satisfying their material needs, it is replied that "all these things happened unto them for types: and they are written for our admonition, upon whom the ends of the world are come" (1 Cor. x. 11). On the story ("worse than Thyestean," Celsus calls it) of Lot's daughters, Origen's apology[2] might have served as a model for the most accomplished of the casuists satirised by Pascal. Naturally, he does not spare a counter-attack on the Greek myths. Then he returns to the question, Who has the best right to allegorise? Celsus maintains that the Jews and Christians have no such right, their early records being mere foolish stories without any deeper philosophical meaning.[3] It appears that he was not judging without examination, but had looked into some of the allegorising writers. "Their allegories," he says, "fit together, with a kind of amazing and absolutely tasteless folly, things that can in no way be harmonised."[4] In passing, he described a disputation between "one Papiscus and Jason" as "worthy of pity and hate rather than of laughter."[5] This has not come down to us; but it is known to have been a popular work in which the Christian view of the prophecies supposed to refer to Christ was defended against the Jews. Origen

[1] iv. 43: ἄγχιστα δὲ τούτοις πᾶσι συμπολιτευόμενον εἴ φαμεν τὸν θεόν, τί ἄτοπον πράσσομεν πειθόμενοι μηδέ ποτε ἀφιστάνειν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ θειότητα τῶν μετὰ τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ἐρ'ρωμένως βιοῦν αὐτῷ ἀνακειμένων; Esau was a bad character (cf. 46: ἀνδρὸς κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν ὁμολογουμένου φαύλου). In v. 59 Origen says that he knows only of a plot of Esau against Jacob, not of a plot of Jacob against Esau.

[2] iv. 45. [3] iv. 50. [4] iv. 51. [5] iv. 52.

insists that "pity and hate" are incompatible feelings, but allows that the book is not among the writings adapted to move intelligent readers. He thinks that if Celsus had read Philo with attention he would have thought better of his allegorising method; since there is much in Philo of Greek philosophy.

Starting from the *Timæus* (like Julian afterwards) Celsus proceeded to develop a philosophical view of creation as against the Judæo-Christian view.[1] Though Origen here finds that nothing is to be made of the attempt to excite prejudice against the "Epicurean," modern readers must be struck with the bent towards scientific naturalism that went along with the Platonism of Celsus. He seems to have opposed to the idea of an original production of the various kinds of bodies by successive acts of volition, the general philosophical conception that it is of the essence of material things to be in an alternating flux; so that particular bodies must be explained as resultants of one uniform natural process, and not assigned without further inquiry to the will of a maker.[2] "No offspring of matter," that is, no particular material body, "is immortal."[3] The necessity of evil (as with Plato) results from the plunging of souls into the flux. Since its primal source is always the same, its total quantity can neither be increased nor diminished.[4] There are periodic movements of mortal things, but no miraculous catastrophes.[5]

To part of this, Origen raises the objection that some evils have been abolished while others have sprung up in human history.[6] An obvious reply would have been that this illustrates the balance; but in any case the objection does not touch the position of Celsus, who had spoken of the "evils in things" (*κακὰ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν*) regarded as portions of the whole. He did not hold that human societies have always existed, but, in a Lucretian spirit, traced man back to beginnings as a mere animal.[7] "Without philosophising," Celsus had remarked, "it is not easy to know whence evils are born." "Nor yet is it easy if you do philosophise," retorts Origen, "nor perhaps possible without divine inspiration." The

[1] iv. 54 ff.

[2] iv. 60: *κοινὴ ἡ πάντων τῶν προειρημένων σωμάτων φύσις καὶ μία ἐς ἀμοιβὴν παλίντροπον ἰοῦσα καὶ ἐπανιοῦσα.*

[3] iv. 61. [4] iv. 62. [5] iv. 69. [6] iv. 63.

[7] iv. 79. Origen tries to make an inconsistency out of this.

greatest of evils is ignorance how God is to be served; and that some of the philosophers have been thus ignorant is proved by the existence of different sects in philosophy. According to the Christian view (*καθ' ἡμᾶς*), no one who does not know that it is an evil to think that piety is preserved in the established laws of what are commonly thought to be States, has it in his power to know the source of evils. And no one who has not an accurate knowledge regarding the Devil and his angels and how he came to be the Devil has it in his power to know the source of evils.[1] Evil in us has not matter for its cause, but the choice made by our ruling principle.[2] A periodic and necessitated cosmic movement, like that which Celsus affirms, would take away our moral responsibility (*τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν*).[3]

Miraculous interpositions, which Celsus had protested against as involving an anthropomorphic conception of Deity,[4] Origen defends as a kind of medicine periodically administered by the Creator when the world is in need of it. That evils are such only to individuals, and are part of the order of the whole, he is able to admit in his own way.[5] The Scriptural imagery about the "wrath of God," he defends as a mode of speech adapted to human weakness. When Celsus, going more into detail, argues against the view that all things were made for man, Origen points out that he is in opposition to the Stoics, and again affects to associate him with the Epicureans.[6] But in fact it was especially by the Platonists that the opposition to the narrow teleology of the Stoics was carried on. What is given of the arguments of Celsus has much in common with the treatment of the subject by Plutarch earlier and by Porphyry later. He points to the signs in the lower animals

[1] iv. 65. One implication is that the Devil and his angels founded "the religion of the Gentiles."

[2] Of course no one denied that moral evil is properly a wrong choice made by the will or the person. The metaphysical question was, How is this possible? Platonic philosophers tried to solve it by the necessity of "matter" as a principle of diremption, setting one thing (in a world like ours) in rivalry with another. What Origen puts forward as a different solution, is a mere restatement of the problem.

[3] iv. 67.

[4] iv. 69: *ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὡς ἄνθρωπος τεκτήναμενός τι ἐνδεῶς καὶ ἀτεχνότερον ὁ θεὸς προσάγει διόρθωσιν τῷ κόσμῳ, καθαίρων αὐτὸν κατακλυσμῷ ἢ ἐκπυρώσει.*

[5] iv. 70. [6] iv. 75.

of an innate intelligence by which they rule their actions for their own preservation, as against the view that they are simply "irrational" and created only to be subservient to man. With Origen it is a fixed dogma that no animal but man can possess reason. If any seem to perform rational actions, it is in them blind instinct of nature; they are really moved by a divine intelligence external to them. The hexagonal cells in hives are part of an arrangement set in action that bees may provide men with honey.[1] In referring to what Celsus relates of the way in which ants help one another with burdens, Origen comments to the effect that to represent ants as having knowledge in doing this, will turn away people of the simpler sort from giving the like mutual aid, because they will no longer have the consciousness of a superiority as human beings.[2] Remembering afterwards a well-known passage in Proverbs (xxx. 24-28), he escapes from the necessity of admitting that the animals mentioned are really "wise," by treating proverbial, or "parabolic,"[3] literature as consisting essentially of "enigmas." "Wherefore also it is written in our Gospels that our Saviour said: 'These things have I spoken unto you in proverbs' (or parables)." And here he thinks it appropriate to quote the statement of Celsus that those who allegorise the books of the Jews and Christians do violence to the intention of the writers; adding the triumphant declaration that now it may be considered as confuted.

That Celsus did not seriously found anything on what he brought together about the divinatory powers of certain animals,[4] Origen himself suspects. The argument that such animals are in closer relation to the Deity than the men who have to consult them in order to gain knowledge of the future, looks like a final and rhetorical touch in a brief literary development of the thesis, and does not seem intended to be taken for more. At any rate, it gives Origen an opening for a long disquisition, in the course of which he states it as the Christian view that certain demons of the Titan or giant race, impious and fallen from heaven, enter into the bodies of animals, preferably birds or beasts of prey, and making them the vehicles of their own fore-knowledge, lure mankind by this means from the worship of the true God.[5]

[1] iv. 82. [2] iv. 83.
[3] iv. 87: ἐπιγέγραπται γὰρ τὸ βιβλίον Παροιμίαι.
[4] iv. 88. [5] iv. 92.

The tone in which Celsus brings this portion of his argument to a close seems of itself to exclude the idea that he attached any weight to his excursion into the lore of divination. "Not therefore for man have all things been made, as neither have they been made for the lion or the eagle or the dolphin; but that this world as a work of God should become complete and perfect altogether. For the sake of this, have all things had their measure assigned, not for the sake of one another (except secondarily) but of the whole. And God cares for the whole; and this whole providence never forsakes; nor does it become worse; nor does God after an interval turn it back to himself; nor does he become angry on account of men, any more than he becomes angry on account of apes or mice. Neither does he threaten those beings of which each in its particular order has received its allotted part."[1]

Origen goes through this, point by point, agreeing or differing as his dogma requires. Then he concludes the fourth book by again, as at the beginning, invoking divine assistance for the continuance of the work.

At the opening of the fifth book, he observes that Celsus in asserting as he does that no God or Son of God has ever come down to men,[2] is in effect denying the popular mythology. The philosophical resistance to the new faith was at a tactical disadvantage here, and the Christian apologist can again profess to discover traces of the impious "Epicurean."

Passing now from the nature of the supreme unity to the graduation of beings in the universe, Celsus puts questions skillfully directed to show that Christianity, and even Judaism, implied in principle as much "polytheism" as the official religion of the Græco-Roman world. Of what nature, he asks, are the "angels," spoken of by the Jews and Christians? Are they what others call gods, or are they "demons"?[3] And since the Jews revere the heaven and its angels, why do they refuse all honour to the sun and moon and the other stars?[4]

To this Origen replies with a certain moderation. The angels are sometimes called "gods" in the Scriptures, but they are not therefore to be worshipped in place of the supreme God.[5] They are certainly not "demons," for this name is to be understood only of evil powers acting without a gross body.[6]

[1] iv. 99. [2] v. 3. [3] v. 4. [4] v. 6.
[5] v. 4. [6] v. 5.

The Jews worship a God not merely above the parts of the heaven, but above the whole heaven itself. As the chosen people of the Supreme, they were not allowed to worship anything subordinate like the heavenly bodies, which were assigned to "the nations" (Deut. iv. 19, 20.)[1] Yet the sun and moon and stars, as works of God, are often celebrated in the Scriptures. Perhaps they are guided by higher intelligences. The opinion of Anaxagoras, that the sun is merely a "red-hot mass," does not commend itself to Origen. Like Philo, he has here come under the influence of the later Hellenism.

Accordingly he does not, in replying to the attack of Celsus on the "resurrection of the flesh," defend the literal sense of the doctrine. This was held, he seems to allow,[2] by the simple-minded believers; but St. Paul, in what he said about the "spiritual body," had indicated a truer view. Celsus, on his part, distinguishes "some of the Christians" from those whom he is attacking; but on the believers who cherish the "hope of earthworms," that after being long dead they are to rise up from the ground with the bodies they formerly had, his attack is unsparing. What soul of a man would desire a putrified body? And how can a body, once decomposed, return to its former state? "Having nothing to answer, they flee to a most absurd subterfuge, that everything is possible to God. But God cannot do what is vile, nor does he will to do what is against nature . . . For he is the Reason of all beings, and cannot do a work that is contrary to reason or to himself."[3] Contemptuous as the phrases are, Origen does not feel himself hurt by them. For in fact his own doctrine is the immortality of the soul, contrasted by Celsus in the same passage with that of a physical resurrection. The ideas of the earliest believers have been left behind, and those of Greek philosophy substituted, as they had begun to be in the Pauline writings. With the heretics, however, who altogether deny the Scriptural dogma of the resurrection, Origen will not make common cause. There is to be a body, but it is to be glorified.[4] And even a literal resurrection of the former body, he retorts on Celsus, is in accordance with some doctrines of the Greeks. The Stoics suppose that, after their

[1] v. 10. [2] v 19.

[3] v. 14 : *αὐτὸς γάρ ἐστιν ὁ πάντων τῶν ὄντων λόγος · οὐδὲν οὖν οἷός τε παράλογον οὐδὲ παρ' ἑαυτὸν ἐργάσασθαι.*

[4] v. 22.

world-conflagration (for they too have this), bodies exactly like those that existed before will appear in the new cycle without even the remains of these to grow from. And surely this is more paradoxical than what is really held by Christians, who suppose the new body to grow, not indeed from the old, but from a λόγος latent in it.[1]

The Jews, Celsus proceeded, whatever one may think of their religion, do at least agree with other men in practising a form of worship which is that of their ancestors. This seems expedient, not only inasmuch as they are preserving laws that were arrived at by common consent in the particular country where they are in force, but also because it is a reasonable view that the different parts of the earth have been from the beginning distributed among different powers.[2] Thus it is unholy to dissolve what has been established by custom in each place.

To this view Origen brings as an objection unholy customs, such as incest and human sacrifice, sanctioned by various religions. Are these to be preserved where they are established?[3] Further, if religion is an affair of local custom, must not the same principle be applied to the moral virtues?[4] Then he attempts a positive view. Celsus, in what he says on the distribution of the parts of the earth among the gods of the nations, has been misled by certain dim traditions "outside the divine word." To learn the truth, we must go to Deuteronomy (xxxii. 8, 9) and to the account in Genesis of the tower of Babel. This indeed has a secret meaning not to be divulged to the uninitiated, but a hint may be given. All except one race wandered "from the East" (Gen. xi. 2), that is, from the light of truth, and may be supposed to have been placed as a punishment in various localities under the government of inferior angels. The one race that was "the Lord's portion" was not, indeed, exempt from shortcomings, but for a time these were not irreparable. At length, this race too having been completely scattered abroad for its sins, the revelation of Jesus is come to all; and, against a revelation

[1] v. 23.

[2] v. 25: δοκεῖ δ' οὕτως καὶ συμφέρειν, οὐ μόνον καθότι ἐπὶ νοῦν ἦλθεν ἄλλοις ἄλλως νομίσαι καὶ δεῖ φυλάττειν τὰ ἐς κοινὸν κεκυρωμένα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι ὡς εἰκὸς τὰ μέρη τῆς γῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄλλα ἄλλοις ἐπόπταις νενεμημένα καὶ κατά τινας ἐπικρατείας διειλημμένα ταύτῃ καὶ διοικεῖται.

[3] v. 27. [4] v. 28.

from the supreme God, the customs prevailing among the dispersed portions of the human race under the penal dominion of lower powers have naturally no right to exist. Accordingly, when Celsus asks the Christians whence they in particular derive their paternal laws, and tells them that they are merely revolters from the Jews, Origen replies that now, "in the last days," "the house of God, which is the Church of the living God, the pillar and ground of the truth" (1 Tim. iii. 15) is "exalted above the hills" and that "all nations shall flow unto it" (Isa. ii. 2). "And we say to those that ask us whence we are come or what leader we have, that we come according to the pledges of Jesus," from all nations, to beat our swords into ploughshares and our spears into pruning-hooks, "becoming through Jesus sons of peace."[1]

Here are plainly to be seen the theocratic pretentions of the "great Church"[2] as against the system of local liberties and tolerance which Celsus was defending in terms of a "theologico-political" theory elaborated to meet practical exigencies. It did meet them on the whole, but it needed accommodation, as Origen was able to show. For the empire did not recognise every detail of religious custom as absolutely sacred. More than a generation before the treatise against the Christians was written, a decree of Hadrian had made all human sacrifices illegal. And the local religions, while their privileges generally were maintained, had no power of coercion over individual dissentients who chose to neglect their rites. So, when Celsus quotes the famous passage of Herodotus (ii. 18) on the inviolableness of their own customary laws to each people, Origen replies by asking what then is to be thought of the teachings of the philosophers against superstition (*κατὰ δεισιδαιμονίας*). And if the right of those who philosophise to desert paternal custom is recognised, how can that of the Christians be denied? Celsus and those who think with him, were they serious in their appeal to custom, would have to lay down the rule henceforth that those who in Egypt adopt the opinions of the philosophers must continue to practise all the abstinences from kinds of food and all the ritual of the Egyptian religion. Any one who did this would be a queer philosopher.[3]

It seems to have been already perceived in the second

[1] v. 33. [2] Cf. v. 40.

v. 35 : *γελοῖος ἂν εἴη φιλόσοφος ἀφιλόσοφα πράττων.*

century that pleas of this form, urged on behalf of the Church, were not really for liberty but for power. Thus Celsus, as if by anticipation, had devoted the next portion of his argument to invalidating the exclusive claims of the Christians (founded on those of the Jews) by setting against them other claims that seemed *a priori* no less valid. Then, at the end of the section, he pointed out that those who arrogate a divine right of dominance over the world cannot even agree among themselves but differ more fiercely than other men. Origen's method of reply is simply to reaffirm the claims; but there is some interest in observing how he does it.

The god Ammon, says Celsus, has no worse claim to convey messages as to what is sacred than "the angels of the Jews."[1] Ammon, replies Origen, may command abstinence from the flesh of cows, and such a command may to a superficial view appear on a level with similar prescriptions in the Jewish law. If, however, Celsus had known the true meaning of such legislation as that of Deut. xxv. 4, he would have known that it is symbolical and refers to the relations of men (cf. 1 Cor. ix. 9), and not to "irrational animals."[2]

There is record in history, Celsus pointed out, of the introduction of a new god, Serapis.[3] But the Son of God, Origen replies to the intended parallel, if he came but recently to dwell among men, is not therefore new; for the Scriptures have knowledge of him as the eldest of all creatures, by whom man was made in the image of God. Serapis came in yesterday or the day before by the deceit of Ptolemy, who wished to show to the Alexandrians, as it were, a god manifest.[4] How he was constructed, and what various things of nature he participates in, we have read in Numenius the Pythagorean. Then, as if unaware that he is himself displaying the parallel

[1] v. 36.

[2] From a modern point of view this is an unfortunate example. Origen had an opportunity of drawing attention to the humanity of the Jewish legislation regarding animal life; and the texts he could have quoted would have met with recognition from a Pythagorean or a Platonist. Yet, so far is he from taking this line that he seems to go out of his way to enforce the characteristic hardness of the new religion, faithfully preserved in the authorised teaching of the Catholic Church as still expounded by its philosophic theologians.

[3] v. 37.

[4] v. 38: *περὶ δὲ Σαράπιδος πολλὴ καὶ διάφωνος ἱστορία, χθὲς καὶ πρώην εἰς μέσον ἐλθόντος κατά τινας μαγγανείας τοῦ βουληθέντος Πτολεμαίου οἱονεὶ ἐπιφανῆ δεῖξαι τοῖς ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ θεόν.*

syncretism, he goes on to set forth the all-comprehensive attributes of the Son of God.[1]

The Jews, Celsus concedes, are not to be blamed for clinging to their own customs, but only for the claim they make to be holier than other men.[2] Though Origen's reply here repeats some positions given above, it contains one or two details worth noting. If it is true, as Celsus maintains, that neither the monotheism nor the rites of the Jews are their peculiar property, we must still distinguish. The name by which the Highest is called is not indifferent: for, as was said before, names are something more than conventional signs. This is especially the case with divine names. To call upon "the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob" has an efficacy in controlling the demons which would be entirely lost if one were to substitute in the formula translations of the names of the patriarchs. So likewise with the names of Israel, of Sabaoth, and of Adonai. Zeus is not the same as Sabaoth: for his name is not divine at all, but is that by which a certain demon pleases to be called upon, who is not friendly to man nor to the true God.[3] Circumcision, though it cannot be denied to be common as a rite to the Jews and to other nations, nevertheless differs according as the doctrines of those who practise it differ. It may have been performed because of some angel hostile to the Jewish race, who was thus deprived of his power to injure.[4] When Jesus had undergone the rite, the angel's power against the uncircumcised who worship only the Creator was altogether destroyed, so that there was no further need to avert injury by the shedding of blood. Kinds of abstinence, again, differ according to the intention. If for example, Christian ascetics abstain from the flesh of animals (though no longer required to observe the distinctions of meats according to Jewish law), this is in order to bring the body into subjection, and not, as with the Pythagoreans, because they think they are sparing their kindred.[5]

Reference to the Jewish and Christian doctrine of angels led

[1] v. 39. [2] v. 41. [3] v. 46.

[4] v. 48. Following a method already adopted by Hebrew interpreters for getting rid of anthropomorphisms in the Bible, Origen substitutes an "angel" for "the Lord" in the barbaric story of Ex. iv. 24-26. Celsus would hardly have seen in this explanation a proof that the Jews and Christians were exempt from demonolatry.

[5] v. 49.

again to an incidental criticism of the resurrection-narratives in the Gospels. Origen begins an attempt at reconciliation of discrepancies, but cuts short the reply by hinting at a mystical significance of the number of angels at the tomb in the different narratives. Equally strange stories, he proceeds,[1] are told among the Greeks.

In noting the contradictory positions of the Christian sects, Celsus brought in the speculations of the Gnostics; though he was aware of the exclusive pretentions of the "great Church," with its acceptance of the God of the Jews as at once the creator of the world and the highest God. It appears from the account given that he knew of Christians who lived according to the Jewish law,[2] as well as of the anti-Jewish Gnostics. Origen repudiates some of the Gnostic sects on the ground that they are not Christian at all. Of some he declares that he has never come in contact with them. Here, however, what Celsus was chiefly concerned to bring into view was the unmeasured vituperation of one another by sects all of which claimed to be Christian, and their deadly mutual hate.[3] Origen tries to palliate differences, as before, by comparing with them the quarrels of philosophical and medical sects. The hatred imputed he will not admit. To hate those that have been led astray by heresies would be inconsistent with the blessings pronounced in the Gospel on peacemakers and on the meek. Celsus from his point of view had not failed to observe the same contrast; as may be seen from his trenchant summing-up. "All those," he says, "who are so much at variance and who in their wranglings confute one another with the most shameful abuse, you will hear saying, 'The world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world.'"[4] Whereupon the apologist exclaims in triumph that all cannot say this; for some of the heretics do not accept the Pauline epistles. Now the passage cited is from Paul (Gal. vi. 14), and they would not quote the Apostle whom they reject.

Though the beginning of the doctrine is naught, continues

[1] v. 57.

[2] v. 61. Of these Origen writes: *οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ διττοὶ Ἐβιωναῖοι, ἤτοι ἐκ παρθένου ὁμολογοῦντες ὁμοίως ἡμῖν τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἢ οὐχ οὕτω γεγεννῆσθαι ἀλλὰ ὡς τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀνθρώπους.*

[3] v. 63: *καὶ βλασφημοῦσι δέ, φησίν, εἰς ἀλλήλους οὗτοι πάνδεινα ῥητὰ καὶ ἀῤῥητα· καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴξαιεν οὐδὲ καθ' ὁτιοῦν εἰς ὁμόνοιαν, πάντῃ ἀλλήλους ἀποστυγοῦντες.*

[4] v. 64.

Celsus in entering upon the next section of the argument, let us examine the teaching itself.[1] Then he compares the religious and moral precepts of Christianity with those of philosophy, and finds that the same things have been said better by the Greeks and without overstrain, or the assertion that they were spoken by God or a son of God.[2] To this Origen sets himself to reply in the sixth book; remarking first that he has no quarrel with the teachings adduced from the philosophers, but that, excellent as they are in themselves, they have the defect of not appealing to the multitude. He is obliged to confess, however, that if Plato is read only by students, Epictetus at any rate is in popular use.[3]

Then the tone changes. It turns out that Plato's wisdom became folly, according to what St. Paul said (Rom. i. 21-23): for the men who have written such things as Celsus quotes about the "first good" go down to the Piræus to offer up prayer to Artemis and to gaze on a procession of the vulgar.[4] In the opening passage of the *Republic*, the Christian Father can see nothing but a degrading compliance with popular idolatry; which was appropriately avenged when God chose the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, "that no flesh should glory before God" (1 Cor. i. 27-29). The truth that was in Plato did not profit even himself, for he thus incurred the punishment of sinners.[5]

Pursuing the argument, Celsus remarks that Plato, although perceiving that the highest knowledge is accessible to but few, does not talk in a portentous manner, and stop the mouths of questioners, and straightway command the acceptance as of faith that "such is God, and he has such and such a Son, and this Son came down and conversed with me."[6] Apparently as a proof that there was after all something portentous about the philosophers, Origen thinks it relevant to quote various marvels from their biographies; again bringing forward the story of Plato's virgin birth. Moreover, Plato himself, in one of his epistles (Ep. vi. p. 323 D) has stated the doctrine of a

[1] v. 65: *φέρ' οὖν, εἰ καὶ μηδεμίαν ἀρχὴν τοῦ δόγματος ἔχουσιν, αὐτόν ἐξετάσωμεν τὸν λόγον.*

[2] vi. 1. [3] vi. 2. [4] vi. 4.

[5] vi. 5. Cf. 3: *διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τοὺς τὰ ἀληθῆ περὶ θεοῦ ὑπολαβόντας καὶ μὴ τὴν ἀξίαν τῆς περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀληθείας θεοσέβειαν ἀσκήσαντάς φαμεν ὑποκεῖσθαι ταῖς τῶν ἁμαρτανόντων κολάσεσιν.*

[6] vi. 8.

divine sonship; speaking of the God of all as the Father of the ruling principle and the cause.

In what Celsus had to say about faith, there occur in the form of deductions from the Christian view, put as absurdities, positions that have since been adopted seriously by the bolder apologists. Because we say that the Son of God suffered the most disgraceful punishment, "Believe all the more."[1] Again; if one sect brings in one person, another another, and all alike say, "Believe if you wish to be saved, or depart," what shall they do who really wish to be saved? Shall they decide by throwing dice?[2] The first challenge was accepted in the paradox of Tertullian.[3] The second will at once suggest to modern readers "the wager of Pascal:" Stake your eternal happiness on the truth of that creed whose promises and threats are the most transcendent.

The distinction between human and divine wisdom, observed Celsus, is not new, but is to be met with in Heraclitus and other philosophers. Then he points out that a fitting humility in presence of the divine law is taught by Plato (*Leges* iv. 715 E-716 A). This the Christians have distorted into a base humility.[4] Plato had also said, before the Gospels, that no one can be extremely rich and attain the height of goodness.[5] In reference to the last point, it is interesting to note that according to the spokesman of the Church the expressions "rich and poor" in the Gospels are not to be understood literally. "For not even the first man you meet would praise the poor indiscriminately, of whom the most part have the very worst morals."[6]

A tangled disputation on the sources of the idea of a heaven or heavens, and on the gnostic sects, Christian or non-Christian, and related topics, is important for ecclesiastical history, but does not contribute much to the direct argument on either side. It may be noted that, according to Origen's

[1] vi. 10: *ταύτῃ καὶ μᾶλλον πίστευσον.*

[2] vi. 11.

[3] *De Carne Christi*, 5.

[4] vi. 15: *ὁ ταπεινοφρῶν ἀσχημόνως καὶ ἀπαισίως ταπεινοῦται, χαμαιπετὴς ἐπὶ τῶν γονάτων καὶ πρηνὴς ἐρριμμένος, ἐσθῆτα δυστήνων ἀμφισκόμενος καὶ κόνιν ἐπαμώμενος.*

[5] vi. 16: *ἀγαθὸν ὄντα διαφόρως καὶ πλούσιον εἶναι διαφερόντως ἀδύνατον.*

[6] vi. 16: *οὐκ ἂν γὰρ οὐδ' ὁ τυχὼν ἀκρίτως τοὺς πτωχοὺς ἐπήνεσεν, ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φαυλότατοί εἰσι τὰ ἤθη.*

report, certain Oriental sects (the "Ophiani"), declared by him to be non-Christian, and perhaps representing the oldest Gnosticism, denied even the existence of Jesus; going beyond the "docetists" who said that he had only an apparent body.[1] Celsus, in his investigations, had come upon strange formulæ of Eastern mystagogues, in which the primeval idea recurred of a "slaying" of the heaven and earth and of many people that they might live, intermingled with ideas of the cessation of death by the death of sin. Everywhere he found the symbolism of the "tree of life," and of a "resurrection of the flesh from the tree"; but of course completely misinterpreted it when, with vigorous sarcasm, he treated it as derived from historical circumstances.[2] Modern anthropologists know that, whether an actual Jesus died on the cross or not, the imagery is far older. The suggestion of Origen that Celsus had invented the most primitive details of it[3] is peculiarly absurd.

A passage which has been thought inconsistent with the opinion that identifies Celsus with Lucian's friend who wrote against magic would by itself rather confirm this; although for the rest the evidence is decidedly against it, since the friend of Lucian was plainly an Epicurean.[4] Celsus quotes, as from a certain Dionysius whom he had met,[5] the view that, for those who live the life of philosophic virtue, magical arts lose the power they have over others. The fact that he quotes this, instead of giving it directly as his own view, would seem to show that he desired to avoid any except a purely hypothetical concession to the claims of magic.

While pointing to representations derived, as he thought, by Christianity from Mithraism, Celsus does not appear to have

[1] vi. 28: *ὅρα γοῦν πῶς ἀλογώτατον πεποίηκεν ὁ Κέλσος ἐν τοῖς κατὰ Χριστιανῶν λόγοις παραλαβὼν ὡς Χριστιανοὺς τοὺς μηδ' ἀκούειν θελόντας τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ, κἂν ὅτι σοφός τις ἢ μέτριος τὰ ἤθη ἢ ἄνθρωπός τις ἦν.* The *ἢ* before *ἄνθρωπος* was omitted on conjecture in the edition of Delarue (1733), which till Koetschau's served as the basis for newer editions. (See Koetschau's textual note, vol. ii. p. 98).

[2] vi. 34: *πανταχοῦ δὲ ἐκεῖ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς ξύλον καὶ ἀνάστασιν σαρκὸς ἀπὸ ξύλου, διότι οἶμαι ὁ διδάσκαλος αὐτῶν σταυρῷ ἐνηλώθη καὶ ἦν τέκτων τὴν τέχνην. κ.τ.λ.*

[3] vi. 35.

[4] The failure of the attempt to maintain the identification has been made clear by Pélagaud.

[5] vi. 41: *Διονύσιόν τινα μουσικὸν Αἰγύπτιον.*

connected the idea of Satan in particular with the Persian religion. He finds that the old Greek mythologists, in their stories of Titans and Giants, offer sufficient materials for distortion into the Christian notion of the Devil. This he regards as involving an impious attribution of human weakness to the highest God, who is represented as having an adversary limiting his power.[1] Origen's reply consists mainly in an attempt to show that the idea of a diabolic resistance to God is present in the Hebrew Scriptures, and therefore cannot have been derived from Greek fables, which are younger. Into his attempts at allegorising we need not try to follow him, especias he admits himself that they are rather beside the mark.[2] They are exceeded in irrelevancy, however, by his disquisition on the Antichrist.[3]

The idea of the Son of God Celsus takes to have been derived from the language of "ancient men" who applied similar names to the world because God is its source.[4] Origen once more replies by insisting on the greater antiquity of Moses and the prophets as compared with the ancients whom Celsus has in view.

Next comes a discussion on the Mosaic cosmogony, which, so far at least as the creation of man is concerned, Celsus declares to resemble the stories of world-production that the poets of the Old Comedy set forth in jest.[5] In the detailed argument, Origen evades some points by affecting uncertainty whether Celsus is aiming his darts at the cosmogony in itself or as it is interpreted by the heretics. To the description of the heterodox interpretations as "abysmal nonsense" (λῆρον βαθύν),[6] he would have had no objection; but Celsus, he complains, has not even discriminated heresy from heresy.[7] He does not profess here to give a full reply: for an adequate exposition whole treatises would be required. With the subject of the six days' work he has dealt in his commentary on Genesis.[8] In what follows, he appropriates as far as possible the Platonising expressions of Celsus on the relation between God and the universe. Of course the most refined philosophical theses are supposed to be present in the Scriptures. No light that was

[1] vi. 42. [2] vi. 44. [3] vi. 45, 46.

[4] vi. 47: ἄνδρες παλαιοὶ τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ γενόμενον παῖδά τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἠίθεον προσεῖπον.

[5] vi. 49. [6] vi. 50. [7] vi. 53.

[8] vi. 60. This exposition is lost.

not there can have been derived from the heathen. Celsus is in darkness, and wishes to cast darkness over the eyes of Christians.[1]

Amid the deluge of Scripture-quotations and expositions in which it is hardly possible to detect anything that appears as if it might once have looked like the semblance of a reply to an outsider, a topic of some philosophical interest emerges. Celsus raises objection to the expression "God is spirit" (*πνεῦμα ὁ θεός*) as having a corporeal reference;[2] and maintains that the Christians, in what they say of the "spirit of God," do not differ from the Stoics, with their notion of a divine breath that runs through and contains in itself all things.[3] Origen's reply is that when God is said to be "breath" or "spirit," this is to be taken in a metaphorical sense, just as when he is described as a "fire"; and that the Christians do not agree with the Stoics in holding the divinity to be corporeal. In reality, they understand by what they call "spirit" an incorporeal essence (*ἀσώματον οὐσίαν*).

Celsus was here of course thinking in terms of the Greek psychology, for which spirit (*πνεῦμα*) meant breath or warm air, intermediate between soul and gross matter. For the Jews and Christians, the "spirit" of man or God, coming primarily from a more archaic psychology, had acquired an application to the highest part of the soul, or principle of life and thought, conceived as a recipient of divine inspiration. Thus it could take no intermediate position, but must be made parallel with mind or intellect (*νοῦς*), the highest part of the soul in the psychology of the Greeks. The Platonising Fathers, having adopted the idea of an opposition of nature between soul (*ψυχή*) and body, must *a fortiori* dematerialise "spirit." Their device, we see, was to treat the expression as figurative. For the possibility of introducing more exact distinctions into their own psychology, they had to wait till another advance had been made by independent Greek thought. It would be vain to look for an immanent development in that which, by courtesy, receives the name of patristic philosophy.

A passage quoted from Celsus a little later puts briefly some

[1] vi. 67 : *Κέλσος μὲν οὖν καὶ οἱ παραπλήσιοι αὐτῷ προβάλλειν σκότον τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἡμῶν θέλουσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ τῷ φωτὶ τοῦ λόγου ἐξαφανίζομεν τὸ σκότος τῶν ἀσεβῶν δογμάτων.*

[2] vi. 70.

[3] vi. 71.

characteristic objections to the Christian scheme of revelation. "If God, waking up, like the Zeus of the comic poet, from the long sleep, was willing to rescue the race of men from evils, why did he send this breath, as you call it, to one corner, when he ought to have blown through many bodies alike and despatched them throughout the whole inhabited world?[1] But it was by way of raising laughter in the theatre that the poet let his Zeus be waked up, and then made him send Hermes to the Lacedæmonians and Athenians. And can you avoid the thought that you have done something more ludicrous in sending the Son of God to the Jews?" When Origen treats it as unworthy of the dignity of philosophy to compare the awakened sender of Hermes in the comedy with God the Maker of all,[2] the retort is obvious. It is precisely the intermittent action and the partiality ascribed to the God of the universe, as distinguished from the gods of popular belief, that the philosopher regarded as more ludicrous.

For the Christian apologists of those ages, as we have in part seen, the vital centre of the case was the fulfilment of what were held to be the Messianic prophecies, by the life and death of the Christ. Thus, when Celsus returns to the attack on this position, again setting the various supernaturalist claims in rivalry with one another, Origen marks the point reached in the controversy by opening another book (the seventh); at the beginning of which he once more invokes divine aid, adding a prayer for the destruction of words against "the truth."

The Christians, says Celsus, while they take no account of the innumerable oracles among Greeks and Egyptians and others, which have benefited mankind by giving equitable decisions for the settlement of the earth, regard as miraculous the things spoken or not spoken by the men of Judæa.[3] To this Origen replies by a tirade against the "demons." Apollo's oracle at Delphi, among other discreditable circumstances, such as being uttered through women instead of men, once went so far as to call frivolous writers like the tragic poets "wise."[4] He notes the insinuation of Celsus in the words

[1] vi. 78: *δέον πολλὰ ὁμοίως διαφυσῆσαι σώματα καὶ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀποστεῖλαι τὴν οἰκουμένην.*

[2] *Our* God (*τὸν τοῦ παντὸς δημιουργὸν θεὸν ἡμῶν*), as Origen puts it, thus emphasising the point that offended the philosophers.

[3] vii. 3.

[4] vii. 6.

"spoken or not spoken" (λεχθέντα ἢ μὴ λεχθέντα); remarking that if Celsus thinks the Messianic prophecies were only written, without having been previously spoken, that shows his ignorance of Hebrew chronology.[1]

Celsus had gone on to state that predictions such as the Christians rely upon in the Jewish writings were still, to his own knowledge, put forth in Phœnicia and Palestine. There are, he says, many kinds of prophecy; but the most consummate is as follows. Then he gives a description of many nameless prophets, in temples and out of temples, each of whom is ready and accustomed to say: "I am God, or Son of God, or Divine Spirit. I am come; for already the world is being destroyed, and you, O men, are lost through wrong-doings. But it is my will to save you; and you shall see me coming again with celestial power. Blessed is he that now worships me, but upon all others I will cast eternal fire, and upon cities and countries. And men who know not their own recompenses (οἱ μὴ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ποινὰς ἴσασι) will repent in vain and groan; but those that have obeyed me I will eternally preserve." They add further, he proceeded, such utterly obscure and crazy things as no one with intelligence can find out the meaning of, for they have no clearness and are nothing; but to every fool or charlatan the things said give a pretext for making out of them anything he likes about anything.[2] Some of these prophets Celsus claims to have personally confuted and brought to confess their method of fabrication.[3]

To this very damaging attack Origen replies by flatly declaring the statements to be falsehoods. If Celsus asserts that prophecy of the old kind has continued in Phœnicia and Palestine, this must be false; for prophecy ceased among the Jews through the departure of the Holy Spirit in consequence of the rejection of Jesus.[4] The statement that many kinds of prophecy are known to him is a false pretence.[5] His assertion that he has personally confuted some of the prophets is a manifest lie. If he wished to be believed, why did he not mention their names?[6] Yet Origen himself tells his readers more than once that he has witnessed the casting out of devils by Christian exorcists. It is fair to add that he does not press his individual testimony, recognising that the fact will, by outsiders, be thought incredible: but he might have remem-

[1] vii. 8. [2] vii. 9. [3] vii. 11.
[4] vii. 8. [5] vii. 9. [6] vii. 11.

bered that the statements of Celsus had on the face of them less improbability than his own.

We may believe without difficulty both that Origen thought he had seen devils cast out, and that Celsus had actually exposed some Messianic impostors or "false Christs."[1] Whether any "true Christ" had appeared whose actions agreed with the Hebrew prophecies as interpreted by the Christians, he thought not worth more particular inquiry. What was to be said on this topic as between one supernaturalist and another, he had relegated to the discourse of his imaginary Jew. For himself, the reflection sufficed that, even if certain writings did predict that God was to eat the flesh of sheep and to drink vinegar or gall, such things were not therefore to be believed;[2] though, in his opinion, nothing so degrading could have been foretold by the prophets. The question is not whether a work has been declared beforehand, but whether it is worthy of God. In the base and shameful, though all men go mad and seem to foretell it, we must still disbelieve.[3] With much of this, Origen, by one of the theological distinctions that were then being wrought out, was able to agree formally. It was not God the Word that suffered and died, but the man Jesus, with whose body and soul God dwelt.[4]

[1] The bearing of these "false Christs" on the mythical theory of the Gospel narrative is ambiguous. On the one hand, it may be said that if the apocalyptic model was so far predetermined that real persons conformed themselves to it, the same model would naturally contribute some of the lines when imaginary but typical incidents were to be woven around an ideal figure. And if, as is likely, insurgent leaders who had uttered apocalyptic prophecies were put to death by Pontius Pilate, it would be easy to assert, after the lapse of a generation, that the New Messiah had appeared during his procuratorship and suffered the same fate. Then we should find ascribed to him the customary predictions of the end of the world mixed with predictions of real events that had happened after the time of Pilate; as in what the critics call the "small apocalypsis" incorporated in the Gospels. On the other hand, the vivid sketch which Celsus gives of the religious agitation continually going on in the East makes it impossible to declare *a priori* that the historical Jesus, if he existed, could not have proclaimed himself the Son of God.

[2] vii. 13.

[3] vii. 14: ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν προείποιεν τοῦτο οἱ προφῆται· κακὸν γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἀνόσιον. οὐκοῦν οὔτ' εἰ προεῖπον οὔτ' εἰ μὴ προεῖπον, σκεπτέον, ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ἔργον ἄξιόν ἐστι θεοῦ καὶ καλόν. τῷ δ'αἰσχρῷ καὶ κακῷ, κἂν πάντες ἄνθρωποι μαινόμενοι προλέγειν δοκῶσιν, ἀπιστητέον.

[4] vii. 16, 17.

Celsus next contrasts the legislation of Moses and of Jesus. If the prophets of the God of the Jews foretold the coming of Jesus, why does God through the law of Moses make it the aim of human life to be rich and powerful, and command his people to slaughter out their enemies without sparing youth or age, and to kill the whole race of them, on pain of suffering the same things themselves if they disobey; while his Son the Nazarene (ὁ Ναζωραῖος ἄνθρωπος) issues the contrary law, that no thought is to be taken about meat or clothing, and that the other cheek is to be turned to the smiter? "Whether does Moses or Jesus lie? Or did the Father, when he sent him, forget what he had laid down to Moses? Or did he condemn his own laws and repent?"[1]

Though Origen's knowledge of the Old Testament enabled him to point out texts, especially in the prophets and psalmists, containing the principles, and even the very expressions, of the teaching of Jesus, he can make no effective use of them, but soon takes refuge in allegory. For the other teachings are there also; and the whole was held to be inspired. According to the true meaning of the old law, as penetrated by what Origen supposed to be a deeper critical insight, the enemies to be slaughtered out are sinful thoughts in the soul;[2] while riches and poverty, just as in the New Testament, have a "spiritual" interpretation. To show that the prophets could not have made riches, in the literal sense, the reward of a righteous life, he quotes from the Epistle to the Hebrews (xi. 37, 38) the list of their sufferings.[3] This of course is doubly irrelevant. The document quoted is Christian; and Celsus had spoken of the ethical teaching of the law in particular, and not of the prophets, as opposed to that of Jesus. An incidental remark is indeed ventured, that with a law of non-resistance to enemies it would have been impossible for the ancient Jews to maintain themselves as a separate political community;[4] but, as this is brought into no sort of relation with what has gone before, it only makes more conspicuous the failure of the reply as a whole.

The Christian idea of a "new earth," Celsus proceeded to argue, was derived from Plato or from the ancient poets.[5]

[1] vii. 18. We may here detect an allusion to one of the gnostic positions about the Demiurgus, of which the mythological development is indicated in the words that follow (καὶ τὸν ἄγγελον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἀποστέλλει;)

[2] vii. 22. [3] vii. 18. [4] vii. 26. [5] vii. 28.

But Moses, replies Origen, was of much greater antiquity than Greek letters, not to speak of Plato and the rest of the Greek authors, who were younger not only than Moses but than most of the prophets. Now Moses had already introduced God as promising the "holy land," the "land flowing with milk and honey." And by this land he could not mean the literal Judæa, which is a part of the earth generally that was cursed for Adam's transgression. The "pure earth situated in a pure heaven," spoken of in the *Phædo*, came therefore from the Hebrews; Plato and "the Greeks" having either heard of or met with the sacred writings and appropriated what they said about the "better land."

To modern readers, accustomed to a Platonised Christianity, the attack on the Christians for the grossness of their materialistic conceptions will seem paradoxical: yet Origen's admissions make it clear that the literalness with which imagery (as he himself regarded it) was understood by the multitude of believers, did not even need to be rhetorically exaggerated for attack. Refuted on every side, continues Celsus, they will return, as if they had heard nothing, to the same question: "How then, unless he be perceptible, shall we know and see God? And how shall we go to him?"[1] Well, he comments, if bodily perception really seems to them the only means of knowing the divine, let them go to the abodes of such gods in human shape as Amphiaraus and Trophonius and Mopsus. These at any rate associate constantly with those who will; and have not merely glided once to their side.[2] In the opinion of Celsus, then, says Origen, what appeared to the disciples of Jesus after his resurrection was a phantom. But how can a phantom have been the source of so many conversions and of so many expulsions of devils?[3] Celsus, however, introduces the Christians as again asking, "What is it possible to learn without sense-perception?" and answers: "The voice is not that of man nor of the soul but of flesh. And yet let them hear, if indeed, craven and body-loving race as they are (*ὡς δειλὸν καὶ φιλοσώματον γένος*), they can give ear to anything. Shut off the vision of sense, and look up with the mind; turn aside from flesh, and awaken the eyes of the soul: only thus will you see God." And if they are in quest of a leader on

[1] vii. 33. [2] vii. 35.

[3] The "visible gods," of whom Celsus speaks, "we know to be demons" (*ἴσμεν γὰρ ἡμεῖς τούτους δαίμονας ὄντας*).

this way, let them shun deceivers and jugglers and those that follow after idols; taking care not to be themselves exposed to derision as having fallen to a lower level than idolatry, worshipping not even an image but a dead man, and seeking a father like unto him.[1]

The last touch, as we learn from Origen's repudiation, refers to the notion that the ruling principle of the world is corporeal,[2] which historians of philosophy attribute to no less instructed a Christian than Tertullian. So far as the defence is relevant, it consists in the citation of thoughts from the New Testament that suggest a more refined interpretation, such as the Pauline distinction between things invisible and the visible things of nature.[3] We shall see, however, that Celsus did not really confound the Christians in an indiscriminate mass, but recognised that those who, in their own language, called themselves the "spiritual," had more philosophical ideas.

Again Origen disclaims formulæ that Celsus may have heard from the "Ophiani," who absolutely deny Jesus.[4] These, he gladly admits, are indeed deceivers and jugglers, and indulge in mythopœic fancies; but they have nothing in common with true Christians.

Whom then, the apologist asks, does Celsus wish us to follow? He sends us, as he says, to inspired (*ἐνθέους*) poets and philosophers, for whom he would have us desert Moses and the prophets. "Blind guides concerning the truth," though they may not have been wholly blind.[5] The passage quoted by Celsus from the *Timæus* (28C), where Plato speaks of the difficulty there is in finding out "the Maker and Father of this whole," he admits to be nobly expressed; but adds that to Plato or any of the Greeks the difficulty was actually insurmountable, for if it had not been so they would have worshipped the Creator only. Celsus appears to think that the knowledge of God is to be attained by some process of mental synthesis or analysis or analogy. In this way, it is at most possible to arrive at the vestibule. In the true sense of knowing, "No man knoweth the Father save the Son, and he to whom," by a certain divine grace, "the Son will reveal him."[6]

[1] vii. 36. [2] Cf. vii. 27. [3] vii. 37.

[4] vii. 40: *Ὀφιανοὶ . . . ὡς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτέρω ἐλέγομεν, τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐξ ὅλων ἀρνούμενοι.*

[5] vii. 41. [6] vii. 44.

Pointing to the disquisition in the sixth book of the *Republic* on the visible and the intelligible world, Celsus thus exhorts the Christians: "These things have been said by men of intelligence, and if you too comprehend anything of them, it is well with you. And if you think that some spirit coming down from God announces divine things, by that spirit we may suppose that these are declared; filled with which, men of old proclaimed much that is good. But if you cannot understand this, be silent and hide your own ignorance, and do not call those blind who see, and lame who run; yourselves being altogether lamed in soul and mutilated, and living with the body, that is, with the corpse."[1]

We are careful, replies Origen, not to set ourselves in hostility with what is well said, even by those outside the faith; and it is we, the abused Christians, who not merely in word distinguish between "being" and "birth," between the "intelligible" and the "visible," between the truth of the former and the deception of the latter. "But some who, by the providence of God, have ascended to the knowledge of such things, act not worthily of the knowledge, and commit impiety."[2] That is (as he explains in the sequel with the usual embellishments from the Epistle to the Romans), the philosophers, by not dissenting from the religious use of statues, were involved in the general guilt of idolatry; so that their superior knowledge only rendered them the more inexcusable. Further, the sacred writers have not been content with a theoretical distinction between "birth" and "being," but have applied it by treating the whole natural life of man on earth as corruption and vanity.[3]

Since you were bent on some innovation, continued Celsus, why did you not take up Orpheus, if none of the other heroes would suffice? By common consent he was in possession of a holy spirit, and he too died a violent death. But perhaps you felt that you had been anticipated. There was Anaxarchus, however, who, being cast into a mortar, and broken under most outrageous blows, said, "Go on bruising the case of Anaxarchus; himself you cannot bruise." This was in truth the voice of a divine spirit. Or, if he too had followers already, there was still Epictetus, who, when his master was twisting his leg, said, undisturbed and with a gentle smile, "You will break it;" and then, when he had broken it, "Did I not say you would break it?" What speech of this kind did your God

[1] vii. 45. [2] vii. 46. [3] vii. 50.

utter when he was being punished? Or else,—since some of you can interpolate her verses—why did you not put forward the Sibyl as the child of God? Or you might have taken Jonah under the gourd, or Daniel from among the wild beasts, or personages still more portentous.[1]

Origen is inclined to conjecture that if Celsus had not been in search of an abusive parallel to Jesus, he would have condemned the poems of Orpheus to be expelled from the well-regulated State; for the Orphic is even more impious than the Homeric theology.[2] The saying of Anaxarchus to the tyrant of Cyprus, and the words of Epictetus, are undoubtedly magnanimous; but the silence of Jesus under insult is still more impressive.[3] If, as Celsus asserts without proof, the Christians have interpolated the Sibylline verses, let the genuine uninterpolated ones be pointed out. In what he says of Jesus (whom, in accordance with the Jewish story, he speaks of as a malefactor), Origen thinks that Celsus was moved by some spirit whose power Jesus had destroyed to the end that he might no longer have blood and the reek of sacrifice, nourished on which he used to deceive the people who seek God in images.[4]

The claim made to novelty on behalf of revelation, Celsus now tests first in the case of an ethical precept, and then in the prohibition of statues, so much dwelt on by Origen. The Christians, he says, have a precept, not to resist violence, but "if you are smitten on the one cheek, offer also the other." This too is ancient. All that they have done is to coarsen the expression. Plato makes Socrates, talking with Crito, argue that one ought never to inflict an injury in return for an injury. This was the opinion of Plato, as it had been the opinion of divine men before him. "But about these and the other things which they spoil in the borrowing, let what has been said suffice. He who cares to seek further will acquire the knowledge."[5]

This, Origen finds, is at any rate an admission of the truth of the Christian precept. And if the substance in the gospel

[1] vii. 53. [2] vii. 54.

[3] It might have seemed obvious here to quote the saying of Luke xxiii. 34; but this does not occur in the earliest manuscripts, and was pretty certainly not extant in the time of Celsus or of Origen. Cyril, in his reply in the fifth century to Julian, who seems to have pleaded it against the Christian persecution of the Jews, declared it spurious.

[4] vii. 56. [5] vii. 58.

and in the quotation from Plato is the same, we must not think that the beautiful phrasing of Plato's Greek raises it entirely above the commoner and simpler language in use among Jews or Christians; although, it must be said, the diction of the prophets has in the original Hebrew an elegance of its own.[1] A greater benefit has, in fact, been conferred on mankind by those who devoted themselves to putting moral precepts in a popular form than by the Greek philosophers, who wrote only for the few.

This argument, which, in one shape or another, we have met with before, if it is intellectually a favourable specimen of apologetic reasoning, is not too ingenuous. Christianity as understood by Origen did not come forward simply with the aim of diffusing a popular version of philosophical ethics. And his Church was fundamentally more hostile to independent philosophy than to "idolatry," as was shown by the event. When it was securely in power, the schools of philosophy were suppressed and "idols" adopted. For the present, however, these were the objects of violent declamation, and intolerance of them the character on which the Christians most prided themselves. Celsus therefore, going on to the next point, tried to show that it was no such ground for pride. The same non-endurance of temples, altars and statues is found among the Scythians and among the Libyan nomads and other nations the most impious and lawless. The Persians too, as is related by Herodotus, thought the use of these external things foolish, because the gods have not human forms; and Heraclitus speaks of the folly of those who pray to statues and cannot distinguish the nature of a hero or a god. But to take statues for actual gods is an error of the most infantile kind. No extraordinary wisdom is needed to see through this. Moreover, the Jews and Christians have no special right to condemn statues in human shape. According to their own documents, "God made man in his own image."[2]

But, answers Origen, if others are intolerant of the same

[1] vii. 59: *οὐδὲ πάλιν ὑπὸ τοῦ κάλλους τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς φράσεως λεγόμενον τὸ αὐτὸ πάντως κρεῖττον εἶναι νομιστέον τοῦ εὐτελέστερον ἀπαγγελλομένου καὶ ἁπλουστέραις λέξεσι παρὰ Ἰουδαίοις ἢ Χριστιανοῖς· καίτοι γε ἡ πρώτη Ἰουδαίων λέξις, ἣ οἱ προφῆται χρησάμενοι καταλελοίπασιν ἡμῖν βιβλία, Ἑβραίων διαλέκτῳ καὶ σοφῇ συνθέσει τῶν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ κατ' ἐκείνους ἀναγέγραπται.* This is one of Origen's most judicious remarks, and may serve to remind us how much the New Testament owes to the English Translators.

[2] vii. 62.

things, their intolerance is not therefore equivalent to ours.[1] The same act in different persons may be due to the most diverse opinions. What distinguishes the Jews and Christians in their refusal to pay regard to statues, is that they are obeying a command of God, whose law forbids them to make the likeness of anything and to worship it.[2]

Celsus went on to say that he was aware of the Christian view that statues are representations of demons. But why should not the orders of divine beings called "dæmons" or "angels" or "heroes" receive their own share of honour? Has not their place in the whole been assigned them by the providence of the supreme God?[3] Origen replies that all, or nearly all, who acknowledge the existence of demons acknowledge that some of them are evil. Now God does not appoint, but only permits, the part which evil beings have in the whole. This, indeed, belongs to a deeper investigation, of which Celsus had no knowledge. So far are the Christians from approving a worship of the demonic or diabolic powers served by "the nations" that they exorcise them by prayers and by lessons from the Holy Scriptures.

To judge by the opening of his eighth book, Origen thought that this method might not be without efficacy as applied to the spirit or demon that animated Celsus.[4] He had before this been brought to confess that his own arguments scarcely suffice without the aid of faith divinely implanted in his hearers, and that the worth of his confutations depends on something other than the "wisdom of men."[5]

The Christians, says Celsus, when they raise objection to the worship of the "demons" on the ground that "no man can serve two masters," are, so far as their thought is concerned, impressing a copy of their own passion on the mind of God.[6] No doubt there is among men a detraction from the service of one when another is served; and the same competition is conceivable in relation to different heroes or demons. But with the highest God, who is untouched by injury or grief, there can be none to compete. Rather, in the service of those ministers who must have received their places in the whole

[1] vii. 63: *οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο ἴσον ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι τούτων ἐκείνους τῷ καὶ ἡμᾶς μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι αὐτῶν.*

[2] vii. 64. [3] vii. 67. [4] Cf. vii. 56, viii. 10. [5] Cf. v. 1.

[6] viii. 2: *νομίζει δὲ τοὺς τοῦτο λέγοντας τὸ ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ἀπομάττεσθαι τὸ σφέτερον πάθος εἰς τὸν θεόν.*

by his appointment, he himself also is served. To say otherwise involves the impiety of dividing the kingdom of God and making a sedition, as if there were some party-chief opposed to him in the universe.[1] For the rest, if they did in fact refuse all honour save to one God, there might be some rational consistency in their unbending attitude; but, as it is, they devote an excessive worship to him who lately appeared, and do not think that in the service of this his minister they commit any fault towards God.[2] If you should tell them that their founder is not peculiarly the Son of God, but that God is the Father of all, and is alone to be truly worshipped, they would not hear of it. What distinguishes them is not really their high veneration for the Supreme, but their extraordinary magnifying of the founder of their sect.[3]

Origen, in the small portion of his reply which has a philosophical character, admits that properly there can be no grief or injury to God. Worship of God, to the exclusion of other powers, is for the sake of the worshippers, who thus guard against withdrawal from their own highest good.[4] Here he coincides in principle, though not in application, with a defender of the pagan ceremonial cults like the author of the *De Mysteriis*, who agrees with his antagonist Porphyry that observances cannot move the gods, but holds that they bring those who perform them nearer to the divinity. And in speculation, here as on occasion before, the Christian Father admits a kind of polytheism. Subordinate "gods" (*i.e.*, the angels) are spoken of in the Bible; though "all the gods of the nations are devils."[5] On the "demons," he thinks it sufficient to educe from the Scriptures the accepted Christian position. Whence, he inquires, can Celsus prove that honours have been appointed to these as to subordinate powers? If Celsus puts a corresponding question about Jesus, "we shall prove that to be honoured has been given him of God, 'that all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father' (John v. 23)." The proof has been furnished through prophecy and miracle.[6] No worship is withdrawn from the Father, since the Father and the Son are one (John x. 30): and yet there are two "hypostases," of which the second is subordinate to the first.[7] Thus the Saviour is not by the

[1] viii. 11. [2] viii. 12. [3] viii. 14. [4] viii. 6, 8.

[5] viii. 3. [6] viii. 9. [7] viii. 12.

Christians (with the exception of a few among the many) regarded as the highest God; for they believe his own saying, "The Father who sent me is greater than I." It is therefore a calumny when Celsus accuses them of subjecting him whom they now call the Father to the Son of God.[1]

We might have taken this for a slightly rhetorical statement by Celsus of the practice of the orthodox Christians as distinguished from their theory; but it is evident from the passage next following[2] that he had definitely some of the Gnostics in view, who in their formulæ declared the Son of Man greater than the God that rules the world. Origen, as usual, repudiates the "heretics;" but he cannot do this without a recurrence to the absurd suggestion that perhaps Celsus did not find the theory, but constructed or added to it. There is nothing whatever in the character of Celsus as revealed in the fragments of his work to justify the ascription to him of fraudulence or indifference to truth. On the contrary, these are the qualities that most strongly arouse his moral indignation.

To forms of cult he evidently attached no importance. In the endeavour to understand the scrupulosity of the Christians, he could only conjecture that their avoiding the setting up of altars and statues and temples must proceed from reliance on the policy of holding together as a secret society.[3] Pure theism does not necessitate their religious separatism. The God who is common to all is good and has need of nothing, and is without envy. What prevents those who are especially dedicated to him from taking part also in the national festivals?[4] If the "idols" are nothing, what harm is there in a public feast? If there are any "demons," then it is manifest that they too are of God, and ought to be propitiated in accordance with the laws.[5]

The religion of the Christians, answers Origen, is too inward and spiritual to permit of their founding external altars and statues and temples. And it seems more reasonable, having regard to the nature of God, to abstain from festivals that trace their beginnings to fabulous stories. If some one should urge that the Christians have holy days of their own, the reply is that the perfect Christian rises above all this symbolism,[6] which in its sensible form exists to remind the many of what they might otherwise forget.[7] These seem to be the rational ele-

[1] viii. 14. [2] viii. 15. [3] viii. 17. [4] viii. 21.

[5] viii. 24. [6] viii. 22. [7] viii. 23.

ments of his answer, disentangled from the Scriptural expositions in which they are involved.

The next argument of Celsus is clear enough in itself, but seems to have been fundamentally unintelligible to Origen through his inability to realise that there could be any ultimate standard but a supernatural revelation. If the Christians have some traditional rule (τι πάτριον)[1] that requires them to abstain from sacrificial meals, then they ought to abstain from the flesh of all animals, as was the opinion of Pythagoras, because of the honour he paid to the soul and its instruments.[2] The implication clearly is: such a generalised position would put the particular scruple on the ground of reason and humanity. In answer, Origen proceeds again to quote the Scriptures in order to show what is or what is not a divine command. If there is any ground for abstinence apart from revelation, to him it can only be the ascetic ground.[3] The Christians do not share the opinion of Pythagoras about souls, but honour only the rational soul and its instruments.[4]

In the same passage, however, we come upon a curious point of coincidence between the philosophers and the orthodox. If, proceeds Celsus, the Christians abstain for the sake of not joining in a banquet with the demons, "I congratulate them on their wisdom," which consists in a slowness to understand that they are always thus participating. For do not the bread they eat and the wine they drink and the fruits they taste and the very water, and even the air they breathe, come to them from the "demons?" The same argument, with the substitution of "demiurgus" for "demons," was pressed by the Fathers against the Gnostics. Celsus is of course arguing on the basis of what was held in common by Jews, by Christians, and by heathen polytheists, who all alike conceived the powers of the visible world under this personal form. But, Origen replies, the good things mentioned come from the angels of God, not from the powers called demons. From these, which are all

[1] Such as the rule of the Essenes.

[2] viii. 28. [3] viii. 30.

[4] Whatever insight was contained in the distinction between the human and the animal mind which the Christians were appropriating, was of course derived from the Peripatetics and the Stoics, who had made it clear to themselves that conceptual thought is peculiar to man. The true line of psychological advance, however, was to make the dogma not more but less hard-and-fast. This was attempted by Plutarch, Celsus and Porphyry.

evil, come famine and drought and pestilence.[1] He thus gives his adherence to a kind of Persian dualism, as against the extreme pessimism of some Gnostics, who formally declared the whole visible world evil. Later orthodoxy tended to a completer acceptance of the philosophic position that the system of the world is an absolute unity; though this had still to be reconciled with the existence of a devil. By the belief in the devil and his angels Origen is so deeply permeated that he will allow those who, like Celsus, are under their government, and "know not God," to give thank-offerings to demons.[2] And comparison with other passages shows that this is not mere irony.[3]

The remainder of the book strongly confirms the view that Celsus was not simply a detached philosopher, but was a practical administrator, probably a Proconsul, like Hierocles, the later opponent of Christianity, His last resource is to try to persuade those who will still, in spite of all argument, adhere to the new faith, not to set themselves in open opposition to public institutions and withdraw wholly from civic life. The danger of a combined attack by the barbarians on the Empire was visible, as indeed it had been to Tacitus.[4] The spirit to resist, Celsus evidently felt, was departing. Thus he is brought to appeal to the surviving patriotism of the more reasonable Christians to come to the aid of the State against its impending destruction, which threatens to involve philosophy and their own religion in one ruin. Those who have commented on the closing passage have noticed how Origen has cut down the

[1] viii. 31.

[2] viii. 33: *καὶ διὰ τοιαῦτα δὲ Κέλσος μὲν ὡς ἀγνοῶν θεὸν τὰ χαριστήρια δαίμοσιν ἀποδιδότω.*

[3] Cf. viii. 34: *οὐκ ἀναιροῦμεν οὖν καὶ ἡμεῖς τὸ πολλοὺς εἶναι δαίμονας ἐπὶ γῆς ἀλλά φαμεν εἶναι μὲν αὐτοὺς καὶ δύνασθαι ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων κακίαν, μηδὲν δὲ δύνασθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἐνδυσαμένους τὴν πανοπλίαν τοῦ θεοῦ.* In c. 36 a curious fact is given about foods "tabooed" in the names of the "demons," accompanied by a characteristically naïve explanation.

[4] See *Agricola*, 12; *Germania*, 33. Consciously or unconsciously, Tacitus brings into proximity with the danger from without a symptom of internal decline. Speaking of voyages to discover the reported "pillars of Hercules" in the northern Ocean, he remarks that "daring was not wanting to Drusus Germanicus, but Ocean stood in the way, both of inquiry into himself and into Hercules. Soon no one any longer made the attempt: it seemed holier and more reverent to believe than to know about the deeds of the gods." (*Germania*, 34.) This was *praeparatio evangelica* in the ancient religion.

appeal. Substantially he has nothing to reply to the charge of "incivism" against the Christian Church. Indeed, some ground is given for the inference that the conversion of the barbarians after the dissolution of the ancient State was already a not unattractive prospect.

Before his final appeal, Celsus tries to terrify the fanatics, who publicly insult statues and blaspheme the gods,[1] with the vengeance of those "demons" in the reality of whom, we must remember, they firmly believed. Origen, while half conceding that this may have been done by uneducated Christians, declares it contrary to the divine law, which bids us "bless and curse not;" and argues that no Christian could be foolish enough to expect that his impunity after such an act would contribute to destroy the ordinary opinions about the gods. For neither the founders of the impious systems of so-called philosophy that deny providence nor those who embrace their doctrines have suffered any of the things that are thought evil by the multitude. On the contrary, instead of having fallen visibly under the displeasure of heaven, they enjoy health and wealth.

A priest of Apollo or Zeus, says Celsus,[2] would answer with the verse of the gnomic poet about the "mills of the gods,"[3] or with that of Homer on the punishment of children's children.[4] Origen of course knows the philosophic teaching which Celsus, as we see by his putting the appeal to terror in the mouth of a priest, holds in reserve. This teaching he urges against the tone of the appeal. Chastisement is not in the end an evil to be feared, since it is for the good of the punished; and the individual is responsible only for his own sins. To show that this "better" view is the teaching of the Bible, he quotes Ezekiel; adding that the present is not the proper occasion to explain the significance of the "parable" in Exodus about "visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation." Then, to the counter-argument of Celsus, that the God of the Christians did not avenge what was undergone by his Son, he replies that vengeance was taken when Jerusalem was destroyed.[5]

[1] viii. 38: *εἶτα . . . φησὶ τοὺς Χριστιανοὺς λέγειν· ἰδοὺ παραστὰς τῷ ἀγάλματι τοῦ Διὸς ἢ Ἀπόλλωνος ἢ ὅτου δὴ θεοῦ βλασφημῶ καὶ ῥαπίζω, καὶ οὐδέν με ἀμύνεται.*

[2] viii. 40.

[3] *ὀψὲ θεῶν ἀλέουσι μύλοι, ἀλέουσι δὲ λεπτά.*

[4] *Il.* xx. 308.

[5] viii. 42.

To an enumeration of the benefits conferred by oracles, he opposes similar marvels related in the Scriptures; observing incidentally that the philosophic schools of Democritus and Epicurus and Aristotle have not believed in the Greek stories, but would perhaps have believed in "ours" if they had witnessed the evident miracles performed by Moses or by some of the prophets or by Jesus himself.[1] And what but miraculous powers could have given the apostles of Jesus, "unlearned and ignorant men," the courage to devote themselves to the preaching of Christianity.[2]

The mystagogues of other sacred rites, says Celsus, hold out the threat of eternal punishment as you do. Why should we believe your threats more than theirs?[3] Origen here again proposes the ethical test. Who is brought to live better by the threatenings? For the rest, the evidence relating to the pagan oracles is nothing compared with that from the fulfilled predictions of Hebrew prophecy.

Approaching now the end, Celsus turns with a final expression of contempt from those who believe they are to rise again for reward or punishment with their bodies, and makes his appeal to the more philosophical, who conceive that which is eternal in them to be the soul or the mind (whatever they choose to call it, spirit or living soul or offspring of a divine and incorporeal nature). With Christians of this kind he can hold discourse.[4] Perceiving evidently the kinship of their "spiritualist" doctrines to the more mysterious among the teachings of early philosophers, he goes on to cite Empedocles as one of those who declare that men have been banished to a life of wandering in the body, either because this is requisite for the ordering of the whole, or to expiate some ante-natal sin, or through some drag on the soul.[5] Then, since the "demons" are the guardians of this earthly life, must you not pay deference to them if you wish to live at all, and not forthwith to go out of the world?[6] The Egyptians, for example, tell of the control such powers exercise over the parts of the human frame.[7] Yet, on the other hand, "perhaps we ought

[1] viii. 45. [2] viii. 47. [3] viii. 48.

[4] vii. 49: *τοῖς μήν γε τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὸν νοῦν (εἴτε πνευματικὸν τοῦτον ἐθέλουσι καλεῖν εἴτε πνεῦμα νοερὸν ἅγιον καὶ μακάριον εἴτε ψυχὴν ζῶσαν εἴτε θείας καὶ ἀσωμάτου φύσεως ἔκγονον ὑπερουράνιόν τε καὶ ἄφθαρτον εἴθ' ὅ τι καὶ ὅ τι χαίρουσιν ὀνομάζοντες), τοῖς τοῦτο ἐλπίζουσιν ἕξειν αἰώνιον σὺν θεῷ, τούτοις διαλέξομαι.*

[5] viii. 53. [6] viii. 55. [7] viii. 58.

not to disbelieve wise men," who say that most of the terrestrial demons, being bound to fleshly things, can only hold out to men or cities the prospect of material benefits; whence devotion to them must have its limits, so that we may not become too much attached to the body and forget what is divine.[1]

This concession was adapted to the popular demonology of of the Platonists, who were joining with Neo-Pythagorean reformers to oppose animal sacrifices. From those reformers Christians of the higher type, to whom Celsus is now addressing himself, had no doubt derived some positions, as the Essenes are thought to have done earlier. Porphyry, who himself wrote against blood-sacrifice, and urged as a popular argument the demonology here referred to by Celsus, appears to have maintained in his work against the Christians that they had no right to reject in principle what was commanded by the Jewish law. The Christian Father has hardly a glimpse of this difficulty. Any one, he exclaims triumphantly,[2] who may have thought our position impious when Celsus was theologising on oracles, and we affirmed that they were works of demons, can now see that in the end he is obliged to agree with the Christians, "as if conquered by the spirit of truth."[3] We can have nothing to do, he reiterates, with the powers that love the reek of sacrifice. And yet service to such a power was just as plainly commanded by the Jewish law as by the laws of "the nations;" though it was opposed in passages of the prophets, as by Greek philosophers and reformers, from Heraclitus[4] onward. Origen, to whom names were so important, would probably have defended himself by distinguishing between "angelic" and "demonic" exactors of bloodshed; if he had not chosen rather to recur to his method of allegorising the law.

To the appeal of Celsus not wilfully to provoke the anger of rulers, who cannot have had assigned to them the government of things here without some dæmonic might, Origen replies partly in language not unworthy of a philosopher, by rejecting

[1] viii. 60. [2] viii. 62.

[3] When Celsus suggests as an alternative that it may be better to regard the demons as really in need of nothing and as doing justice without favour, but as pleased with the voluntary offerings of piety, Origen finds that he has slipped back into falsehood under his own wickedness. Then he judicially concludes: *δοκεῖ δέ μοι συγχεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸν τόπον καὶ ὅτε μὲν τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ὑπὸ τῶν δαιμόνων ταράττεσθαι, ἔσθ' ὅτε δὲ καὶ 'ανανήφων ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπ' ἐκείνοις ἀλογιστίας ἐπ' ὀλίγον τι βλέπειν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.* (viii. 63.)

[4] Fragm. 5 (Diels).

all unmanly compliance, and partly by calling to mind that the Christians too have been taught that "the powers that be are ordained of God" (Rom. xiii. 1)[1] and have been commanded to "honour the king" (1 Peter ii. 17).[2] They cannot, however, swear by the emperor's fortune; because "fortune" is either nothing but a name, in which case it ought not to be sworn by, or it is actually one of the evil demons. Celsus doubtless remembered that he was addressing Oriental sectaries, from whom the modes of thought that had given birth to the titles of Alexander the son of Ammon, and Ptolemy the Saviour, and Antiochus the God Manifest, and Divus Julius, were not alien; yet he shows no disposition to override the individual conscience, but allows, and even affirms strongly, that all tortures and all deaths ought to be endured in preference to doing or saying anything impious towards God.[3] But, he says deprecatingly, and as if hoping that æsthetic feeling might count for something, you will show more reverence to God by praising the Sun or by singing a beautiful pæan to Athena, thus going through the manifestations of divinity in detail, than by stopping short at a colourless devotion to the highest.[4]

We have no objection, Origen replies, to praising the Sun, as a creature of God: indeed we do this of our own accord; but, as we flee fables and seek truth, we cannot dissociate Athena (whom some may allegorise into Wisdom),[5] from the manifold adventures of the goddess. Nor may we sing hymns except to God and his only-begotten Son, whom the sun and moon and stars also hymn.

Then, returning to the argument about the respect to be paid to rulers, he quotes the warning of Celsus to the Christians that, in view of their attitude, it is reasonable for the Emperor to take measures against them. "For if all should do the same as you, there will be nothing to prevent his being left alone and deserted, and the things on earth becoming the prey of the most lawless and the wildest barbarians; no fame being left any longer among men either of true wisdom or of your religion."[6] And, he proceeded, it is no use your saying that

[1] viii. 65. [2] viii. 68. [3] viii. 66.

[4] viii. 66: *ἐὰν δὲ κελεύῃ τις εὐφημῆσαι τὸν Ἥλιον ἢ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν προθυμότατα μετὰ καλοῦ παιᾶνος εὐφημεῖν, οὕτω τοι σέβειν μᾶλλον δόξεις τὸν μέγαν θεόν, ἐὰν καὶ τούσδε ὑμνῇς· τὸ γὰρ θεοσεβὲς διὰ πάντων διεξιὸν τελεώτερον γίνεται.*

[5] viii. 67. [6] viii. 68.

if the Romans are persuaded by you, and give up their ancestral laws about things divine and human, your Most High will come down and fight for them. In spite of all the promises you attribute to him, his first worshippers, instead of being lords of the whole earth, are left without a clod or a hearthstone; and you yourselves are in hiding and are sought out to be condemned to death.[1] You fancy indeed that you will persuade one set of rulers after another till you have brought all the world under a single authority;[2] but he who thinks it possible that the inhabitants of Asia and Europe and Africa, that Greeks and barbarians to the ends of the earth, should agree in accepting the same law, knows nothing.[3] Come and help the Emperor with all your strength: be his fellow-labourers in administering justice; fight in the army as soldiers and as commanders.[4] Take part in governing your country.[5]

The extremely fragmentary character of the concluding citations is obvious on the surface. Origen's reply, here especially, fills much space but can easily be brought into small compass. "If all should do the same as I," the barbarians will yield themselves to the word of God and be the mildest and most law-abiding of men.[6] It has been foretold in the prophetic writings that all the nations shall be brought "under one yoke." This, in its full sense, is perhaps not possible for those still in the body; but it is not impossible when they are released from the body.[7] We help the emperors by praying for them, as we are instructed to do (1 Tim. ii. 1, 2). You do not make the priests of your own temples serve in the army, seeing that they have to keep their hands pure for sacrifice.[8] The Christians, more than all other men, benefit their countries; for they train their fellow-citizens to piety towards the city of God, "taking up into a certain divine and heavenly city those that live well in the least cities."[9] In each city we have a fatherland of another constitution (ἄλλο σύστημα πατρίδος), founded by the word of God; and we call to govern-

[1] viii. 69. This, it is held, fixes the time of composition of the work of Celsus after 177 (or 176), the date of the rescript of Marcus Aurelius here alluded to; while a reference in c. 71 to "our present rulers" (οἱ νῦν βασιλεύοντες ἡμῶν) places it within the time when Commodus was associated in the empire (177-180). (See Koetschau's Introduction, p. l.)

[2] viii. 71. [3] viii. 72. [4] viii. 73. [5] viii. 75. [6] viii. 68.

[7] viii. 72: καὶ τάχα ἀληθῶς ἀδύνατον μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτο τοῖς ἔτι ἐν σώμασι, οὐ μὴν ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀπολυθεῖσιν αὐτῶν.

[8] viii. 73. [9] viii. 74.

ment over the churches of God those who are unwilling to rule, but whose fitness we recognise and therefore constrain them.[1]

Finally, Origen asks Ambrose whether Celsus fulfilled his promise to write another book, in which he proposed to give instructions to those who were willing to take his advice. If so, he is requested to send it, so that Origen may refute the false doctrine it contains, and at the same time bear witness to the truth of anything that is well said.

It is not altogether because the event is known that readers have been impressed in the concluding passage of Celsus with the consciousness of impending defeat, and throughout the treatise of Origen with his full confidence in victory. As Plutarch said, that from the time of Cæsar the whole drift of things seemed to be to monarchy, so a century or two later it might have been perceived that the drift was to its complement theocracy. Yet, if we look at the present state of the world, we shall find that, so far as there is a principle of rational order in it, it has returned to a system much more like that of Celsus than of Origen. Europe was indeed for a time brought under the "one yoke" of the "great Church," whose law, as Origen proclaimed, was to be king to the exclusion of other laws;[2] but the new reign still left "many unsubdued." In Europe itself the turn of the tide came; and now the Western successors of those who adopted Christianity or had it imposed on them recognise, within limits differing little from those that Celsus and the statesmen of his time would have fixed, the autonomy of local religions. The claim of an authoritative creed to lay down the law within that which it considered its own sphere is repudiated by the principles of legislation. Take for example the government of India, and observe whether it conforms more to the model of Rome in the age of the Antonines or to the ideal of the historic Christian Church.

The doctrine of the "one yoke" is of course still represented. It is cherished by reactionary minds in Europe; and it is embodied in the claims of actual institutions. The Papacy, the Caliphate and the Tsardom alike proclaim an order that is in theory universal, authoritative and revealed. The head of each is a spiritual descendant of the anointed priest-king whose phantom, hovering over the world, has more

[1] viii. 75. [2] v. 40.

than once organised the hopes and fears of the multitude in the interests of absolute power. This ideal, though we call it Asiatic, does not, however, extend over all Asia. Probably starting, as we have seen, from Babylonia, it moved on the whole westward. It was promoted by the denationalising process carried out by Assyrian kings. It seized the imagination of Persians and of Jews, and took form in systematic religious propaganda.[1] At last it realised itself in the Christian and to a less extent in the Mohammedan religion; in "Holy Wars" for Cross or Crescent, and in the Holy Inquisition. Eastern Asia, though not since then wholly untouched by the movement, has in the meantime preserved its own types which are different. In India, a priestly caste secured for itself the highest social rank; but, being pre-eminently speculative, it maintained philosophic liberty, though its distinctive philosophy began as a mystical development of religion, and hardly at all went through a scientific stage like philosophy in ancient Greece and in modern Europe. The more secular-minded races of China and Japan, while preserving the outward form of a political theocracy—the emperor being held divine—placed the idea of the State and not of a Church uppermost. Geographical extremes therefore in a manner meet. The nations that have emerged from the theocratic order of Christendom into the systematised religious tolerance of modern Europe and America have a certain common ground with those that have stood outside the process and formed themselves on a different model from the beginning.

In spite of the industrial chaos and barbarism through which we are passing, a kind of "grammar," not of "assent" but of a liberal order, thus appears to be secure. And on a general survey it does not seem likely that the forces of light will be overpowered by the forces of darkness. Still, it is worth while to remind ourselves that the ancient European civilisation, even in its later and on the whole inferior phase, had something which we have not. The theoretical principles to which the men who practically directed affairs openly appealed as the highest, were those of a free philosophy, not of an authoritative creed. Now the unity that may for good and not for evil embrace the world is that which is arrived at in the end by the consensus of the best minds; not a unity imposed in the name of something outside humanity. For the order of the

[1] See the works of Professors Meyer and Gunkel, referred to above.

universe, so far as man is concerned, expresses itself, as Celsus may still teach us, through human reason, and not through superhuman beings coming down to live among men.

# JOHN SCOTUS ERIGENA

WHENEVER the time shall arrive for a final estimate of the doctors of Latin scholasticism, the compassion expressed by Dante for the virtuous and philosophic heathens whom he saw in Limbo[1] will be transferred to them. Powerful as were their intellects, not even the greatest of them could achieve work having the permanent suggestiveness or the æsthetic value we find even in much that is not of supreme rank in ancient and modern thought. Under the compressive force of authoritative revealed religion, the most that they could do was to prepare the way for happier ages by showing, through the very failure of all constructive effort, that their faith and their philosophy could not live together. In the end, positive advance came not from their results, but from fuller knowledge of the Greeks, whom they themselves, with imperfect means, had sought out as the masters of all science. The humanists and thinkers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries took the right way in breaking, as far as might be, with the middle period. Now, however, that the intellectual contest has long been decided, even those who have least sympathy with that period, ought to make some attempt at doing justice especially to the figures in it that belonged by spiritual affinity not to their own but to a past or a future age.

Among these, unquestionably, the greatest is John Scotus Erigena. Born in Ireland early in the ninth century, he does more than any one else to confirm the opinion that has found favour about the adventurous genius of the Celt. For, while frequently penetrating, through the veil of its Christianised version, to the genuine thought of that Neo-Platonic philosophy which was the last expression of Hellenism, he is even more

[1] *Inf.* iv. 43-45.

remarkable by his direct anticipations of Spinoza and Berkeley and Hegel. And these are not the casual thoughts of one who did not know whither they might tend. No one was ever more clearly conscious of what he meant to say, and of its bearing; and no thinker was ever more audacious. Yet even this illustrates the strength of the spiritual yoke that had now been laid on the European mind. When Erigena comes down from the heights of metaphysics where he is at home to the details of his system, it is evident that for him there is no conceivable structure of life and thought but that of Catholic Christianity. Historical sense has disappeared. Boethius, who died in 524 or 525, was still an "ancient." For him, the Greek and Roman past presented itself in perspective. For Erigena, on the other side of the gulf, it is all "heathendom," with its "secular philosophers," whose intellectual authority has sunk under that of the Church and its fathers. A father like Origen, who had shown comparative independence, he places among the greatest of men. And yet to the intellect of Erigena, in an atmosphere not fatal to criticism, it would have been evident that in the kingdom of thought the least among the Greek philosophers is greater than Origen.

Of his own predilection for the Greeks he was perfectly conscious, though he fancied that it was for the ecclesiastical writers whom he read, when really it was for the older thoughts they transmitted to him. He must have been one of the last in Western Europe to possess an effective knowledge of Greek before it ceased for six centuries. This he had no doubt acquired in the monastic schools of Ireland. From Ireland he found his way to the court of Charles the Bald, the grandson of Charlemagne, who placed him at the head of the royal school in Paris, and set him to translate into Latin the writings attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite. To his translation, Erigena appended some verses in which he vigorously assailed papal Rome, and declared that the glory had departed to the Greeks and to Constantinople. This was an illusion of which doubtless a visit to the Greek empire would have cured him; as the last Neo-Platonists were cured of their illusion that they would find the ideal state in Persia. The Latin West was at any rate alive: the double-headed system of Pope and King or Emperor was less deadly than the Byzantine form of theocracy, as events have shown. Amid conflicting wills, the division of power between the spiritual and the secular chiefs allowed modern Europe to emerge. And Erigena found in practice

the advantage of the division. His imperial patron could protect him from the demand of Pope Nicholas I. that he should be sent to him to be examined, or at least should be dismissed from court.[1] The demand may not unnaturally have been provoked by such verses as these.

"Constantinopolis florens nova Roma vocatur:
Moribus et muris Roma vetusta cadis.
Transiit imperium, mansitque superbia tecum,
Cultus avaritiae te nimium superat.
Vulgus ab extremis distractum partibus orbis,
Servorum servi, nunc tibi sunt domini.
. . . . . .
Truncasti vivos crudeli vulnere sanctos,
Vendere nunc horum mortua membra soles."[2]

But of course it would be an error to regard this as an attack on the order of Western Christendom. The imagination is already that of Dante, that an ideal Christendom had once existed, and that its rulers had become corrupt.

Erigena, it appears from contemporary evidence, was not an ecclesiastic. He is described as a *scholasticus* or man of learning. As such he had won a great reputation, accompanied by suspicions of heterodoxy. These may first have arisen from the treatise he wrote, at the request of Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims, and Pardulus, Bishop of Laon, against the ultra-Augustinian doctrine of predestination put forth by the monk Gottschalk. The treatise of Erigena *De Praedestinatione*, which saw the light (or the darkness) in 851, was condemned by the Synod of Valence in 855, and by the Synod of Langres in 859. These condemnations, however, had no traceable effect on the fortunes of Erigena, and they certainly did not change the spirit of his philosophising. In his great work *De Divisione Naturae*, the distinctive views of his early tract fall into their place as part of a comprehensive system; and still more audacious positions are added to those that had called forth even in that age the wail, "*Putas Filius hominis veniens inveniet fidem in terra?*"[3] Not till the thirteenth century, however, was his later work decisively suppressed. The reason assigned for the suppression was that the "worms

[1] *Joannis Scoti Opera*, Migne, *Patrol. Lat.* vol. cxxii., pp. 1025-6.

[2] *Opp.* 1194.

[3] See the "Monitum ad Lectorem" prefixed to the *Liber de Praedestinatione*. (*Opp.* 353-4.)

of heretical pravity" with which it was found to swarm had attracted the lovers of those profane novelties that the Apostle gives instruction to avoid. In short, it was thought to have contributed to the revolt against the Church which had just been stamped out in blood and fire. After the Albigensian Crusade came the centralised Inquisition; and, in 1225, Honorius III. ("Bishop, Slave of the Slaves of God, etc."), with the usual preamble about the enemy who ceases not to sow tares, sentenced it to the flames.[1]

Thus for the later Middle Ages—for typical Scholasticism—the system of Erigena was unknown. If either then or at the opening of the modern period it had any influence, this must have been indirectly, through positions of his heretical successors in the twelfth century, quoted by orthodox schoolmen in order to refute them. At last, in 1681, Th. Gale, Dean of York (who also edited the book *De Mysteriis*), coming upon a manuscript that had escaped destruction, published the first printed edition. With no long delay, the *De Divisione Naturae* was placed upon the Index of Prohibited Books (1685). Since then, however, the authorities of the Roman Church have decided that, as Erigena's works are so important for the history of Scholastic theology, they may be officially reprinted. Thus the edition that students must now possesss is that of H. J. Floss (first published in 1853) in Migne's "Latin Patrology." There appears to be still important textual work to do;[2] though in the edition of Floss good use was made of the materials available at the time. It seems only fair to recognise here a certain liberality; but, as may be gathered from the notes and preliminary essays, the condemnation passed on Erigena's doctrines has been in no way withdrawn.

The present study aims at giving some account of the philosophy of Erigena as set forth in his principal works. For us, the interest of these is that, in a dark period of European history, they recall the light of the past and prefigure the return to it. Yet, while in speculative power Erigena was probably inferior to no metaphysician that ever lived, we must not expect in the study of him more than historical interest. He cannot, as both late Greek and early modern thinkers still can, furnish us with hints for new paths to follow. Freer though he was than the systematisers properly called "Scholastics" who came

[1] *Opp.* 439-40.

[2] See J. Dräseke, *Johannes Scotus Erigena und dessen Gewährsmänner* (1902).

after him, the superincumbent weight of religion was too heavy to be shaken off. The freedom he could enjoy was the spiritual freedom that has been found not out of reach of a prisoner.

To form an estimate of his intrinsic power, it is instructive to consider the limitations in the philosophical culture of his age. Any History of Philosophy may be consulted for the list of books that he read. He possessed a portion of the *Timaeus* in the Latin translation of Chalcidius, Aristotle *De Interpretatione*, the *Categories* with the *Isagoge* of Porphyry; and, for the basis of encyclopædic knowlodge as then understood, the compendia of Martianus Capella (fifth century), Boethius, Cassiodorus (sixth century), and Isidore of Seville (seventh century). Metaphysical doctrines of Aristotle he knew only at second hand. He was trained of course on the Latin Fathers, and drew much from Augustine's *Confessions* and *City of God*. Works ascribed to Augustine on Dialectic and the Ten Categories were used by him. His favourites, however, were the Greek ecclesiastical writers, whom he read in the original. Of these he is especially devoted to the Pseudo-Dionysius (end of the fifth or beginning of the sixth century), and to Maximus the Confessor (seventh century), who depended on Dionysius and on Gregory of Nyssa (fourth century). This Gregory, Erigena in citing him confuses with Gregory Nazianzen. Through this series he derives, on the theological side, from the school of Origen, whose *Principles* he quotes.

Perhaps it may be thought that the very narrowness of his training gave him some advantage. The discontinuity of culture in the West was doing what Proclus had seen the need of when he expressed the wish that the mass of ancient writings might for a time be withdrawn from the eyes of men. The ancient structure of thought being broken up, it was easier for some of its separate original ideas to go on to new phases. Thus Erigena could carry forward some of the ideas of Neo-Platonism—which, in its genuine Hellenic form, he probably did not know at all—to what we now recognise as a more modern stage. While repeating the mystical positions, he gives the impression of being personally very little of a mystic; and he is more explicitly a pantheist, and is a pantheist of a more naturalistic type, than the ancient Neo-Platonists. On this side he may have been inspired by the poets. As is noted by Prof. W. P. Ker,[1] he quotes the famous lines of Virgil on the

[1] *The Dark Ages* (1904), p. 163.

immanent spirit of the world. These were afterwards the favourite quotation of Bruno (who of course cannot have read his mediæval precursor). To the new faith no positive virtue can be attributed in bringing on this development. Bruno was in conscious opposition to the mediæval view of life; and Erigena deliberately puts forward this side of his thought against what he takes for granted are the received opinions. If the faith had any part in the altered point of view, it was that of Sin and Death and Hell in the philosophy of Erigena himself; these being, according to his interpretation of theological doctrine, the negative element involved in a world-process leading to perfection.

Although the whole philosophy of Erigena is contained in his chief work, *On the Division of Nature*, it is worth while first to give a short account of what he found it possible to bring out in his refutation of Gottschalk. Theologically as the topic of predestination was conceived, he appears from the beginning as a philosopher. True philosophy and true religion, he declares, are identical.[1] The formal statement, indeed, is adopted from Augustine; so that too much stress should not be laid on it taken by itself. But while it might have been applied in either direction, Erigena sets out to argue as a philosopher, and only in a secondary way tries to prove his agreement with the authorities. This gives colour to what in itself is a neutral assertion.

In his references to Gottschalk, the philosopher descends to the conventional language of theological controversy,[2] and professedly holds himself to be defending the Catholic faith against heresy. What the orthodox representatives of the faith thought of the defence, they were not long in showing.

And, if Erigena's rhetoric sometimes goes far, it must be remembered that he was protesting against what he himself describes as the "most stupid and most cruel madness"[3] of the position that part of the human race is, by divine decree, damned to everlasting fire. That there was in his

[1] *Liber de Praedestinatione*, cap. i. 1, 358 A: "veram esse philosophiam veram religionem, conversimque veram religionem esse veram philosophiam."

[2] iii. 7, 369 D: "Merito quippe in oleo atque pice ardere debuisti, qui et lumen caritatis et mysterium praedestinationis perperam docere non timuisti."

[3] i. 4: "stultissima crudelissimaque insania."

inner thought no horror of heresy as such is shown by his contention that heresies (including that of Gottschalk) are useful in stirring up inquiry.[1]

What had drawn down on Gottschalk the condemnation of the church was not precisely the cruelty of his doctrine. Here the question could only be between lighter and darker shades. The true ground of objection was the exalted and self-confident fanaticism that would have diminished the function of the priest. If there was a "double predestination," by which every man was already assigned to hell or heaven, the mediation of the hierarchy between man and God, though not necessarily made an end of in theory, became in effect of smaller importance. Now Erigena's position was here not less dangerous than Gottschalk's. Making divine predestination indistinguishable from divine foreknowledge,[2] he is as thoroughgoing a determinist as his antagonist can have been. On the other hand, he abolishes the real hell of the theologians, belief in which was not Gottschalk's heresy. God, he maintains, knows only the real: hence both sin and punishment, being unrealities, fall outside the divine knowledge and have no true causation.[3] They are—to anticipate the later result—passing illusions determined by the apparent separation of individualities which are never really separate, and which will in the end return in appearance also to the unity of the whole.

The practical-minded prelates who had called in a dialectician to help them must have been dismayed to find him, in his opening pages, starting off from the juridical problem of the Roman theologians to speculative metaphysics. For him "the will of God" is identical with the cause of all: and the logic of this does not allow him to think of God as a person among persons, laying down laws and rewarding or punishing their observance or transgression. To necessarian antagonists it must have seemed an evasion when he argued that because the sum of things is a product of the will, which is identical with the being or nature, of God, the predestination in them is not "necessitated"; since the will of God is free

[1] i. 3.

[2] ii. 2, 361 B: "Quod est ergo Deo esse, hoc est ei sapere, et quod est ei sapere, hoc est scire, et quod est scire, id est destinare." The qualification that follows is not allowed essentially to affect this position.

[3] This is a general philosophical statement of his doctrine. Cf. iii. 3, 366 B: "Peccatum, mors, miseria, a Deo non sunt. Eorum igitur causa Deus non est."

and exempt from all constraint of necessity. What he meant was, that there is no difference between the real nature of things and the nature of God, and that this is caused by nothing outside itself. The fundamental thought of Erigena about the causal order allows no more place than that of Spinoza for the possibility that anything could be other than it is. Evils, he grants, are also foreseen in a manner, and therefore predetermined:[1] for, as the position was afterwards developed, there is no actual evil that does not contain an effort after some good, and this is real. Nor does he altogether refuse to employ the term "necessity" in relation to particular things.[2] The thought that love in all things loves God, that is, itself,[3] has received a Spinozistic turn.

Of course the argument could not remain all through at this high philosophic level; and much trouble had to be taken in manipulating the authorities. Erigena, however, finds general support in the theory of Augustine, derived from Neo-Platonism, that sin by itself has no positive nature;[4] the disappearance of all good being equivalent to the disappearance of all essence. This he developed with rigorous logic on his own lines, and heroically tried to make the Father agree with him in detail. Who, he asks, can think of contradicting Paul or Augustine?[5] He repeats that sin and death and eternal torments are nothing at all: wherefore they can neither be foreknown nor predestinated.[6] God's foreknowledge or predestination is one with the true and positive essence of things.

Still, though what is proper to evil may be only privation, there is the appearance to explain. Whence comes the appearance of sin and suffering? The answer of Erigena is that it comes not from any divinely created nature, but from a perverse motion of the individual will. As the sin arises from the will of each person, so does the punishment.[7] Neither sin nor punishment comes from God.[8] The sinner damns himself. And it is not the "nature" of the sinner, but only the perverted will, that sins and is punished. No

[1] ii. 4, 5.

[2] ii. 6, 364 B: "Nam si omnium naturarum est necessitas Dei voluntas, erit Dei voluntas naturarum necessitas."

[3] iii. 6, 368 D: "Caritas in omnibus Deum, id est, se ipsam diligit."

[4] vii. 6. Quoted from *De Libero Arbitrio.*

[5] xi. 3, 7. [6] x. 5. Cf. xv. 1. [7] vi. 1. [8] x. 3.

nature, as such, will be punished, and therefore none will be miserable. For every nature either is God or was made by God. Now the creative nature is incapable of misery; and it cannot justly punish the natures which it created.[1] In the system of things, the evil will is prevented from finally attaining its end; and in this its punishment consists. As no nature is punished so also no nature, whether creative or created, punishes.[2] It is sin itself that punishes sin. There is no separate place of punishment.[3] "Accordingly, if there is no beatitude except life eternal, and eternal life is knowledge of the truth, then there is no beatitude except knowledge of the truth. But whatever is believed of beatitude, the counterpart of this must necessarily be believed of its defect, which is misery. Thus if there is no misery except death eternal, and eternal death is ignorance of the truth, then there is no misery except ignorance of the truth."[4]

In this particular treatise, Erigena does not go forward to his doctrine of the restitution of all things at the end of the world-process. No "nature," it is said, is damned; and all natures, as such, enjoy happiness. Yet, as the appearance of sin and punishment, found in the present life, is not said to cease in the future, "eternal damnation" is formally retained, if in an unorthodox sense. Sin continues to punish itself in the future life.[5] A distinction exists between those that are predestined to life and those that are simply left to undergo, in their individual wills, the penalty of sin. As all have sinned, how is this "election" just? Why should any, even so, be "reprobate?"

The theory on which Erigena grounds his reply is that all individual wills were placed in the first man, and therefore can

[1] xvi. 1, 418 AB: "Naturam creatricem miseriae esse capacem, dementissimum est suspicari. Creatrix autem natura quali justitia punitura sit naturas, quas ipsa creavit, non invenio. Nulla dehinc natura punietur, non punita non erit misera." Cf. xvi. 5, 423 A: "divina aequitas non punit, quod sua bonitas creare voluit."

[2] xvi. 4.

[3] xvii. 7, 428 D: "Proinde nulla universitatis parte punitur impius, sed sua propria impietate in se ipso."

[4] xvii. 9, 430 AB.

[5] xvi. 6, 423 C: "In omni enim peccatore simul incipiunt oriri et peccatum, et poena ejus, quia nullum peccatum est, quod non se ipsum puniat, occulte tamen in hac vita, aperte vero in altera, quae est futura."

justly be punished; for each, as thus prefigured, sinned. That which sinned was not the general nature of man.[1] A different view would make the punishment unjust, for in no one can another's sin be justly punished. And, it is repeated, what sins and is punished was not substantially created by God.[2] It was, however, involved somehow in the eternal order of things. To the question why the consequences of sin should be healed in some natures and not in others, an answer is assumed that appears formally orthodox. All might justly have been left in the general mass, but free grace was given to the elect. In the later treatise this is turned into a philosophical doctrine of the necessity that there should be a scale of beings in the universe. Some must be "reprobate," in the sense that all cannot be gods or seraphim. None are deprived of happiness, but there are degrees.

The foregoing exposition, of course, gives little notion of the medium through which Erigena was obliged to work his way to these theories. Yet it must be obvious that the language of the faith did not well fit them. It is interesting to observe that, rough as the time was, he could still make a point incidentally by urging the less vengeful character of human justice as against the theological hell. Even human laws do not decree that men shall sin, and then punish them for sinning; but threaten punishments in order to deter them if possible, and punish to correct them.[3]

*The Division of Nature*, to which I now proceed, is in the form of a dialogue between a master and a pupil. This dialogue is not a catechism. The pupil shares equally in the argument, both putting serious objections and from time to time taking up of his own accord the thread of the positive exposition. The conversation, indeed, is not dramatic in the sense that there is collision between different types of thought. The system expounded is that of Erigena and no other. Yet

[1] xvi. 3, 419 BC: "Non itaque in eo peccavit naturae generalitas, sed uniuscujusque individua voluntas."

[2] xvi. 3, 420 A: "In nullo quippe vindicatur juste alterius peccatum. Proinde in nullo natura punitur, quia ex Deo est, et non peccat. Motus autem voluntarius, libidinose utens naturae bono, merito punitur, quia naturae legem transgreditur, quam procul dubio non transgrederetur, si substantialiter a Deo crearetur."

[3] xiv. 5, 412 B: "Quod si ita est in legibus mutabilitate temporum transitoriis, quid putandum fieri in aeternis pietatis justitiaeque immutabili vigore refertis?"

the form adopted gives the discussion a certain increased liveliness.[1]

The work begins by a broad statement of the "division." "Nature is the general name of all things that are and that are not." Its "parts" or "species" are: first, that which creates and is not created; second, that which is created and creates; third, that which is created and does not create; fourth, that which neither creates nor is created.[2] The first is God as principle; the fourth is God as end. The second is the intelligible system of causal ideas or reasons by which the world was produced; the third is the visible world as a system of effects. In reality all are substantially identical: each is the whole viewed in a certain aspect. This is to be understood when they are called parts or species or forms. We are obliged to use the words; but here they indicate no essential division or demarcation.

Not all these points are brought out at the very beginning; but, as will be seen, they are a fair summary of Erigena's metaphysical position. And he transports us rapidly to the centre of it.

A disquisition on the various kinds of "not-being" introduces the paradox, well-known later to the mystics, that that which surpasses all intellect, as well as that which falls below it, may be said not to be, or to be nothing. This can of course be traced to Plato's idea of the good beyond being; its antithesis, which is indeterminate matter, being treated as similarly incomprehensible. In the use of this form of paradox, it may be observed, the Neo-Platonists were more cautious than the mystics of the East or of mediæval Europe. I do not think the assertion is anywhere flatly made by Plotinus, that God, or the One, both "is and is not." The principle of things "is not" any of the particular things that have being; though in another sense (as Erigena also says) it is all of them because it produces them.

Of the remaining antitheses, the most important for its bearing on the argument that follows is this. In one sense,

[1] This observation has been made by Noack, the German translator of the *De Divisione Naturae*. See his "Schluss-Abhandlung" (1876) in J. H. v. Kirchmann's *Philosophische Bibliothek*, Bd. 66. In the preface to the translation, Noack oddly tries to claim Erigena as the first representative of the "Christian German consciousness." As in the case of Shakespeare, the British Islands have a prior claim.

[2] *De Divisione Naturae*, lib. i. l.

things are said to be or not to be according as they exist at a particular place and time among products of generation, or are still latent in their causes. For example, the men that are to be born in the future, though already existent in the creative reasons that prefigure them, are said not to be. In living things the virtue of the seed is said not to be so long as it keeps silence among the secrets of nature: when it has appeared among actual births and growths of animals, or in the flowers and fruits of trees and herbs, it is said to be.[1] On the other hand, according to the philosophers, those things only that are comprehended by intellect are said truly to be; and these are the reasons of things. Generated things that appear at particular times and places, and are subject to change and corruption, are said not to be.[2]

God cannot be known in essence to any intelligence whatever, even angelic. What is called knowledge of God is, and must always continue to be, through certain "theophanies." The height of knowledge attainable would be to view all things, whether sensible or intelligible, as manifestations of God. Thus, while in one sense the divine nature is nothing, in another it is all that exists. It not only creates but is created, "because there is nothing essentially beside itself; for it is the essence of all things."[3] A similitude may be found in our intellect, which is said to be (*esse*) before it arrives at thought and memory, and to be made (*fieri*) when it has received form from certain phantasies. As it becomes thus formed though in itself without all sensible form; so the divine essence, itself above intellect, is self-created in all forms of intellect and sense. This self-creation is identical with the creation of things.

The same positions are more elaborately developed in a discussion on the two kinds of theology, the negative (ἀποφατική) and the affirmative (καταφατική). The first shows how nothing can be predicated of the divine essence; the second, how all things that are can be predicated of it.[4] Terms like "super-essential," and so forth, positive in form, have a negative meaning. For what is definitely asserted is "not essence"; what there may be beyond, remains undefined. As there is nothing opposite to God, so no term that has an opposite can

[1] i. 5. [2] i. 6.

[3] i. 12, 454 A: "creatur autem, quia nihil essentialiter est praeter ipsam; est enim omnium essentia."

[4] i. 13.

be predicated of him: hence not "being," not "goodness." In reality this negative theology agrees with the affirmative. For the affirmative says, the divinity can be called this, but does not say, it is this properly: the negative says, it is not this, although it can be called this.[1]

The negative theology is carried through in the form of a proof that every one of the Aristotelian categories loses all its sense when applied to the divine nature.[2] Detailed discussion of the category of place in particular leads to its resolution into "definition." Every definition is contained in some scientific discipline, and every discipline in the mind. Hence place exists properly in the mind,[3] and is therefore incorporeal; as are indeed in the last resort all the ten categories. Erigena then goes on to prove that corporeal matter is nothing but a "composition of accidents."[4] It is, as he says afterwards, put together from incorporeal qualities.[5] If common usage asserts the essence of things to be nothing but their visible and tangible body, that is only as all things known by sense or reason or intellect are predicated of God, though the pure contemplation of truth approves him to be none of these.[6] The essence underlying the composition of accidents called body is a certain individual unity (*unum quoddam individuum*), to be thought of as incorporeal.

Place and time are inseparable, and without them are no generated things.[7] All essence (οὐσία) created from nothing is local and temporal: local because it is in some manner, since it is not infinite; temporal because it begins to be what it was not.[8] The "nothing" from which creation takes place, we are told elsewhere, is indistinguishable from the divine

[1] i. 14.

[2] Erigena brings the categories under two genera, motion and rest; and these again under τὸ πᾶν. See i. 22.

[3] i. 28, 475 B: "Si enim definitio omnis in disciplina est, et omnis disciplina in animo, necessario locus omnis, quia definitio est, non alibi nisi in animo erit."

[4] i. 34.

[5] i. 42, 484 C: "Ipsa etiam materies, si quis intentus aspexerit, ex incorporeis qualitatibus copulatur."

[6] i. 36.

[7] i. 39, 482 A: "Itaque aliquo modo esse, hoc est localiter esse, et aliquo modo inchoasse esse, hoc est temporaliter esse."

[8] i. 45, 487 A.

nature; for there is in reality no other nature. What we are to understand here by the creation of particular things is that, before the local and temporal manifestation of an eternal essence, that local and temporal manifestation did not exist; not that the eternal essence did not exist. The manifestations, however, constitute all that gives determination to the essence.[1]

On matter and body, no new argument seems to be added to what may be found in the Neo-Platonists; and the distinction between the technical terms has become a little blurred. The conceptions of formed body and of merely potential matter run into one another. The advance is in the tendency, characteristic of British thought more than of modern thought in general, to single out the problem of the external world as a specially interesting one, instead of leaving it to be settled by implication as part of a total philosophical system. This leads to the pointed assertion that there is no "corporeal substance" distinguishable from the immaterial essence of the individual. When the concourse of phenomenal "accidents" is taken away, no reality at all remains in body as such. To Erigena, as to Berkeley, any other view seems almost too absurd for refutation.[2] Of course he does not anticipate Berkeley's empirical treatment of the problem.

He is fully conscious of the objections that will be raised to his "negative theology," but this does not prevent him from following it out to its last results. Action and passion, he finds, can be predicated of God only by metaphor: "and so in reality God neither acts nor suffers, neither moves nor is moved, neither loves nor is loved."[3] But is not this, the pupil asks, opposed to the authority of Holy Scripture and of the Fathers? The teacher cannot be unaware how difficult it will be to persuade simple minds, when even the ears of those that seem to be wise are horrified. "Be not afraid," the master replies. "For now we are to follow reason, which investigates the truth of things, and is put down by no authority, nor is in any manner hindered from publicly opening and declaring what the effort of studious inquiry searches into and with labour discovers."[4] While the authority of Holy Scripture is to be followed in all things, it is not to

[1] i. 45, 487 B: "Nam et causa omnium, quae Deus est, ex his, quae ab ea condita sunt, solummodo cognoscitur esse; nullo vero creaturarum argumento possumus intelligere, quid sit: atque ideo sola haec definitio de Deo praedicatur, quia est, qui plus quam esse est."

[2] i. 47. [3] i. 62, 504 B. [4] i. 63 *fin.*

be believed that its words in their obvious meaning always convey the truth: rather, certain similitudes are used in order to raise up our yet rude and infantile senses. Hear the Apostle, who says: "*Lac vobis potum dedi non escam.*" Thus, while the faithful are provided with something definite to give a stay to their thoughts of the divine nature, reason goes beyond and shows that of God nothing can properly be asserted. And yet not irrationally, on the other side, all things from the height to the depth can be asserted. The Creator is even the cause of contraries, in virtue of what he has positively created; and thus to the opposites of each good their place in nature is allowed till the process shall be completed that ends by abolishing even the appearance of evil.[1] After these and other explanations, the disciple feels himself ready, in spite of the terrors of authority, to proclaim his open adherence to what reason clearly establishes; "especially as such things are not to be treated of except among the wise, to whom nothing is sweeter to hear than true reason, nothing more delightful to investigate whilst it is being sought, nothing fairer to contemplate when it is found."[2]

In the remainder of the first book, the antithetic statements are continued. All significant terms carried over from *natura condita* to *natura conditrix*, we are told, must be understood as predicated *translative* only, not *proprie*.[3] It is thus when God is said to love and to be loved, to make and to be made. God is without beginning and end, therefore without motion or process, and therefore, since making implies movement, in the proper sense can neither make nor be the object of making.[4] But if he is conceived as a maker, then his making must be regarded as co-eternal and co-essential with him. Thus understood, his making or action is indistinguishable from his essence. He alone truly is, and nothing else subsists by itself.[5] What is really signified by the words used in Scripture,—such as, to will, to love, to see, to hear,—is nothing but the ineffable essence, or rather, the more than essence, incomprehensible by all intellect.[6] On the other side, God is rightly said to love because he is the cause of

[1] i. 66. [2] i. 67 *fin.* [3] i. 68. [4] i. 71.

[5] i. 72, 518 A: "Cum ergo audimus, Deum omnia facere, nil aliud debemus intelligere, quam Deum in omnibus esse, hoc est, essentiam omnium subsistere."

[6] i. 73.

all love: by this love all things are held together in the whole and are moved towards the end of their desire. In short, every action and passion may be affirmed and denied of him alternately.[1] Yet the denial belongs to a higher order of truth.[2] For the affirmation, as we have seen, is by metaphor (*translative*); the negation, in the proper sense (*proprie*). And Erigena does not try to evade the consequence by insisting on terms like ὑπεράγαθος, ὑπερούσιος, and so forth. "More than" goodness and essence, he has pointed out, means only "not goodness and essence as understood by us." On the other hand, when the divine essence is conceived as in all things, true reason compels us to say, in the words of Scripture but with no limited reference to the disciples of Christ: "It is not you who love, who see, who move, but the Spirit of your Father."[3]

Still, however, the pupil is troubled by the question, how is this compatible with Holy Scripture and with the Catholic faith? Philosophically, it has been proved that God is no being along with others, and yet is all beings. But in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, a series of definite assertions is made about the divine essence. Why this particular selection from all possible assertions? Whenever the difficulty recurs (and it recurs frequently), it is met with the curt reply that the object of the doctrine seems to have been that Christians might have something distinctive to say. And yet, in detail, Erigena has an elaborate philosophical interpretation of the Christian Trinity. In his historical circumstances this is, of course, perfectly intelligible. He could emphatically declare that reason is by nature prior to authority. True authority is nothing but truth found out by reason and handed down in written tradition for the benefit of posterity.[4] But the authority referred to was that of the Fathers (with the Scriptures). A philosopher of the ninth century might try to turn them also into philosophers to be respected by the

[1] i. 75, 521-2: "Deus itaque per seipsum amor est, per seipsum visio, per seipsum motus: et tamen neque motus est, neque visio, neque amor, sed plus quam amor, plus quam visio, plus quam motus. . . . Amat igitur seipsum et amatur a seipso, in nobis et in seipso: nec tamen amat seipsum nec amatur a seipso, sed plus quam amat et amatur in nobis et in seipso." And so for the rest.

[2] i. 76, 522 B: "Verius enim negatur Deus quid eorum, quae de eo praedicantur esse, quam affirmatur esse."

[3] i. 76.

[4] i. 69.

after-world for their insight and discoveries; but not thus was the "dogmatic slumber" of Europe to be definitively broken. The non-philosophical data of their system were for them its essence; and these no mediæval thinker could in so many words set aside. Thus Erigena, after scaling the heights of reason, has to plunge again and again into the morass. Fortunately, this side of his thinking can be in great measure, though not wholly, ignored. We see how external it was to him in reality.

At the opening of the second book, the teacher proves expressly that one identical ground is indicated by all the four terms of his division of nature. The division is not really of genus into forms or species, nor of whole into parts, but proceeds "by a certain intelligible contemplation of the universality—by the universality I mean God and creatures." All may finally be brought back to a single individual unity, which is both cause and end. The first term and the fourth, —namely, that which creates and is not created, and that which neither creates nor is created,—are evidently to be understood only of God, and so refer to one subject. The first indicates the unformed principle of all; the fourth, the end which all things desire and to which all return. These are in themselves indiscernible. Only "in our theory," according to a difference of aspect, are the principle and the end two and not one. That which takes the second place in the division, namely, the nature that is created and creates, consists of the primordial causes "in created nature"; from which primordial causes the nature created and not creating flows as effect. The reality indicated by this third term, and that which is indicated by the second, as alike included in "created nature," are there one. Further, Creator and creature, the sole self-subsistent and that which, so far as it is at all, is only a participation in the sole self-subsistent, are in reality the same: so that the reduced pairs are not to be held apart, but coalesce into a single unity. In the present book is to be discussed mainly the procession of creatures from the one first cause though the primordial causes or ideas.[1] A warning, however, is given that, in view of the connexion of one aspect with another, the topics cannot be strictly limited.

Certain distinctions of Maximus are first introduced, leading to the position that in man is represented every creature,

[1] ii. 1, 2. Cf. iii. 1.

visible and invisible.[1] Here we find ourselves involved in mythology. Man, we are told, in accordance with the theory of Maximus, was originally a sexless unity. This was divided into the two sexes and multiplied into diverse varieties in consequence of the fall, but is to be restored to unity in Jesus Christ, "in whom there is neither male nor female." A noteworthy point is the insistence of Erigena that the dignity of human nature has not been lost. Its character as the microcosm of creation is innate and indestructible.[2] The punishment due to the fall was inflicted not in anger, but as a means of bringing man back to his original state of unity.

A difficulty is raised by the pupil as to the relation between the history in time thus presupposed, and the unity that never ceases to exist while the process including the lapse and the restitution is going on. For by pure intellect the world is even now contemplated not as a changing aggregate of diverse and separate parts, but as a whole immutably subsisting in its reasons.[3] To be quite clear about the solution (here only in part given), it is necessary to keep well in mind a whole series of discussions both in the present and in the later books. Particular statements might otherwise be found misleading. The general result may be thus anticipated. Erigena accepted the Neo-Platonic view of "creation;" namely, that it does not refer to an order in time, but in "dignity."[4] It is in this sense that the cause of all precedes the ideas, and that these precede the things of time and space. The unity remains in reality unbroken. The whole is always perfect: in the universe, all contraries are harmonised. At the same time, the datum of the Christian revelation is accepted, that there is a total process of finite and temporal things, having a beginning and an end. Before and after this process there is nothing but eternity. Erigena makes no attempt to explain this away, and even declares it rational: yet he nowhere gives distinct philosophical reasons for it. His metaphysical doctrine in truth required

[1] ii. 5 *init.*: "Est enim ex duabus conditae naturae universalibus partibus mirabili quadam adunatione compositus, ex sensibili namque et intelligibili, hoc est, ex totius creaturae extremitatibus conjunctus."

[2] ii. 11, 539 CD: "Non enim in mundo moles corporeas, spatiisque distentas, multiplicesque diversarum partium ejus varietates vera ratio considerat et honorificat, sed naturales et primordiales illius causas, in seipsis unitas atque pulcherrimas, in quas dum finis suus venerit, reversurus erit, et in eis aeternaliter mansurus."

[3] ii. 14.

[4] ii. 19.

the view that there is no limit in the past or in the future to the history of appearances; but, on this side, he never came face to face with the logic of the position. It is enough for him that all the reality of the world is prefigured in the eternal ideas. Process, involving beginning and end, can therefore be treated as really nothing.[1] But, a Neo-Platonist would have said, if the mixture of illusion arises by some necessity, is not the necessity always the same? What ground then is there for assigning any limit in time to the world of mixture? Erigena often puts questions bordering on this, but this precise question he never puts. The evasion, however, seems unconscious. And thus, it may be remarked, the opinion is confirmed that he did not know the original Neo-Platonists, whose treatment of the topic had been quite explicit. An attempt to sap orthodoxy by indirect methods and ironical phrases would have been impossible in his age. Where he differs from the received view, he points out the difference and openly defends his own. And, as a matter of course, any view taken is defended on the ground that it is really compatible with the orthodox and catholic faith, however strange it may appear to the vulgar.

In an elaborate interpretation of the Mosaic cosmogony, contained partly in this and partly in the next book, the sacred writer is found to be setting forth in general the relation between the intelligible and the sensible world, and in detail the elements of physical science as this was understood in Erigena's time. A long disquisition on the Trinity leads to the psychological theory of man. In human nature there is found to be the derivative trinity of οὐσία, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια, *essentia*, *virtus*, *operatio*; again, νοῦς, λόγος, διάνοια, *intellectus*, *ratio*, *sensus*. These trinities are the same. Here "sense" means internal, not external sense (αἴσθησις), which refers, as the Greeks say, to the conjunction of body and soul. Within this trinity are not included, as substantial parts of human nature, vital motion and the corruptible body. These are the results of sin; and, at the resurrection, will not indeed perish, but will lose their separateness and pass over

[1] ii. 21, 561 A: "ea sola, quae aeterna sunt, ante hunc mundum fuerunt, et post eum futura sunt. Et nihil sub sole novum, hoc est, quicquid novum sub hoc mundo est, nihil est; mundus enim iste totus novus dicitur, quia aeternus non est, et in tempore ortus est; ideoque nihil est."

into the essential trinity of human nature.[1] In paradise,—that is, in the archetypal state,—man's body was spiritual, as it is to be after the resurrection.

The psychology here presents nothing scientifically original. The intermediate position, for example, of discursive reason between pure intellect and sense-perception was an established doctrine of later antiquity, transmitted by the Greek Christian writers. The discussion brings us, however, to an interesting metaphysico-theological development. The human soul, it is concluded, being the image of God, resembles God in everything save that its essence is derivative. But between God and his image, asks the pupil, is there not also this difference; that God knows both that he is and what he is, whereas the soul knows only that it is, not what it is (*quid sit*)?[2] I see, replies the teacher, that you have been deceived by a semblance of true reasoning. For if God is absolutely infinite (*universaliter infinitus*), he must be indefinable not only by every creature but by himself. How can the divine nature understand what it is, when, as was shown in the first book, it can be brought under no category and is none of the things that exist? God does not know "what" his nature is, because distinctively it is not anything.[3] This paradox of the "divine ignorance," which is the highest wisdom,[4] is further developed. One corollary is that God does not know evil. If he knew it, evil would have a substantial existence in the nature of things. "For God does not therefore know the things that are, because they subsist; but they therefore subsist, because God knows them."[5] That is to say, God knows only in creating determinate existences. The indeterminate, whether above these like the divine essence, or below them like "privation," is unknowable. In God, to know and to do are the same. He knew all things that were to be made before they were made. "And, what is more

[1] ii. 23, 571 A: "In hoc enim ternario summae ac sanctae Trinitatis imago expressa cognoscitur."

[2] ii. 27.

[3] ii. 28, 589 BC: "Deus itaque nescit se, quid est, quia non est quid; . . . seipsum non cognoscit aliquid esse."

[4] ii. 28, 594 A: "Ipsa itaque ignorantia summa ac vera est sapientia." Cf. ii. 29, 598 A: "Et in quantum se nescit in his, quae sunt, comprehendi, in tantum se scit ultra omnia exaltari; atque ideo nesciendo seipsum, a seipso melius scitur."

[5] ii. 28, 596 B.

wonderful, all things therefore are because they have been foreknown. For the essence of all things is no other than the knowledge of all things in the divine wisdom."[1] By an application of these positions, as we have seen, Erigena thought to banish the doctrine that God predestines to evil. The knowledge which God has of all that he creates does indeed carry with it predetermination; since the divine knowledge necessarily causes the existence of the things known (or is those things): but evil, as a falling-off from the reality of nature, is outside this knowledge.

Of theology, says the master, the part called negative (ἀποφατική) has now again been set forth; in which it is shown that God is none of the things that are and that are not, and knows not himself as any of them; "which species of ignorance surpasses all knowledge and understanding."[2] Under the head of the theology called affirmative (καταφατική) we are offered further developments on the Trinity. The end of all that can be uttered about the Trinity in Unity, it is observed, is merely that we may have something to say in praise of what is ineffable.[3] Incidentally we meet with a modification of a "Johannine" thought. If human nature does not first know and love itself, how can it desire the knowledge of God?[4] The book ends with the reaffirmation that the "primordial causes," which the Father created in the Son, are "what the Greeks call ideas." They are also called predeterminations (προορίσματα) or predestinations, or divine volitions (θεῖα θελήματα); and are said to be the principles of all things because all objects of sense or thought, whether in the visible or in the invisible world, subsist by participating in them.[5]

The third book is specially devoted to the consideration of the nature which is created and does not create; but the desirability is recognised of first setting forth some descending order of the causes among themselves, though this can have no absolute philosophical validity.

The order to be adopted is that of St. Dionysius the Areopagite in his treatise *De divinis Nominibus*. This order is discerned in the mind that contemplates rather than in the causes themselves.[6] As it depends on our choice

[1] ii. 20, 559 B. [2] ii. 30, 599 C. [3] ii. 35. [4] ii. 32. [5] ii. 36.

[6] iii. 1, 624 A: "Ipsae siquidem primae causae in seipsis unum sunt, et simplices, nullique cognito ordine definitae, aut a se invicem segregatae, hoc enim in effectibus suis patiuntur."

whether we begin with one or another of the spaces into which a circle is divided by its radii, so, in considering the primordial causes, we may begin where we like. The choice has been made to begin with goodness as a principle. But this choice, says the pupil, cannot be altogether arbitrary. Nor is it, the teacher concedes: but he desires to avoid any rash promise of satisfaction, finding that he has "scarcely a place among the last followers of the great philosophers."[1] If possible, however, he would escape the doom of the servant who neglected his one talent. He will therefore venture an explanation why goodness comes first in the series.

The explanation is that things are because it was good that they should be: it is not their mere being that makes them good. Goodness being entirely taken away, no essence remains. And it is not conversely true that, essence being entirely taken away, no goodness will remain. For there is a goodness beyond that of "beings"; which are so called because they fall under definite forms of intellect or sense. Thus goodness is more general than essence. The things that "are not" (in any circumscribed mode) are better than the things that "are" (as thus defined).[2]

Here Erigena has thought his way back to a metaphysical position of Plotinus. The method which he follows of descending from the more general to the more special is carried through on the model fixed for the latest dependents on Neo-Platonism by Proclus. As goodness is more general than essence, so essence is more general than life, and life than reason. This, as has been said, is not in strictness true of the primordial causes themselves; but it has its application to their effects as mentally contemplated. For in goodness participate things that are and that are not, but in essence only things that are; in essence things living and not living, but in life only things living; in life things rational and irrational, but in reason only things rational. All the "distributions," we are always to bear in mind, are united "by a certain ineffable unity."[3]

As with Proclus, so with Erigena, the outward progression has its complement in a return of all things to their source.[4] The difference is, on the one side, that for Proclus the relation

[1] iii. 1, 627 A. [2] iii. 2. [3] iii. 3.

[4] iii. 4, 632 C: "iterumque per secretissimos naturae poros occultissimo meatu ad fontem suum redeunt."

of principle to end does not express itself by a total process in time; on the other side, that for Erigena the pantheistic thought is more explicit. The cause of all is all.[1] An analogue is our own intellect, which remains intrinsically invisible and incomprehensible while manifesting itself by certain signs. Hence in both cases a whole series of coincident contraries: "appearance of the non-apparent," and so on.

The Christian dogma of creation however, brings back the difficulty: How is the eternal existence of all things in the Wisdom of God compatible with their beginning to be and ceasing to be in time? How can that be eternal which was not before it was made? The supposition of a formless matter in which temporal things are generated from their eternal causes offers no way of escape, since this too has no origin outside God, but is among the things divinely predetermined.

The teacher cannot promise a complete solution; but he will go as far as thought, divinely illumined, permits, and then, when the mind has reached its limit, confess ignorance.[2] After some further preliminaries on the existence of the causes, ideas or reasons of things in the Word of God, which may also be called the Reason and Cause, the answer already hinted at is given more circumstantially. If you take away their eternal causes from the things that begin to be and cease to be in time, these are nothing, Their real existence is identical with their ideal pre-existence.[3] As pre-existent, they are both "made," in the all-inclusive Word, and eternal. As temporal, they are partly real (having eternal causes), partly unreal. The pupil, however, cannot all at once get over the apparent opposition, and restates the difficulty in a pointed form: "The things that are eternal never begin to be, never cease to subsist, and there was no time when they were not, because they always were; but the things that have been made have received a beginning of their making."[4] Moreover, that which has begun to be must inevitably cease

[1] iii. 4, 633 A: "Ambit enim omnia, et nihil intra se est, in quantum vere est, nisi ipsa, quia sola vere est." Cf 634 A: "quae ineffabilis diffusio et facit omnia, et fit in omnibus, et omnia est."

[2] iii. 7.

[3] iii. 8, 640 AB: "Nihil enim aliud nos sumus, in quantum sumus, nisi ipsae rationes nostrae aeternaliter in Deo substitutae."

[4] iii. 9, 647 C.

to be. It is not conceivable that the master has in view to defend the position of some who think that the visible creation, or part of it, will last for ever in the future and thus maintain a kind of "semi-eternity," in spite of its having had a beginning. Rather it may be conjectured that he follows those who hold that, while the whole world will be dissolved, its incomposite nature will survive; this being incorruptible because incorporeal. The teacher confesses that he did once accept the false opinions referred to; but he has retraced his steps. Then the pupil goes on to say that the views now commended to him on the authority of St. Dionysius the Areopagite are incomparably deeper and more wonderful than his former ones. What he had held was that God alone is without beginning, and that all things else are not eternal but have been made. The new position is "yet unheard of and unknown not only to me but to many and almost to all. For if it is thus, who would not straightway break forth into this speech and cry out: God therefore is all, and all things are God! Which will be esteemed monstrous even by those who are thought to be wise."[1] Let the doubt then be resolved, so that he may not sink back in thickest darkness after the hope has been raised of the dawn of light to be. And let the way of reasoning be begun with natural examples, "which none resists unless blinded by excess of foolishness."

The example given by the teacher is from the science of arithmetic, interpreted according to a speculative idea which he traces to Pythagoras.[2] Unity, or the "monad," eternally contains in itself, as a system of latent "reasons," infinite number and all the rules by which numbers are combined. Number is thus, in analogy with creative deity, at once maker and made; maker as the monad, made in all determinate combinations of numbers. The monad as principle is identical with the monad as end, into which all the numbers produced return when analysed. Its existence as unity does not cease though the production of plurality; and all that it contains and makes is eternal like itself, not having its origin from a beginning in time. It is itself one eternal product of the deity, to whose action it furnishes a natural analogy. Of arithmetic as of the other natural arts, the created and human

[1] iii. 10, 650 CD.

[2] iii. 11, 652 A.

intellect is not the maker but the finder, though it finds them within itself, where they are produced, and not without.[1]

This is only illustration. The direct reply is a restatement of the principle of immaterialism already affirmed.[2] The things that begin and cease to be have their true being in their "primordial causes," which are eternal. As determined to a particular time and place, they are only appearances. To the difficulty that time and place too must have their primordial causes in the Word of God, so that even "accidents" do not fall outside the Word, the concession is made that here is a mystery of which the mode is beyond investigation. All is no doubt predetermined, including what are to us accidents. Thus these too have corresponding to them a reality; but, difficult as the distinction may be, this reality is not to be confounded with the beginning and ending and spatial limitation of the appearances under which the causes of things are manifested. An illustration may be found in the incorporeal virtue of the seed, manifested in all that grows out of it, from grain to harvest. And, if any one objects that this requires a matter to manifest itself in, the reply is, that every manifestation can be resolved into something in the last resort immaterial, such as colour, odour, and so forth.[3]

Thus it is God himself who is created in all that exists. There is no being or not-being outside his essence. And within the divine nature there is nothing that is not co-essential with it. We must not conceive of God and the creature as two things standing apart from one another, but as one and the same.[4] "Eternal, he begins to be, and immoveable he is moved to all things,[5] and in all things he is made all." And this, the teacher explicitly declares, is not said of the Incarnation of the Word in human form, but of the universal theophany

[1] iii. 12, 658 B.

[2] iii. 14, 663 A: "MAG. Recordarisne, quid de ipsa materia in primo libro inter nos est confectum, ubi ex intelligibilium coitu ipsam fieri disputavimus? Quantitates siquidem et qualitates, dum per se incorporeae sint, in unum vero coeuntes informem efficiunt materiam, quae adjectis formis coloribusque incorporeis in diversa corpora movetur. DISC. Recordor sane. MAG. Ex rebus itaque incorporalibus corpora nascuntur."

[3] iii. 16.

[4] iii. 17, 678 BC: "Proinde non duo a seipsis distantia debemus intelligere Deum et creaturam, sed unum et id ipsum."

[5] Movement, as with Aristotle, means change in general.

which has neither cause nor matter nor occasion outside the divine nature.

This leads to that "identification of contraries" which fascinated later pantheists. The two extremes of super-essential reality and not-being are alike formless; and in each alternately, according to the point of view, may be seen the source of all that is manifested in the appearances of the visible world. Are they not then equally good names for the indefinable cause which is all and yet nothing? The Scripture seems to bear this out. "His light," says the Psalmist, "is as darkness."[1]

Not only are the extremes identified, but the mean—that is, the graded variety of existing things—is declared identical with both. "Accordingly the divine goodness considered as above all is said not to be, and to be nothing at all; yet in all things it both is and is said to be, because it is the essence of the whole universality." Thus considered, as having passed from "nothing" to "something," every category may be applied to it.[2] In descending the scale of production it is therefore made apparently the basest and vilest things; and to say this can offend those only who are unwilling to see the clear light of wisdom: for to the universe as a whole there is nothing vile or base. God is now all in all, and is not merely to be made so at the end of a process in time.[3]

When Erigena comes down from metaphysics to physics, he has to educe such science as he can from the account of the six days' work in the Book of Genesis. Throughout the exposition, he insists that the six days are not to be understood of an order in time, but of an intelligible order of causation. The visible world issued as a whole, and not part by part, from its invisible primordial causes.[4] Here again

[1] iii. 19.

[2] iii. 19, 681 D. Cf. 681 A: "Dum ergo incomprehensibilis intelligitur, per excellentiam nihilum non immerito vocitatur. At vero in suis theophaniis incipiens apparere, veluti ex nihilo in aliquid dicitur procedere, et quae proprie super omnem essentiam existimatur, proprie quoque in omni essentia cognoscitur, ideoque omnis visibilis et invisibilis creatura theophania, id est divina apparitio potest appellari."

[3] iii. 20, 683 B: "Ac sic ordinate in omnia proveniens facit omnia, et fit in omnibus omnia, et in se ipsum redit, revocans in se omnia, et dum in omnibus fit, super omnia esse non desinit."

[4] iii. 27, 699 C: "de causis adhuc incognitis, ac veluti formis adhuc carentibus omnium rerum visibilium conditio, nullis temporum spatiis vel locorum interpositis, simul in formas numerosque locorum et

it is expliciitly declared that the cause and the effect are in reality identical.[1] Against those who, professedly founding themselves on Scripture, say that the heaven with its stars, the ether with the planets, the air with its clouds and winds and lightnings, the water and its fluctuant motion, earth likewise with all its herbs and trees, are without soul and every kind of life, he cites Plato and his disciples;[2] who not only assert a general life of the world, but also confess that no bodily thing is deprived of life, and have had the hardihood to give to this life, whether general or special, the name of soul. This position he defends at length, arguing that the "most universal soul," or "most general life," penetrates all that exists, even what appear to our senses to be dead bodies; and this it does in a manner of which the all-diffusive power of the solar rays furnishes an imperfect similitude.

While protesting that he would avoid the appea :1 ( "following the sect of Plato,"[3] he again takes up the position that man is a microcosm, uniting in himself the intellect of angelic spirits (in terms of the Christian transformation of Platonism) with the discursive reason peculiar to himself and the sensitive and nutritive life of the animal and of the living germ that is in all things.[4] So far as this book is concerned, he seems to be on the way to a doctrine like that of the Arabian philosophers who held that the only human immortality is the immortality of the race and its general mind. At least in explaining the unlikenesses among men, he brings in no intrinsic difference between one human soul and another, but lays down the position that all manifested unliknesses are due to accidents of time and place and circumstance; the "substantial form" of human nature being one and the same in all.[5] We may infer, however, from portions of the later

temporum producta est." Cf. 31, 709 D: "ipsa natura simul in omnes coepit currere creaturas, nec ulla alteram locorum seu temporum numeris seu spatiis praecessit."

[1] iii. 28, 704 B: "Aliter enim in causis, aliter in effectibus una eademque res theoriae speculationibus intimatur." Cf. 25, 693 AB.

[2] iii. 36, 728 A: "Plato, philosophorum summus, et qui circa eum sunt."

[3] iii. 37, 732 D.

[4] iii. 37, 733 B: "non immerito dicitur homo *creaturarum omnium officina*, quoniam in ipso universalis creatura continetur. Intelligit quidem ut angelus, ratiocinatur ut homo, sentit ut animal irrationale, vivit ut germen, corpore animaque subsistit, nullius creaturae expers."

[5] iii. 27, 703 BC.

books, that he retained in theory as well as in dogmatic belief something of the metaphysical "individualism" of his Platonic predecessors, Hellenic or Christian. Whatever his doctrine may be, it is applied equally to the souls of animals. On purely philosophical grounds, he decides that these do not perish with their bodies. Incidentally he points out the difficulty of reconciling the absolute unlikeness assumed between man and brute with the evidences that have been collected of animal intelligence.[1] The main argument, however, is from the relation of species to genus. The highest genus in which living things participate is the primordial life or soul. Now if the species included under this perish in part, the whole loses its integrity. If, for example, the only species left were to be man, that would not be the preservation but the ruin of the genus. And if the genus is a substantial unity, how can it perish? By participation in this, then, the life or soul of every species must be supposed to remain after the destruction of the particular bodies it governs. Erigena recognises that the authority of eminent Fathers is against him: but he conjectures that they put forward in public the doctrine they taught, not because they were careless about the investigation of truth, but in order to deter the unwise among men from imitating irrational animals. With this aim, they represented them as viler than they are. And indeed, as not having the distinctive characteristics of man, the lower animals are not fit objects of human imitation, though they no less contain a reality that is imperishable.

The fourth and fifth books, comprising nearly half the entire work, treat of "the return of all things into that nature which neither creates nor is created."[2] The difficulty of this, the master says, is such that, in comparison with it, what has gone before may seem plain sailing in an open sea. Yet, in spite of all the syrtes and the hidden rocks that beset the passage, he ventures to promise, under divine guidance, safe arrival in port. The disciple is eager to continue the voyage; declaring that reason experienced in this deep (*ratio perita hujus ponti*) gains more delight from the exercise of virtue in the secret channels of the divine ocean than from the smooth and leisurely course that is insufficient for the disclosure of its strength.

Modern readers too will find this second part more difficult

[1] iii. 39. [2] iv. 2.

and complex than the first; and they will not fail to recognise the particular syrtes and hidden rocks that are the cause. In Erigena's statement, however, there is no irony. We must not forget that, deeply as he sought to transform it, he accepted the account of man's creation and fall and redemption given by the Christian creed as in some sense a divine revelation. Thus he takes for granted that a theory of reality can be conveyed by a rational interpretation of the faith. This makes the genuinely, if not completely, philosophical character of his theorising the more remarkable; as appears especially when it is cleared (so far as possible) of the Scriptural and patristic developments in which it is frequently immersed.

A profound thought that presents itself detached from these is the idea of a "dialectic" running through nature. The art which divides genera into species and resolves species into genera, is found to be no mere human contrivance, but to have been established in the nature of things. Thence it was discovered by the wise and turned to account for its use as an instrument of investigation.[1] It hardly needs pointing out how on one side this suggests the Hegelian Dialectic; on the other, Mill's "Natural Kinds."

The principle laid down for the interpretation of Scripture is not in itself different from that of many orthodox Fathers and Doctors. There was general agreement that the sacred writings may yield the utmost variety of senses.[2] Whether the particular interpretation adopted was, in the opinion of ecclesiastical authority, legitimate, depended not on the method but on the result. If the most strained and violent allegorising yielded orthodox doctrine, no fundamental objection was raised. Criticism, in our sense, was as completely absent as in the ascription of documents to apostolic authors by the early Church. And often, so far as I am aware, nothing would be said against Erigena's procedure. A case in point may, I suppose, be found in his development of the Pauline pneumatology in the sense of the Neo-Platonic antithesis between body and immaterial soul and mind, and the reading of this into the double account of creation in

[1] iv. 4.

[2] iv. 5, 749 C: "Est enim multiplex et infinitus divinorum eloquiorum intellectus. Siquidem in penna pavonis una eademque mirabilis ac pulchra innumerabilium colorum varietas conspicitur in uno eodemque loco ejusdem pennae portiunculae."

the Book of Genesis. Here modern criticism detects two documents, in one of which man was described as created with the animals but last of the series, in the other as separately created before them. Erigena sees quite plainly the facts that are the basis of the modern theory; but regarding the whole as revealed, finds in the double account an indication in what manner man is an animal and a spirit, and both at once.

The heterodoxy comes in when he approaches his theory of the restitution of all things. To this the fourth book is mainly preliminary, giving an interpretation of the Creation and Fall; but soon we perceive his preoccupation with the theory already in part set forth in the *De Praedestinatione*, that no real nature is to be finally lost.[1] As this theory logically requires, every reality, of whatever kind, is held to be prefigured in the creation. The conclusion is here already involved: all that exists being predetermined, the process must end in the complete preservation of all reality in its perfection for ever. There is, for Erigena, a beginning of process in time; but there is no historical fall of man. Both the devil and man, as he puts it, fell without temporal interval.[2] There was no primeval perfection of human nature in a local paradise, but only in the archetypal idea. There was no actual or appreciable time during which man lived without sin.[3] His "fall" consisted in descent from the state of an idea, prefigured in the divine mind, to the conditions of birth.

Even man's body, so far as it is truly body, "subsists in its reasons."[4] It was not sin that made an animal of man, but nature.[5] As has been said, God created every creature, both visible and invisible, in man. The reality or substance of the human mind is not other than its notion in the divine mind.[6] And, as the internal notion of things in the human mind is the substance of those things of which it is the notion, so the notion by which man knows himself is his substance.[7]

[1] iv. 5, 760 C: "Non enim divinae justitiae est visum, ex eo, quod fecit, quidquam perire, praesertim cum non ipsa natura peccaverit, sed perversa voluntas, quae contra naturam rationabilem irrationabiliter movetur."

[2] iv. 20. [3] iv. 15 ff. [4] iv. 5, 759 B. [5] iv. 7, 763 A.

[6] iv. 7, 768 B: "Possumus ergo hominem definire sic: Homo est notio quaedam intellectualis in mente divina aeternaliter facta."

[7] iv. 7, 770 A.

The notion of man in the divine mind, and the notion which he has of himself, though both called "substances," are not to be understood as two, but as one substance viewed in a twofold manner.[1] The existence of the human mind, and its self-knowledge, are coincident. And the knowledge it has, even if only of its own ignorance, suffices to prove the existence of the self. In a remarkable passage, Erigena, after Augustine, gives vigorous personal expression to that notion of "consciousness" which had gradually become clear to the ancient schools, and which was afterwards to be made by Descartes the methodical beginning of a new movement.[2]

The self-knowledge of man in the primordial causes before time is general, not of any particular human mind. Human nature is there a unity without distinction of individuals.[3] The self-knowledge of the particular human mind is a knowledge of itself in relation to time and place, and does not exist before these.

Human and even animal sense, Erigena says with Augustine, is superior to the greatest splendour of the visible world regarded as devoid of life.[4] As we have seen, however, he does not in his own theory so regard it. The antithesis here is between sense and body in abstraction. The position to

[1] iv. 7, 770-1: "DISC. Duas igitur substantias hominis intelligere debemus unam quidem in primordialibus causis generalem, alteram in earum effectibus specialem. MAG. Duas non dixerim, sed unam dupliciter intellectam. Aliter enim humana substantia per conditionem in intellectualibus perspicitur causis, aliter per generationem in effectibus."

[2] iv. 9, 776 B: "Scio enim me esse, nec tamen me praecedit scientia mei, quia non aliud sum, et aliud scientia, qua me scio; et si nescirem me esse, non nescirem ignorare me esse: ac per hoc, sive scivero, sive nescivero me esse, scientia non carebo; mihi enim remanebit scire ignorantiam meam. Et si omne, quod potest scire se ipsum nescire, non potest ignorare se ipsum esse; nam si penitus non esset, non sciret seipsum nescire: conficitur omnino esse omne, quod scit se esse, vel scit se nescire se esse."

[3] iv. 9, 776-7: "Nam in illa primordiali et generali totius humanae naturae conditione nemo seipsum specialiter cognoscit, neque propriam notitiam sui habere incipit; una enim et generalis cognitio omnium est ibi, solique Deo cognita. Illic namque omnes homines unus sunt, ille profecto ad imaginem Dei factus, in quo omnes creati sunt."

[4] iv. 10, 784 D: "*Nam si melior est anima vermiculi*, ut sanctus Pater Augustinus edocet, *quam corpus solare totum mundum illustrans;* vita siquidem extrema, qualiscunque sit, primo corpori pretiosissimoque dignitate essentiae praeponitur: quid mirum, si omnia totius mundi corpora humano sensui postponantur."

be enforced is that the whole soul, and not merely its higher part, called spirit or mind or intellect, was made in the image of God. This follows from its being all in the whole and all in every part, not only of the body but of itself. For (as had been shown in the ancient psychology) no mental "faculty" is isolated; in each the whole soul expresses itself. "But in two modes above all we know the human soul made in the image of God: first, because, as God is diffused through all the things that are, and can be comprehended by none of them, so the soul penetrates the whole instrument of its body, yet may not be enclosed by it; in the second place, because, as of God is predicated only being, but in no manner is it defined what he is, so the human soul is only understood to be, but what it is neither itself nor other creature understands."[1]

The material and external body, due to sin, is as a kind of vestment of the internal and "natural," identified by Erigena with the "spiritual," body. "For it is moved through times and ages, suffering increase and loss of itself, while that remains ever immutably in its internal state."[2] Corporeal individuality is treated as one of the secondary things befalling man "from the qualities of corruptible seeds."[3] And yet of this too there is something that remains. When the corruptible body is dissolved, a certain form of it endures in the soul, and preserves a relation to the material elements into which the body has been decomposed.[4] In the creation, the consequences of sin were provided for before it happened.[5] The bad will precedes the act: hence man was never without sin, as he never subsisted without mutable will. For even the irrational mutability itself of free-will, because it is the cause of evil, is necessarily a kind of evil.[6]

Thus in the original "paradise"—interpreted as meaning, not a place, but ideal human nature created as a whole—everything was prefigured. By the man placed in paradise was meant intellect (*νοῦς*); by the woman, sense (*αἴσθησις*).[7]

[1] iv. 11, 788 A. [2] iv. 12, 802 A.

[3] iv. 12, 801 CD: "Universaliter autem in omnibus corporibus humanis una eademque forma communis omnibus intelligitur, et semper in omnibus incommutabiliter stat. Nam innumerabiles differentiae, quae eidem formae accidunt, non ex ratione primae conditionis, sed ex qualitatibus corruptibilium seminum nascuntur."

[4] iv. 13. [5] iv. 14.

[6] iv. 14, 808 C: "Nam et ipsa irrationabilis mutabilitas liberae voluntatis, quia causa mali est, nonnullum malum esse necesse est."

[7] iv. 16, 815 D.

This interpretation is adopted from Ambrose; who, as Erigena thinks, follows Origen, though he does not cite him by name. In the allegory is to be understood sometimes "internal," sometimes "external," sense. External sense, however, is not a part of the primal human nature, but is superinduced. Evil (as Erigena uniformly teaches) has no existence in itself, but is found only where falsity has its seat; and the recipient of error is no other than the external sense, by which the parts of human nature properly so called are deceived.[1] This is indicated by the "tree of knowledge," which is a mixed thing. So far as it is good, it comes from God: so far as it is evil, it is in reality nothing, and can be referred to no cause.

The difference between the good and evil in the mixture may be seen by considering, for example, a golden vase adorned with gems, viewed by one who is wise and by an avaricious man. The former will find the nature of the phantasy all good, referring the beauty of the vase simply to the praise of the creator, and will feel no temptation of personal desire; the latter will be inflamed with cupidity, "the root of all evil."[2] The meaning of the forbidden fruit is that intellect and sense (figured as the man and the woman) are prohibited from the undiscriminating appetite for good and evil, infixed in imperfect souls from the delight in the beauty of material things.[3] Before the visible creature is delighted in, the praise ought to be referred to the Creator. When man through pride disregarded this due order, when he placed the love and knowledge of the Creator after the external beauty of the material creature, he took the way to perdition.[4]

The theory derived by Erigena from Maximus, and here again introduced,[5] that if man had not fallen he would have been multiplied like the angels, without the union of the sexes, is declared by the Catholic editor to be theologically heterodox.

[1] iv. 16, 826 B: "Nulla enim alia pars humanae naturae falsitatis errorem recipit praeter sensum exteriorem, siquidem per ipsum et interior sensus, et ratio, ipse etiam intellectus, saepissime fallitur."

[2] iv. 16.

[3] iv. 18. For all that, Erigena can recognise that the beginning of knowledge is in sensible experience. Cf. iv. 25, 855 B: "omne studium sapientiae, omnisque mentis conceptio, puraque veritatis cognitio a sensibus corporis auspicium sumunt, ab inferioribus ad superiora, et ab exterioribus ad interiora ratione gradatim ascendente."

[4] iv. 22.

[5] iv. 23.

Philosophically the interesting point is, whether the archetypal unity of the human race, as Erigena understands it, excludes real individuality. Now the reference to multiplication (whatever the theory may mean for a theologian) evidently decides against this view. Since the species, even if retaining its archetypal perfection, is to be thought as multiplying itself, it must have implicitly contained the individuals, ideally prefigured.

The individualism which, in the last resort, has not been expelled from Erigena's system by his stress on the primal reality of genus and species, becomes most marked in the fifth book. Here, after the preliminaries of the fourth book, a full and positive theory is expounded of the return of all things to their principle, which is also their end. In what is said in Genesis of the "tree of life," the return of human nature to its original state is found to be indicated.[1] This return of man (in whose nature all creatures are included) is to be for ever.[2] Things visible and invisible, in spite of their apparent departure, always indeed remain in their original unity. When they have finally returned and are one in the divine nature, "as now and ever they are one in their causes," no nature further will be produced: whence the divine nature into which they return is rightly said not to create; as it is said not to be created because it is the cause which has no principle beyond.[3]

Arguments for the return are first drawn from sensible things. The rhythm alike of astronomical and of vital motion furnishes an analogy with which a total movement of the whole from beginning to end appears to be in agreement. The words *principium* and *finis*, of course, make it easy to identify on the one hand the temporal beginning with that which is held to be the ever-present cause or principle of all movement, and on the other hand the final cause or object of desire with a temporal end in which things attain rest. The metaphysical principle being conceived as identical with the end, the notion is further suggested of a corresponding identity between the primal and the ultimate state of the universe. Yet, in this

[1] v. 1.

[2] v. 2, 862 D: "nunquam ad egestatem temporalium rerum, quae omnino cum mundo peribunt, reversurus, totus in Deum transiturus, et unum in illo futurus."

[3] Cf. iv. 27.

book also, the whole is declared to be always perfect.[1] For Erigena no less than for Proclus, the μονή coexists with the πρόοδος and the ἐπιστροφή (though Erigena does not know these particular terms). And the analogy of visible things is not consistently carried through. For we have no knowledge of any actual cycle that closes with a final rest of the visible agents. As Bruno said after the Ionians, the end of one process is the beginning of another. Thus, if the analogy of the parts were applicable to the whole, a repeated rhythm would be demanded, not a single world-process. But the real ground of the theory is a dogma. Erigena is seeking for confirmations, and not simply "following the argument." We can guess what his system might have been earlier or later; but, as it is, he accepts a datum not purely philosophical, and not scientific even as science was understood.

The true tendency of his speculation may be seen in what he brings forward to illustrate recurrence in the "intelligible" order that is the object of the "liberal arts." The divisions of Dialectic, he points out, start from οὐσία and are brought back to it through the same stages. Arithmetic begins with the monad and resolves all numbers again into this. Geometry proceeds similarly in relation to the point; Music in relation to the single note; Astronomy in relation to the indivisible unit by which it measures spaces of time. In Grammar and Rhetoric, the remaining two of the seven liberal disciplines, he goes on to say, examples have not been sought; because, on the one side, they are attached to Dialectic as subordinate members; and because, on the other side, they do not treat of the nature of things, but rather of human rules of custom, or of special causes and persons. Not that they entirely want principles of their own: for Grammar may be said to begin and end with the letter, Rhetoric with the "hypothesis," or determined question which is beyond controversy for the disputants.[2]

In all this, clearly, there is no reference to an order in time. And the same is true of what follows concerning human nature. This, says Erigena,[3] through all its corruption has in no wise lost the integrity of its essence, by which it is in union

[1] v. 35, 954 C: "Aliud est enim considerare singulas universitatis partes, aliud totum. Hinc conficitur, ut, quod in parte contrarium esse putatur, in toto non solum non contrarium, verum etiam pulchritudinis augmentum reperitur."

[2] v. 4.

[3] v. 6.

with God; nor can it lose it. His view here closely resembles that of Plotinus regarding the "pure soul," which remains exempt from all sin and suffering, while the "composite nature," produced by the association of soul and body, pays the penalty of what has been done amiss. Our nature, Erigena says in the same spirit, has not been lost or changed, but discoloured with the deformity of vices.[1] From this "fall," however, it is to return by stages.

Without attempting wholly to extricate the philosophy from the mythology, we may proceed to the development of the theory as it stands.

The essence of sensible things will remain perpetually; because it was made in the divine wisdom beyond all times and places and all mutability; but what is generated at times and places will perish, after an interval determined by the Maker of all. To this end of preservation in their "reasons" from which they set out—not in their circumstances of place and time—all men aspire, and it cannot be supposed that they will rest till they have attained it. The whole of human nature will be finally liberated from death and misery, though it will not be equally blessed in all.[2]

The stages of reversion are five: (1) When the body is resolved into the four elements from which it was composed, and the soul thus liberated; (2) When each receives back his own body at the resurrection; (3) When the body shall be changed into spirit; (4) When the spirit, or more expressly, the whole nature of man, shall return into its primordial causes, which are ever and immutably in God; (5) When nature itself with its causes shall be moved (*i.e.*, transformed into God, as air illuminated is transformed into light.[3]

This transformation of man and of all things into God does not mean that their finite substance is to perish, but that they are to be carried over by degrees into a fuller existence.[4] The

[1] v. 6, 873 A.

[2] v. 3, 868 B: "Hoc autem dicimus, non quod natura in omnibus æqualiter futura sit beata, sed quod in omnibus morte et miseria futura sit libera. Esse enim et vivere et aeternaliter esse commune erit omnibus et bonis et malis; bene autem et beate esse solis actione et scientia perfectis proprium et speciale erit."

[3] v. 8.

[4] v. 8, 876 B: "Quomodo enim potest perire, quod in melius probatur redire? Mutatio itaque humanae naturae in Deum non substantiae interitus aestimanda est, sed in pristinum statum, quem praevaricando perdiderat, mirabilis atque ineffabilis reversio."

end is not a confusion of substances, but a union in which each retains its identity.[1] Examples of such union without confusion are found in the different individuals of a species, the species of a genus, the genera of the same essence (οὐσία), the numbers implicit in the monad, the lines implicit in the point.[2] It is illustrated in simultaneous vision of the same object by many persons; there being no confusion of the perceptions, though all refer to one thing.[3] So also different musical sounds do not lose their particular qualities when combined in a single harmony. And if, as has been said, the qualities of visible things are in reality incorporeal, and terrene bodies are formed by a heaping up of these incorporeal qualities, what difficulty is there in the final resolution and return of all that has been thus put together into the incorporeal, which is the real?[4]

The pupil here raises the question, whether all things do not, throughout the processes of generation and corruption, remain permanently in their causes; the going forth to the procreation of visible things, and the return, being only an affair of places and times and accidents. Is not substance always in reality free from these, as finally it will become free from their appearance? Yes, answers the master. All that begins in time by generation must have an end; but this does not affect the incorporeal and intelligible grounds of corporeal and sensible things.[5]

The extension of bodies will perish; and so also will time, with motion, of which it is the measure. Before and after the world, there is neither place, in this sense, nor time, but only eternity. Place understood as mental definition, on the other hand, is not among the things that perish.[6] Although, when the world has returned to its source, places and times no

[1] v. 8, 879 A: "Non enim vera ratio sinit, superiora inferioribus vel contineri, vel attrahi, vel consumi. Inferiora vero superioribus naturaliter attrahuntur, et absorbentur, non ut non sint, sed ut in eis plus salventur, et subsistant, et unum sint." Cf. 880 A: "Naturarum igitur manebit proprietas, et earum erit unitas, nec proprietas auferet naturarum adunationem, nec adunatio naturarum proprietatem."

[2] v. 10.

[3] v. 12.

[4] v. 13.

[5] v. 14.

[6] v. 18.

longer exist, there remain the "simple and unmixed reasons of places and times."[1]

What is dwelt on in the end is the preservation rather than the absorption of differences.[2] The "effects"—namely, visible things—are to perish only by returning to their causes, and not by becoming simply non-existent.[3] The "annihilation" of local and temporal forms, which are mere appearance, means the restoration of the things manifested under them to their true reality. In their causes and reasons, "all animals must be said to be more animals than in the corporeal and sensible effects themselves. For where they subsist, there they are truly animals. Similarly it is to be understood regarding all sensible things, whether celestial or terrene. Since the things that are varied in places and times and fall under the bodily senses, are all of them not to be understood as the substantial and truly existing things themselves, but as certain transitory images and echoes of these."[4] This is illustrated by the transmutation of the passions into the virtues of the soul, and their preservation at this higher stage. Why then, Erigena asks, may not irrationality itself be transmuted (in the reunion of the whole) into the height of rationality?[5]

He thence goes on to deny the perpetuity of evil as an object of punishment. At the consummation of things, all evil, whether in the human race or in the demons, will be

[1] v. 23, 906 AB: "Mundus quippe peribit, nullaque ipsius pars remanebit: ac per hoc neque totum. Transibit enim in suas causas, ex quibus processit, in quibus neque loca sunt, neque tempora, sed locorum temporumque simplices sinceraeque rationes, in quibus omnia unum sunt neque ullis accidentibus discernuntur. Omnia enim simplicia, omni compositione substantiarum accidentiumque carentia, et ut sic dicam, unitas simplex, et multiplex adunatio omnium creaturarum in suis rationibus et causis, ipsarum autem causarum et rationum in Verbo Dei unigenito, in quo et facta sunt et subsistunt omnia."

[2] v. 21. "Plane perspicio," the disciple comments, "non aliud esse mundo perire, quam in causas suas redire, et in melius mutari."

[3] v. 25, 913 B: "per inhumanationem Filii Dei omnis creatura in caelo et in terra salva facta est. Omnem vero creaturam dico corpus, et vitalem motum, et sensum, et super haec rationem et intellectum."

[4] v. 25, 913-14.

[5] v. 25, 916 BC: "Si ergo passiones, quas rationabilis natura ex irrationabili in seipsam deduxerat, in naturales animae possunt mutari virtutes, cur incredibile sit, ipsam irrationabilitatem in altitudinem rationabilitatis transmutari?"

abolished. The heterodoxy of this, the Catholic editor remarks, scarcely needs pointing out.[1] Erigena, while trying, as in the *De Praedestinatione*, to educe it from Augustine's borrowed doctrine that evil is no true being, but a negation of being, appeals more especially to "the blessed Origen,"[2] whose treatise περὶ Ἀρχῶν he cites at considerable length.[3] Not the substance, but only the hostile will, of the enemies of the good, whether men or demons, is to be destroyed. The evil of punishment, fixed and retained for ever at the end of the whole process, the teacher argues, would mar the perfection of the "last things." The conception of hell itself, so long and so far as it continues to exist, he spiritualises by treating it as not a place, but the vain remorse of an evil conscience, or the state of the bad will deprived of the means of doing evil.[4]

This interpretation the pupil accepts; but he raises the difficulty, in what subject is the punishment. If all "substance," as created by God, is impassible and incorruptible, it cannot be this that is punished: neither can the punishment be that of a mere "accident," without subject. A third position, it is shown, remains; namely, that "vice, which is not, is punished, yet in something which is, and is impassible, since it is not permitted to suffer pains."[5] The impassible subject of the pains imposed on its accidents, Erigena speaks of as "humanity"; thus again suggesting the peculiar form of Realism held afterwards by Arabian philosophers. This general and all-inclusive human nature he compares to the solar light, uncontaminated by contact with impurities;[6] and to the element of air, vitalising all breathing things, and in its own substance unaffected by mixture with gross exhalations from the lower world.[7]

If we were to take certain passages by themselves, it might be thought that everlasting punishment in some form was maintained. The ambiguity comes from the necessity of

[1] "Ea, quae Joannes Scotus jam de abolitione mali deque poenis ac suppliciis impiorum, sive hominum, sive demonum, cet. disputat, veritati catholicae omnino repugnare, vix est, quod moneamus." (p. 918, note a.)

[2] v. 27, 922 C. [3] v. 27, 929-30. [4] v. 29.

[5] v. 30, 940 D. Cf. 31, 943 C: "Ipsa siquidem natura, sicut libera est, penitusque absoluta ab omni peccato, ita universaliter libera et absoluta est ab omni poena peccati."

[6] v. 31, 942 D. [7] v. 31, 947-8.

using the consecrated theological language. Erigena, I take it, meant his explanation of what "the letter" calls eternal torments to refer only to what goes on while the world is in process. The ultimate cessation of hell is plainly implied.[1] Those who hold the common opinions, he describes as "transfusing the gifts of nature and of grace into the cruelty of vengeance."[2] What is spoken of as divine infliction of penalties is a kind of "spiritual medicine" to bring back the creature, weary of mutable things, to the immutable forms of true reality.[3] And, he adds, repeating the doctrine already set forth, the perverse movements of the will, which are punished, are neither from God nor from created nature, but are "incausal": when they are sought out by themselves, nothing is found in them but privation and defect of the lawful and natural will.[4]

As there is no separate place of punishment, so there is no separate place of reward. The imagination of paradise as a circumscribed portion of a "new heaven and new earth" seems to Erigena so gross that on meeting with it in "books of the holy Fathers" he is stupefied. Those "most spiritual men," he thinks, can only have thus expressed themselves for the edification of such as are "given up to terrene and carnal thoughts and nourished on the rudiments of simple faith."[5] Then he restates his own view that time and local situation are to cease entirely when the universe and all individual things return into their "reasons." In the final reversion of all things to their source, not even an "ethereal" body will be left, but the body itself will pass into spirit in its sense of intellect.[6] While this return is definitely educed from the "ecclesiastical doctrine" and from Scripture,[7] it is not identified with the Day of Judgment; which is treated in a

[1] v. 35, 953 B: "Non enim conveniret immortalis Creatoris bonitati, imaginem sui aeterna morte detineri."

[2] v. 37, 985 A. [3] v. 35, 959 B.

[4] Cf. v. 35, 960 A: "Ac per hoc verissime de divina praedicatur justitia, quod in nulla creatura, quam fecit, puniri permittit, quod fecit; punit autem quod non fecit."

[5] v. 37, 986 C.

[6] v. 37, 987 B. The Greek Fathers maintain "non mutationem corporis terreni in caeleste corpus, sed omnino transitum in ipsum purum spiritum, non in illum, qui aether, sed in illum, qui intellectus vocitatur."

[7] Cf. v. 19.

rationalising manner as meaning essentially, not a catastrophic appearance of the Lord in the clouds, but the result of its mortal life for each individual soul.[1]

Though all souls are to return to God, not all are to be "deified." Deification is a gift not of nature but of grace. As is said in dependence on Dionysius the Areopagite: "It is common to all the things that have been made, to return, as by a kind of perishing, into their causes, which subsist in God; it is the property of the intellectual and rational substance to be made one with God by virtue of contemplation, and to be made God through grace."[2] The gift of deification is reserved for some men and some angels.[3] This is indicated by the parable of the wise and the foolish virgins. The foolish represent that portion of mankind which desires only natural goods: by the wise are signified they whose thoughts are directed to the higher perfection to be attained through grace.[4] It is not in the least denied that natural goods *are* goods.[5] Accordingly, those that seek them are in the end to be restored to paradise in the general sense, that is, to the natural integrity of human nature; though only those that aim higher are, in the more special sense, to "eat of the tree of life," or to be deified with the saints.[6] To any who may think this difference in the distribution of gifts inequitable, Erigena replies that a universe without variety and degrees would have no beauty. There are distinctions among the orders of angels; and, if man had not fallen, there would no less have been various orders of men.

Thus election and damnation are finally turned into the harmonious mixture of "aristocratic" and "democratic" justice in the universe. How little such a development was capable of overcoming the forms of the creed, the history of the later Middle Ages sufficiently proves. And of course the Gospel

[1] v. 38, 997 B. [2] v. 21, 898 C.

[3] v. 23, 904 AB. Cf. 907 A: "ipsam deificationem, quae solis purgatissimis intellectibus donabitur."

[4] v. 38, 1014 BC.

[5] Cf. v. 36, 936 AB. From the necessity of "phantasy" for knowledge, it is argued that this, like everything that springs from natural causes, is a good. "DISC. Phantasia igitur aliquod bonum est, quoniam naturalium rerum imaginatio est. MAG. Illud negare non possum: omne siquidem, quod ex naturalibus causis oritur, bonum esse non denegatur."

[6] v. 38, 1015 AB.

itself suggests no such softened interpretation of the "Gehenna" and "outer darkness" of the Parables. The Eastern despot or slaveholder, with his "tormentors" always at hand, could not be turned into the ideal ruler of the philosophic "City of Zeus," which Erigena would fain have restored. His own hope, as we may infer from the last sentence of the brief recapitulation that follows only too many pages of the customary allegorising, was in the perhaps remote future. "Unusquisque in suo sensu abundet, donec veniat illa lux, quae de luce falso philosophantium facit tenebras, et tenebras recte cognoscentium convertit in lucem." What he might not have understood is that liberation of the light he had already attained could only come through dissolution of the whole structure and system within which it had been his destiny to work.

# ANIMISM, RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

For a growing science like anthropology, there appears to be some advantage in attempting from time to time a kind of philosophical schematism. Such attempts may suggest points for research; and, as they are not likely to be taken for more than they are worth, they can in any case do no harm. The present attempt, of course, starts from previous discussions; but, to avoid complication, I shall try to state the positions in such a way that they may be understood by themselves.

The most general thesis is this: that the thoughts of mankind about the causes behind or immanent in the visible order of things go through three stages; which may be characterised distinctively as the animistic, the religious, and the philosophical. When man, from a group of social animals, not yet thinking or speaking, became truly man through the evolution of speech and thought, there arose many speculations. A fundamental one was that which is known as the "ghost-theory." The problem presented itself: how to explain the alternations of consciousness and unconsciousness, waking and sleeping, life and death. The primeval solution was to suppose a more or less permanent entity, capable of going away to other places and again returning; the presence of which was the cause of the manifestations summed up as "life." This entity was figured, according to analogies suggested by reflexions, shadows, dreams and so forth, as a second "self," in appearance like a material organism, but thinner of substance. The self, more or less permanent though not necessarily immortal, having thus assumed a figured and as it were objective form, could be used as a general idea to interpret not only human and animal life

but the changes in inorganic things. Independently of this "ghost-theory," life may already have been attributed to moving objects; but not before the ghost-theory was evolved could the general mode of explanation known as "animism" shape itself out. Some kind of figured image was a necessary adjunct to early thinking about causes. Hence the importance of the ghost-soul as distinguished from the vague notion of a force that was also life. To anything that, in the process of abstracting from the whole mass of phenomena, came to be looked upon for any reason of interest or convenience or curiosity, as a separate "object," a ghost-soul of its own could be ascribed. This was regarded at once as the bond that gave it permanence and as the source of action and change. An ascending process of "integration" accompanied the gradual discrimination or "differentiation" of phenomena; so that vague or more definite cosmic powers came to be conceived as permanent existences with ghost-souls of their own. These, being thought of on the analogy of the self, might be figured as becoming separately visible in human shape. Or, as a deviation from the type of the "magnified and non-natural man," they might be imagined as presenting themselves either in the forms of particular kinds of animals or in compounded and monstrous forms. Meanwhile human life went on complicating itself. Classes were distinguished, and societies came to consist of rulers and ruled. Customary law and morals grew up. All this structure was transferred by analogy to the ghostly or "spiritual" world. A "supernatural" hierarchy was conceived, which comprised at once human souls separated by death from their bodies, and the lesser and greater invisible powers in or behind nature. These last are the "gods" and "demons," with whom the souls of individual men are associated, usually at an inferior level. Since man feels his dependence on the external order of things in which he is involved, he tends to put all that concerns him under the protection of the beings he conceives as ruling it. He begins to fear or love them because he regards them as personal wills that can be affected by the things he does or leaves undone. Thus arise "cults," consisting of prayer, sacrifice and sacrament. Prayer, anthropologically defined, is entreaty to a quasi-human being; sacrifice is primarily a gift; sacrament is participation in a banquet. Ghosts of ancestors, with demons and gods, may have part in the devotion addressed to the invisible powers; but this devotion becomes most dis-

tinctively entitled to the name of "religion" when it is systematised in relation to certain great gods. The special class of the "priesthood," scarcely needed when animism is in its first anarchic phase, assumes importance as the invisible hierarchy is specialised and brought under the government of a single head. This class tends to claim more and more of human life for the powers it represents. Aided by the conscious weakness and ignorance of the many, it may succeed, by assuming knowledge of the unknown, in establishing its supremacy on earth. The normal result of this is an elaborate and at last petrified system of sacred rites, carrying with it a fixed order of all that began as spontaneous expression of human needs and aspirations. If, however, the movement does not go too far; if "religion" grows sufficiently to substitute a kind of cosmic or centralised or generalised outlook for mere individualist "animism," but does not gain full control; then there appears a third stage. Thinkers arise who question the customary views embodied in the social and spiritual tradition. Thus the "philosophic" stage is reached. In common with religion, philosophy aspires to unity; but it tends to dissolve the unity based on old custom. "Free thought," in a smaller or larger class, is the condition of its existence. When it becomes practical, it aims in its own way at the direction of human life. Sometimes it has been tempted to take short cuts, and to elaborate schemes of philosophic oligarchy. Normally, however, it perceives in the long run that the direction must come, not from the attainment of power by the representatives of a particular doctrine, but through a consensus arrived at by widening the atmosphere of discussion to which the life of the philosopher owes its birth.

What is called "magic" seems to be best defined as the practical instrument of the animistic conception of things. The "medicine-man," or early professional wonder-worker, in accordance with the theory of the time, supposes things to be capable of sympathetically affecting one another through their immanent souls. His distinction from other men consists in his ability, partly natural and partly acquired, to devise particular ways and means of influence. Side by side with magic, there grows up what comes to be known later as positive "science." For certain groups of phenomena, an order of a more impersonal kind impresses itself on observers. One generalisation is added to another; and, as some of these generalisations turn out useful in practice, the search for them

becomes systematised. Both magic and the rudiments of science run on through the distinctively religious stage. Either or both, as in ancient Egypt and Chaldæa, may be specially cultivated by the priestly class. Where a strong hierarchy exists, cultivation of science, or the knowledge of impersonal "laws of nature," in subordination to utility, has little tendency to bring on a new phase of thought. Its accumulation, however, as soon as the results are viewed by minds that have arrived at reflection within a less fixed social structure, contributes powerfully to aid the rise of philosophy, or disinterested and individual speculation on the causes and principles of things as parts of the whole. In the end, and in an ideal order, the proper place of science would seem to be an instrumental one in relation to philosophy, similar to that which is filled by magic in relation to primeval animism. In periods when men lose the sense of unity, it temporarily falls into subserviency to the commonest material ends blindly pursued by the greatest mass or by the most powerful anarchs.

A form assumed by religion either in rivalry with philosophy or a little before philosophy appears, is that of "divine revelation." Teachers known as "prophets" arise, who proclaim a reform of the existing priestly religion in the name of a communication to them from the gods. Sometimes the great god of the tribe or race is declared to be the revealer. Sometimes a deity who has passed or is passing into obscurity is announced as a new or hitherto unknown god. The prophet may be a real person who spoke or wrote; or he may be an ideal figure, in whose name teachings are put forth by a group. Revealed religion belongs to a stage of some ethical reflectiveness; but of less reflectiveness, and, more especially, of less disinterested questioning, than philosophy; which appeals not to the commands of a god, but to the rational insight of hearers. In its actual development, revelation can become as hierarchical as the older priestly religions which have already systematised the popular cults and the mythical fancies arising out of them. In its most characteristic form, it transcends the bounds of nationality, becomes aggressively intolerant of other religions, and appeals to "faith" against the presumptuous doubts of "the world." Coming, as it does, when the spontaneous formation of cults and myths is already on the wane, it is apt to find philosophy crossing its path. And, even apart from this, it finds a latent scepticism tending to invalidate its claims. Thus even a period so generally credulous and so dominated

by a systematised form of revealed religion as the European Middle Age, expressed what was the secret thought of many in the legend of the "Three Impostors." An impious book, it was said, had been written, in which this title was applied to the founders of the three great religions which, in Europe and Western Asia, claimed supreme authority over a peculiar race or over all mankind.

Revealed religion, confronted by philosophy, shapes out the intellectual system known among Jews, Christians and Mohammedans as "theology." This is a doctrine taught as authoritative by the hierarchy, and constructed by the scientific elaboration of myths and legends accepted as data not to be questioned. The typical expression of the system is the mediæval conception of philosophy as the "ancilla theologiæ."

Even when philosophy has separated itself from the mythologies that accompany or grow out of religious cults, it continues to have points of reference to the phases that preceded it. Accordingly, philosophers have been warned by anthropologists that they must carefully test their instruments of thought. Not only "animism," but language and arithmetic are products of savage or barbaric intelligence, and were not framed for the speculative purposes to which they are afterwards put. How does this affect the validity of philosophy itself? Are the systems of individual thinkers likely to show nearer approaches to truth than modes of thought which have pervaded whole societies, and from which no one born into those societies can escape if he would?

Let us test what are still the rival types of philosophy first in relation to animism.

It may be maintained that when mythological explanations from gods having the character of ghosts are once transcended, two types of independent philosophy arise in succession by a purely speculative process. In its first disinterested effort, human thought fixes on some objective ground of things, and tries to explain all else, including itself, from this. Thus arises the phase of "naturalism." Then, stirred up to further reflection by the unsolved problems left, thought turns back upon itself and finds that it has within a ground of reality at least co-ordinate with that which is without. Later, some thinkers go on to argue that the apparent objective ground is a derivative of a principle like that which the mind discovers in itself. Yet, though this process seems purely speculative,

the question may be raised whether in either phase real independence has been gained. Dr. Tylor, in *Primitive Culture*, has drawn attention to the resemblance between the theories on the origin of mental images put forward by some of the "naturalistic" thinkers, and the early animistic fancies about ghostly but still material semblances thrown off by objects. And something apparently like the Platonic "ideas," from which in Europe the other group of philosophies has been developed, is also to be found among barbaric tribes. Indeed, in the notion of archetypal animals, from which the individual members of the species are copied, some primeval tribes might seem to have anticipated theories worked out by modern comparative anatomists of "idealistic" lineage. Further, the whole doctrine of the idealists in general may seem open to the charge that its point of origin is merely the "ghost," to which it returns by reaction from the naturalistic theories, whether mechanical or "hylozoist." Hylozoism, again, has its point of origin in the primitive fancy that there is a kind of "life" in moving things.

There is no need to say much on the criticism of naturalism from this point of view. It will be readily admitted that later doctrines of a naturalistic kind have provided themselves or have been provided with a verifiable experimental basis in physics and physiology which puts them out of reach of attack on the ground of their anthropological origins. If they are to be attacked on the ground of origin at all, criticism must start from an investigation of processes of perception which existed before man became man. The origin of the idea of material substance having been psychologically traced, any one who wishes to use it as an ultimate basis may reasonably be asked to give grounds for holding that, while the idea has come to exist through a mental process not by itself guaranteeing reality, it is still intellectually trustworthy. The answer would only be furnished by a philosophical system that had some rational account to give of mind also. In the meantime, the bare fact that primitive men persisted in what was no doubt the naïve animal belief that there is something of the nature of "material substance" outside, does not tell against ancient or modern physical ontologies, whether these work with continuous and transformable elements, or with atoms and void, or with atoms and ether.

Is the idealist in worse case? Is his system, from the anthropological point of view, reactionary? On the whole, it

does not seem so. The resemblances to primitive fancies are not greater, and the points of contact are not more important, than those that can be shown for naturalism. Plato's realised "ideas," as principles of explanation, have a purely philosophical pedigree. Historically they are traceable to the profoundly scientific investigation of Socrates into concepts or general notions. General definitions of terms being fixed, while the particulars brought under them vary, it seemed to Plato that real forms, somehow of mental nature, corresponding to that which is general in language, might constitute a permanent system which was the reality behind the flux of the visible world. And this problem of mediation between flux and permanence was determined for him by the fully articulate "naturalistic" philosophies (as they are now considered) of Heraclitus and Parmenides. If, in speaking of the soul, his language and thought are to some extent coloured by the "ghost-theory," his successors were able to free themselves as completely from this as the modern successors of Democritus and Epicurus have freed themselves from the theory that mental images are thin films of existing or no longer existing persons or things. It may be said equally of Plotinus and of Berkeley, that if they had not adopted the word "soul" or "spirit," they would have been obliged to invent a term or terms to indicate something undeniably having reality, and yet totally unexplained in the seeming accounts given of it by contemporary "mechanical philosophers." Was not Plato's own reference to a reality "beyond being" an attempt—not yet quite successful—to express pure subjectivity in its opposition to "being" viewed as objective? The "ideas," though he regarded them as mental, he had not been able to clear of a kind of objective character involving their separability from all actual minds.

Thus the rival philosophies are left to arguments from science and reason. They cannot invalidate one another on grounds of history or "pre-history." Substantially, the origins both of naturalism and of idealism are rational.

What then is their relation to the historical religions? Or is there some difference in this respect between the two types?

The general answer is that naturalistic philosophy had put forth its declaration of independence by the end of the sixth century B.C.; and that, with some modifications, the same attitude was continued by idealism. For all popular gods are "personal." That is to say, they are conceived as individual wills capable of relation to other individual wills. They can

enter into communion with their worshippers; can contract with them or share a banquet; and can have their purposes changed by means of which the typical modes are prayer and sacrifice. Now above all these lords of the world, if not actually as excluding them, the Ionian and Eleatic philosophies placed the universe or its essence. That essence may be defined as rational law or as pure being. Equally, it is inaccessible to the means of approach used in the popular cults. God, said Xenophanes, is neither in body nor in thought like mortal man. And even tried by a human standard, the deeds commonly attributed to the gods are most shameful. To offer blood-sacrifice in expiation of guilt, said Heraclitus, is as if one were to wash out mud with mud. If the gods are perfectly wise and benevolent, said Socrates, is it not better for ignorant beings who do not know their own good, to ask only for good things in general, and not to make particular requests to the gods? And by Plato the modes of feeling characteristic of the "natural religion" of all mankind were regarded as the most impious of all. To treat the gods as accessible to prayers and gifts is to hold that they can be bribed. Gods of whom things are related that do not conform to the "idea of the good" can have no place in a city ruled by philosophers. Later, perhaps the most primitive of distinctively religious ideas, that of sacrament, is treated in a dialogue of Cicero as if it had long since been denuded of all its meaning. No one can be so foolish as to believe that what he is eating or drinking is a god.

This is one side of the case. On the other side, it must be allowed that often philosophers have tried to enter into alliance with religion, and have accused their philosophic antagonists of being irreligious. These again have sometimes retorted by accusing the "religious" philosophers of forming reactionary alliances. And all schools alike have been at times eager to show that, when everything else is gone, philosophy itself is a religion.

Shall we agree with this contention? If philosophy, in both its phases, has reached, as it undoubtedly has for some thinkers, a position not only beyond mere animism but beyond the historical religions, are we to say that it is still a kind of "religion?" And can any one school, if it chooses, make this very general claim on better grounds than its rivals?

On behalf of idealism, it might be urged that, since its ultimately real world corresponds with that to which primitive men assigned their ghosts and gods, this is the permanently

religious view; that animism, religion, and idealistic philosophy or "spiritualism," are successive resultants of the same impulse in conflict with a more or less developed materialism. On the other hand, the term religion seems to convey especially the notion of a stringent coercive power. Whether the tie is primarily conceived to bind (*religare*) the worshipper or the god, does not affect the general argument. The important thing is, that there is system and necessity. Now the feeling of this binding unity, on the intellectual side, has been most strongly impressed by the objective order of nature, whereas the centre of interest to the animist or spiritualist is a self or selves. And the many selves could scarcely have become aware that they were in a system at all unless they had inferred in one another resembling ideas which they took to be derived from a single objective world common to them all. So far, therefore, as idealism and naturalism are concerned, the claims balance.

From other points of view, the idea of a bond, and the feeling of dependence implied in religion, have been so used as to connect it especially with the social order and with ethics. Here is the source of the Positivist Religion of Humanity, and of Matthew Arnold's definition of religion as "morality touched with emotion." And these, whatever may be said by the representatives of the historic religions, are not simply individual fancies; as may be shown.

The Positivist conception has the character of a genuine deification. For religion, as actually existent, has not always, in its intenser forms, directed itself to the whole or to its cause or principle, but has often especially adored powers great though not universal. "Ancestor-worship," indeed, seems to be a portion of early not yet organised animism taken up afterwards into systematised religion as a subordinate part. The nations in whom it continues to predominate are not regarded by us as distinctively religious in temperament. And the individual human beings that are the objects of a cult never seem to rise to a very high stage of deification. Yet Man as well as Nature can contribute to the pantheon by a generalising process. When among the powers worshipped as great gods there are found ancestors of tribes or races, these seem to be imaginary representatives of the whole people,—like "Hellen" or "Israel,"—not actual persons even vaguely remembered. In their own way, they have the generality and remoteness belonging to cosmic powers like the

sky or the sun. Sometimes they become reduced to the status of "eponymous ancestors" and nothing more: sometimes they retain a higher rank as permanent tribal gods. No general rule can be laid down as to their origin and phases of transformation. But, evidently, in view of these instances, humanity can claim by analogy to be regarded as a "great being" of divine order, though not as the God of the universe. In the worship of Humanity there would be no reversion to mere ancestor-worship. And in regarding any conceived universal God as too high to be the object of a cult, the Positivists, as they themselves also contend, do not represent a deviation from normal religious instinct. If they desired extraneous philosophical support, they might find it in the "general human intellect" of the Averroists; which was held to be immortal in contrast with the fluctuating individualities that are its temporary expression.

The view that religion is "morality touched with emotion" can claim, if not such decided affinities with organised religions, yet at any rate a long philosophic ancestry. Spinoza in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Pomponazzi and Bruno and others during the period of the Renaissance, and before them a whole series of mediæval thinkers, nominally Christian or Mohammedan as the case might be, were willing to regard religion (or "theology," as they said) in this light. The philosopher rose to intellectual contemplation or to mystic absorption in the divine. His virtue was disinterested. For the multitude, the moral virtues under the sanction of hopes and fears were the highest attainable. The "religions" were to be judged by their power of directing the emotions of men in general to practical conduct. All were good provided they did this; if at the same time they did not assume an intolerant attitude to knowledge, but respected the free thought of the few.

Again, though not in the same way, Kant thought that which is permanent in religion to be ethics in one aspect. His conception agrees on the whole with that of the later Stoics: and in Bruno, a thinker of very different temperament, there are occasional suggestions of a similar view. For Kant regarded religion, in this sense, not as an imperfect thing but as the highest in man; and Bruno, in theory, placed the Stoic calm, at once ethical and religious, above the enthusiastic effort towards contemplative vision and ecstasy.

There is moreover an affinity between the ordinary type of

the "good man" and the "religious man." The moral virtues have to be practised from custom and training before they can be practised from insight; and a favourable condition for the observance of some of them is impressibility by all that is received and believed in the surrounding society. Fear of all deviations from the fixed order of a ritual is likely to be accompanied by awe of an established moral code in its social character. Now the man who cherishes fear of the supernatural sanction appealed to by his own community (the εὐσεβής), or who loves the familiar rites, or desires more minutely specified ones (the φιλοθύτης), is looked upon as pre-eminently pious or religious. And it is usually expected that such a man will, in consequence, be morally good from the point of view of the social code. If he is not, it is thought anomalous.

On the other hand, the "mystic" is often thought to be a distinctively religious type. But the mystic is essentially one who, though practising the moral virtues, has gone beyond them and is seeking to relate himself to the unity in or above the whole, and no longer to the humanised gods that deal in rewards and punishments. From the position he has attained, he rejects for himself all special rites, and even somewhat looks down upon the practical virtues. It may often be said that he is in effect escaping from what is historic in religion to philosophy. And yet this philosophy itself, even when dissociated from every positive cult, is often called "religious." In the philosophy that springs out of science, an analogue of mysticism is "cosmic emotion;" and for this too a religious character has been claimed.

Thus the result of the examination is ambiguous. Philosophy has transcended the historic religions: and yet there are assignable grounds why it may call itself "religious" if it chooses. There would of course be extreme rashness in any attempt to forecast the future of religion as the word has hitherto been understood. Its most imposing and most terrible manifestations appeared after war had been definitely declared by the philosophers on its underlying ideas in the name of the true and the just. Yet this must be insisted on: that philosophy is no mere transition between one dominant religion and another, but contains in itself the promise of a higher and more permanent order than the august structures of the historic faiths. We may speculate about possible "religions of the future;" but in face of them as in face of the religions

of the past, it would be the right and duty of philosophy to maintain its independence. For the ultimate end is not the elaboration of a new ritual, conformable to new ideas, but the prevalence of philosophy, which has no need of ritual, as the guide of humanity.

If this conclusion seems too austere, we must recall to mind that philosophy is not the whole of the culture which is substituting itself for that of the historic religions. When the whole is considered, it will be seen that there is gain and no loss. Even philosophy by itself, compared with the speculative element in religions, is more varied as well as more disinterested. Contrast the narrowly practical, credulous yet essentially incurious, minds of the Christian Fathers with those of their philosophic contemporaries even when least original. If we bring artistic culture into the account, the case is still stronger. As traditional religion ceases to dominate men's spirits, art, in all its forms, passes into a higher phase. In spite of the opposition that is often supposed to exist, it developes along with ethics; though the two developments may not often simultaneously reach their height in the same society. For reflective ethics appears when the efficacy of traditional rites is questioned; when prophets begin to set justice and mercy against sacrifice. So also the stiff "hieratic" forms of typically religious art give way to forms in which the æsthetic sense attains freedom of expression. Really great art, even of a religious kind, scarcely appears while the faith which it serves is yet unopposed from without and unvexed by internal scepticism. An outburst of it seems usually to coincide with the incipient decadence of belief. Thus the other expressions of human activity, and not merely speculation, go on to a newer order as the "close knots of religions" are undone. Or, if we like to put it in Hegelian phrase, historic religion, with all that it has tried to express, is "taken up" into the next period of man's spiritual evolution; and thus in the end nothing is lost.

The strength of the old structures must be admitted. For preserving archaisms there is no power comparable to religion. Under favouring conditions, there seems no limit to the length of time a sacerdotal hierarchy, in alliance with political absolutism, can last on in a petrified form. Yet, when the conditions are unfavourable to survival, a possible life of millennia may be reduced to an actual one of centuries. Why did not the new Persian theocracy of the Sassanidæ last as

long as the old institutions of Egypt or Babylon? Merely because it could not escape early collision with the aggressive fanaticism which sprang from the new and less complex creed of Mohammed. A similar doom may be in store for the Russian theocracy. For circumstances begin to be even more hostile. On one side a foe has arisen with superior military organisation. On the other side a subversive propaganda is ever going on. And this starts, not (as in the case of the Roman Empire confronted with Christianity) from the lower civilisation of the East, absolutist and theocratic, but from polities which, whether fully conscious of it or not, are the heirs of the ancient republican state.

How long the transformation will take, there as elsewhere, and whether there will again be great reversals, it is useless to discuss. The whole matter has been summed up by Giordano Bruno, in a passage of which the primary idea is better known than the remarkable qualifications with which it is stated. "We are older and have a longer age behind us than our predecessors. But that some of those who came later have been no wiser, and that in general the multitude of those now living have no more wit, than the men of former times, is because they have not lived with the years of others, but are dead to others' experience as to their own. Moreover, since there is perpetual vicissitude of opinions as of all else, to have regard to philosophies simply as ancient, or again as modern, is the same as trying to decide which came first, day or night. The thing we ought to consider is, whether our own thought or the thought of our adversaries is that which puts a term to the night or to the day."[1]

[1] *Cena delle Ceneri*, Dialogo I.—I have abbreviated the passage in translation.

# A COMPENDIOUS CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES

It is generally allowed that in his Classification of the Sciences Comte furnished a valuable clue to a systematic order in the objective study of nature. Metaphysicians and psychologists find his scheme at fault in its imperfect recognition of the place of subjective studies. Still, it may be noted that he himself, in his later speculations, did something to remedy this defect. After Sociology, which he at first regarded as the supreme science, he placed a Science of Morality. Further, in his *Synthèse Subjective*, he began to set forth a statement of fundamental principles underlying all the positive sciences; and, beyond them all, a view of the cosmos as animated and as related to ends. This indeed was put forward as poetry or religion, and not as demonstrated truth; but it is plainly an approximation to a more "metaphysical" view than that which he had hitherto taken. What I propose is to carry out this completion systematically, with due recognition of the validity of subjective principles which Comte himself would have repudiated, but which, as is acknowledged equally by the successors of Kant and of Mill, are indispensable for a full account of knowledge.

In Comte's final scheme the positive sciences follow one another in the order:—Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Sociology, Morality. This list itself, to begin with, needs correction. Astronomy, as Mr. Spencer has shown to the satisfaction even of some adherents of Comte, does not properly belong to the series of fundamental or abstract sciences as he conceived them. It is a concrete science in the sense in which Geology is a concrete science.

Under Biology, Comte himself made a special division for Cerebral Physiology; this being his equivalent for Psychology. When Psychology is recognised by name, it is clearly entitled to a separate place. Lastly, it may be observed that Comte's Moral Science is not philosophical ethics, but is the science of the individual human mind viewed as posterior to life in society. Thus it is really a higher Psychology; namely, that of man as possessing the attributes which distinguish him from brutes.

When from the correction of the list we proceed to its completion, we find that before Mathematics must come Logic (Formal and Material) viewed as a philosophical science.




After the higher branch of Psychology comes Metaphysics (as Theory of Knowledge and as Ontology). We are now presented with the result that, to figure the amended classification, Comte's linear series, provisionally conceived as in a straight line, must be bent into a circle. For a series

beginning with Formal Logic and ending with Metaphysics is subjective at both extremes. Moreover, in the speculative though not in the didactic order, Metaphysics as Theory of Knowledge precedes Logic. This is represented in the accompanying diagram. The additional points there figured will be explained in the sequel.

The problem now before us is to show how the determinations of this series are consequent one on another. Beginning with Formal Logic, we may simply posit, as first principles of the science, the Laws of Thought, which, though disclosed by metaphysical investigation, can be stated with perfect intelligibility to those who have not gone through the dialectical process that establishes them. For scientific purposes, it is sufficient that they should be found to be applicable tests of formally valid thought. Nor is the metaphysical problem ever raised by their breaking down. It arises from the theoretical need felt of completing the circle. The circle becomes formally complete when the Theory of Knowledge restores to us with confirmation the principles on which we have hitherto implicitly or explicitly proceeded. Historically, it may be noted, Aristotle arrived at the Laws of Contradiction and of Excluded Middle in his *Metaphysics*.

These and the Law of Identity I hold to be laws of thought, not of things. To take specially the Law of Contradiction, which, according to Aristotle's exact way of putting it, asserts that A cannot be not-A at the same time and in the same relation. The law tells us that thought, if it would be formally valid, must not contradict itself; but it does not enable us to assert a single materially new proposition. Given a subjective world of concepts, we can maintain order among them by this and the other laws; but we cannot make any assertion that is not implied in what we have already said. Thus, unless we have, beyond the laws of thought, some general proposition or propositions about experience, we can have no science of nature. The laws of thought by themselves do not allow us to deny, *a priori*, that what objectively exists is a Heraclitean flux without the reason which Heraclitus supposed to underlie it, and without the equivalence of measure which he held to be the rule of its transformations. Let us imagine ourselves endowed with the laws of thought and presented with such a flux. The Law of Contradiction is evidently of no avail if nothing remains itself for more than a moment and if there is no constant relation of it to anything else. It is true that we

are still obliged to treat the momentary existence of A as inconsistent with its non-existence at that moment; but, if that is all, there can be no system of experiential knowledge. The formal law does not entitle us to deny the complete absence of perdurability or uniformity. Thus, on the one side, it is valid for thought whatever our experience may be; and, on the other side, we cannot by means of it anticipate experience to the smallest extent. For real availability, it is absolutely dependent on there being an order of which by itself it contains no assertion.

In passing from Formal to Material Logic, we come first to the general principles of mathematical knowledge. Since Kant's investigation of these, it is allowed that they are "synthetic" and not merely "analytic." That is to say, there are involved in mathematical demonstration propositions which are neither an affair of hypothetical definition nor can be educed from definitions by means of the formal laws of thought. To take Kant's own examples. The geometrical axiom that "two straight lines cannot enclose a space" is not a truth that can be evolved by mere comparison of the concepts of the straight line and of space. Similarly with an arithmetical proposition such as $7+5=12$: no mere comparison of the concepts of the separate numbers can give the resulting number. In both cases, what is required is a construction in intuition or in the corresponding imagination,—a process of mental drawing, or of numbering things or events in time. And the peculiarity of mathematical principles is that, upon such construction, recognition of the necessary truth of the proposition is the outcome of a single act of comparison. Thus they are not generalisations from experience.

This last position of Kant has been contested from the experiential side. What remains incontestable is that, besides the principles of Formal Logic, mathematical science requires first principles peculiar to itself. The positions of Locke, of Leibniz, and of Hume in the *Inquiry*, are abandoned on this point. Kant's view as regards the peculiarity of mathematical reasoning, it may be observed, had been in part anticipated in the Platonic school. Plato himself had marked off Mathematics from what he called Dialectic—which was at once Metaphysics and Logic—on the one side, and from such an adumbration of Physics as was then possible on the other. Aristotle divided Metaphysics proper from Logic; and by Plato's successors, with the aid of the later Peripatetics,

something was done to make clearer the precise character to be ascribed to mathematical truth. An intermediate position was assigned to it between laws valid for pure thinking, which are prior, and "laws of nature" emerging from observation or experiment, which are posterior. These distinctions were to some extent obscured in the early modern period, but may now be considered as restored, though it cannot be said that definitive conclusions have yet been reached. It is henceforth clear, however, that the character of the special logic which belongs to Mathematics can only be determined by an investigation like that of Kant's Transcendental Æsthetic. Such an investigation is necessarily metaphysical. Psychological theories of the origin of space as a mental form can at most furnish hints towards fixing the problem. Whatever the final result may be, Kant has determined the method of the inquiry.

For the classification of the sciences, it is sufficient to note that mathematical truth, though "material" and no longer purely "formal," does not yet suffice to determine anything whatever about the order of nature. This was fully recognised by Kant, who saw that before even "synthetic" propositions regarding space and number can be applied to phenomena, certain other general maxims, beyond both these and the laws of thought, are needed. The case may be illustrated as when we were discussing the applicability of the Law of Contradiction. Let us suppose ourselves to have the power of counting, and of drawing figures in an imaginary space. Then, if we can provide our constructions with names, and can somehow communicate with similar intelligences, we may work out a system of pure arithmetical and geometrical truth. But suppose that, so far as external nature is concerned, we are confronted with an absolute and lawless flux. Then we can do nothing whatever with our mathematical system. It is of no use to us that the results of counting and of drawing follow with necessity, if numerable things alter their number from moment to moment and figured things change their shapes at random. For abstract geometrical truth indeed it is not required that perfect triangles and perfect circles should exist in nature; but, for applicability of deductions about those geometrical figures, things marked out with figures that approximate to them must retain their shapes long enough for the deductions to be also approximately applicable during a time that is not merely infinitesimal.

To give us the least rudiment of physical or natural science, we evidently require some recognisable perdurability or constancy in things. This requirement is now expressed as the Uniformity of Nature. In antiquity it found expression partly in very slight outlines of a logic of Induction, but most expressly in axioms of which the general form was that nothing is produced from nothing and that nothing can return to nothing. This conception goes back to the beginnings of the Ionian physics. For the history of modern science, its most important ancient phase was Atomism. The physics of Democritus and Epicurus, ready to the hand of scientific philosophers at the opening of the modern era, grew into the corpuscular Mechanics of the seventeenth century. Taken up again by Dalton from Newton, it received its most accurate and verifiable expression in the atomic theory of modern Chemistry. Meanwhile, with Descartes and the Cartesian school, there had come into clear view for the first time the idea of formulating a law of indestructibility of motion, as it was then put. For "motion" or momentum, Leibniz substituted *vis viva* or "force." At length, in the nineteenth century, the anticipated law was accurately formulated as the law of the Conservation of Energy. That Matter and Energy are alike perdurable through all change is not, however, sufficient for scientific uniformity. A law of sequence among the changes themselves is also needed. This has been expressed as the Law of Causation, and, in this expression, has been made a fundamental principle of Inductive Logic. In the modern development of the Logic of Induction, the great names are those of Bacon, Hume, Comte and Mill. Since Mill, we have a logic of the investigation of nature comparable, in its systematic character, with the formal logic of Aristotle.

In their investigation of the subjective grounds of the principle of Uniformity, Hume and Mill applied themselves more specially to the philosophical or metaphysical problem. To Bacon must be ascribed distinctively the idea of methodical induction, in contrast with "induction by simple enumeration," and to Comte the idea of a scientifically certain or positive "law" of phenomena. On the metaphysical question there is now perhaps more agreement among philosophers than appears. Experientialists do not uphold Mill's view that the Uniformity of Nature is itself established by an induction from particulars; and the successors of Kant on their side do not think that experience can be constituted by

mental forms or "categories" applied to a chaos of given sensations. Kant's position as against Hume being conceded to this extent, that experience has its formal elements which are as real as the matter of perception, Kantians or Hegelians hardly contend for more. The categories, they themselves allow, are immanent in experience, and do not need to be imposed on it from without. Indeed the notion that Hume was a pure sceptic without serious belief in scientific truth, or that Kant held nature to be a chaos put in order by the individual human mind, would be allowed to be too "schematic," and not agreeable to the deeper drift of the thinkers themselves. Were "the given" a chaos, no subjective forms, call them "necessary" or not, could set it in order. Nor does it seem reasonable on the other hand that, if there are no intelligible laws to which it is really conformable, the modes of formulating it suggested from time to time by some of its casual conjunctions should agree so well with the rest. To maintain that there is now an approach to unanimity on these points may seem paradoxical. But, in the end, what historical reason is there for expecting that the opposition between *a priori* and *a posteriori* methods, or between Rationalism and Experientialism, will be the one permanent line of cleavage between philosophic schools?

After the logic of the sciences come the positive sciences as such. The first question that arises with respect to these concerns the position of Mechanics. Shall we, with Comte, place at the end of the mathematical sciences Rational Mechanics? Or shall we separate Mechanics as a whole from Mathematics, and make it the fundamental department of Physics? It seems to me that the incontestable portion of Kant's mathematical doctrine necessitates the second position. With Mechanics comes in the conception of "mass," which cannot be educed from space as a pure form of intuition, but has direct reference to data of sense supplied by the feelings of pressure and touch. Yet Comte's view was not altogether ungrounded. The higher branches of mathematics, such as those that deal with infinitesimals and with imaginary quantities, have been elaborated, as Prof. Bain has pointed out, in close connexion with physical investigations, and often for the sake of solving definite physical problems. Everything except their primary assumptions may have been evolved by pure mathematical construction and formal reasoning; but, if the assumptions themselves are not

congruous with the physical order of nature, the theories as a whole remain mere curiosities, and can scarcely be regarded as in any proper sense "true." The reason for including them in Mathematics while excluding Rational Mechanics seems, however, to be this. In Rational Mechanics the idea of a moving mass is fundamental. In Mathematics, whatever may be the manner in which any of its peculiar assumptions are finally selected as worthy to form the ground of a special theory, they can be treated actually as determinations of space and number without direct reference to mass. This is of course the normal relation of a simpler to a more complex science. The fact that the more complex science furnishes it with some of its problems does not destroy its logical priority.

Under Mechanics come the Laws of Motion and the Theory of Gravitation. The latter theory was first definitely attained as the result of investigations in the concrete science of Astronomy. This, again, illustrates the relation just referred to. Gravity belongs to General Physics in so far as its theory, once attained, can be stated and worked out with reference to hypothetical masses, and without taking account of the actual masses and distances, empirically ascertained, of particular bodies in the universe. This distinction, insisted on by Mr. Spencer, was adumbrated in ancient schemes, Peripatetic or Platonic, by the division of the rational theory of the Sphere from Astronomy regarded as a partially empirical science; though the ancient distinction agreed more nearly with Comte's view in so far as the doctrine of the Sphere was assigned to Mathematics.

The divisions of Special Physics are in part determined by the particular senses receptive of the phenomena grouped together. Light, heat and sound refer unambiguously to the senses of sight, temperature and hearing. These senses are not, indeed, allowed a share in the scientific explanation, which is referred to the so-called "primary qualities of matter," appreciated by the senses of touch and pressure; but without them the phenomena could not for us have been grouped together at all. Several senses being given, however, combined observations enable us to mark off other groups of phenomena which do not, as such, appear to a particular sense. Metaphor apart, we have no sensations of attraction or repulsion. Hence gravitation could not be directly observed, but had to be inferred from its effects in the form of pressure

or motion. Electrical and magnetic phenomena have had to be indirectly appreciated in more various ways. Their common features once known, they could be made the subject of a branch of Special Physics, referred, like the others, to Mechanics or General Physics as fundamental. The reason why Mechanics is thus fundamental seems to consist essentially in the more permanently numerable and measurable character of the phenomena of perception that are its material.

Of Chemistry we may say generally that it deals with the compositions and decompositions of kinds of matter; whereas molecular Physics deals with states of aggregation of particles conceived as all alike. The complex way, however, in which Chemistry furnishes problems to Physics makes the borders of the two sciences difficult to define. For the perception of the qualitative changes going with changes of composition, it is worthy of note that the senses of taste and smell are of account along with the others. As is of course the case also in the special branches of Physics, no demonstration that modified arrangements of simple particles accompany the qualitatively different phenomena can annul their actual differences of quality. Hence, even if matter as it must be for Mechanics were found to be everywhere ultimately homogeneous, this would not efface the division between Chemistry and Physics.

With Comte we must add to the list of objective sciences that are fundamental and abstract the science of Life. For vital phenomena are distinguishable from chemical as these from physical phenomena by presenting a new problem of general form, and not merely particular empirical aggregations to be explained by combining and applying the orders of scientific truth already determined. The general problem of Biology is fixed by the nature of living organisms, which, as such, manifest what can only in fact be described as an "immanent end." The parts of an organism act together in such a way that the union of their functions maintains, against resistances that do not overpass certain limits, the continuous existence of an individualised whole. This *consensus* of functions clearly presents a higher problem than those of Chemistry and Physics, inasmuch as we get no hint from any special sense or combination of senses for the demarcation of it. The preceding sciences furnish the instruments for dealing with the problem of organic life in detail; but that problem itself does not admit of a state-

ment wholly resolving it into problems of Physics and Chemistry. And theories of the Evolution of Life cannot, of course, explain how there come to be living forms at all in distinction from the other objects in nature; nor, on the positive side, how those forms are transmuted so as to become, when considered in relation to the general conception of an organism, more "organic." What they really set forth is certain conditions depending on the existence of many kinds of organisms together in space and time. Those conditions being known, and the general teleological nature of an organism being given, the account of living forms on earth can be immensely simplified; but the distinctive problem is not removed in this way any more than it is by the detailed study of physico-chemical processes in the particular organism. Of late, as it would be easy to show, philosophical Biology has become more and not less convinced of the irreducibility of its problem.

The transition from Biology to Psychology is marked by the introduction of a new method. To observation and experiment, the methods of the physical and natural sciences, there is added introspection. This peculiar method is the condition of there being a science of Psychology at all. It has indeed been ascertained that the physiological functions of the brain are in some way concomitants of what is known to us introspectively as mind; but no observation of those functions, and no experiments, would have revealed the existence of mind in special relation with organisms if mental phenomena had not been known to us through our having reflected on them. Hence the proper name of the new science is not Cerebral Physiology, but Psychology.

By "Animal Psychology" in the diagram is not meant Comparative Psychology, or the study of the various manifestations of mind in different species of animals. This is a "concrete science." The fundamental or abstract science in relation to it is constituted by the study of mental synthesis in general previous to the formation of the Concept. Without this kind of synthesis, the actual phenomena of the human mind would, of course, be inexplicable; and, as it is common to man and at least the higher animals, the abstract science that deals with it may from that circumstance receive a name. Under this head may be studied the elements contributed to mind by the senses, and their grouping in accordance with the laws of association first ascertained by

analysis of the phenomena of memory. Here already we have elementary forms of Emotion and Will, and of Reason as intelligent adaptation of actions to practical ends. The higher, and properly human, form of intelligence appears only with conceptual Thought.

To the Psychology of Man the transition is through Sociology, regarded as a fundamental and abstract science. Comparison of the various forms of human society is a concrete science, like Comparative Psychology. The fundamental character of Sociology is proved by its introducing a new mode of relation, namely, the relation between organisms that live in community and become capable of intellectual converse. In the evolution of human society, we must suppose that the passage has taken place from vague interchange of feeling and co-operation for common ends, to mutual understanding of ideas and fixation of a system of signs by which thought can control action. From the uttered sound associated with an image has been evolved the word which stands for a concept.

On Human Psychology the remark may suffice for the present that of course the power of conceptual thought modifies everything else. Perception, emotion and will are quite other in man than they would be in an animal with only "generic images" in the place of general ideas, and with only intelligent adaptation in the place of discursive thinking. The phases of the human mind called Emotion and Will point to Æsthetic Philosophy and to Practical Philosophy (Ethics and Politics), as the phase of Thought points to Metaphysics. Here the last only, as having a more fundamentally theoretical character, comes directly into view.

While Psychology, with its peculiar method, first shows us the outlet—or the inlet—to reality, it is Metaphysics that gives the direct theory of reality. From metaphysical analysis of knowledge in general there results the doctrine known as Idealism. All the "objects" of the positive sciences are resolved into appearances, related in forms which, like the elements related, are such only for Mind. So far as the material elements of knowledge are concerned, idealistic doctrine seems to owe most to English Experiential Philosophy. For the theory of relations or forms, it owes most to Kant and the "Intellectualists." The truth in both lines of thought may be summed up in the position that, as the relations between the elements of experience are just as real, so also they are just as ideal, as the elements.

That Metaphysics must include Ontology as well as Theory of Knowledge is again becoming clear. Evidence of this is to be found in the frankly speculative attitude taken up by Mr. Bradley as the representative of one view, and by Mr. McTaggart as the representative of the other, on the question of the Immortality of the Soul, relegated by Kant with all other ontological questions to the Practical Reason. As an aid towards reclaiming the province of Ontology for Metaphysics, it may be worth while to attempt to contribute to the proof—independently, as I think, of what is sectional in any philosophic school—that the question, whether the individual soul is permanent, is accessible from the speculative side.

Acceptance merely of Idealism and of the formal Laws of Thought would not, it seems to me, give us sufficient grounds for approaching it. We need some real proposition about mind. Now if all that is is ultimately mental, and if at the same time no permanence beyond the moment can be asserted of that which is, then the hypothetical position in which we should have been if furnished with formal truths, but confronted with a material chaos, becomes actual. There is no reason, however, to acquiesce in this result. As against it, we can explicitly state an axiom or postulate which certainly is not devoid of meaning: namely, that there is a whole of Mind and that that whole is perdurable. This seems, both in itself and from scientific analogy, the most reasonable position. It is already laid down in Plato's *Phædo*, though in a form which, through its close union with direct examination of the arguments for the permanence of the individual soul, has given critics trouble to disentangle. Thus it is, historically, nearly as old as the axiom of the physical perdurability of Matter. The Conservation of Energy, with its apparently intermediate position between physics and metaphysics, was naturally much later to receive satisfactory statement. Appearing for long in the guise of propositions about the ambiguous entity called "force," with its suggestion at once of inherence in matter and of subjective activity, it had to be defined as an altogether phenomenal truth, and thrown over to the objective side, before scientific clearness could be attained. Given the perdurability of Mind, as distinguished at once from the merely formal axiom of Identity, that A is A, and from the axioms, having reference to the object-world, that Matter and Energy persist in time, we can now state intelligibly the further questions: Are individual minds or souls alternately segregated

from the whole of Mind and re-absorbed into it; there being thus emergence and cessation of ever new intrinsic differences? Or do they represent permanent distinctions, through changes of phenomenal manifestation, within a total intellectual system? To state the questions is not of course to answer them; but, once the general axiom of perdurability is admitted, they become accessible to the laws of thought. The criterion seems to be, Which supposition is most thinkable in accordance with the nature of mind?

To return now to a topic just raised under the head of Psychology. The amended classification of the sciences here proposed seems to exclude Practical and Æsthetic Philosophy. Yet these too have a scientific or speculative aspect, as on the other hand Metaphysics and Logic, which are included, may be treated not only as speculative sciences but as disciplines regulative of thought. Again, no place has been found in the diagram for the concrete and applied sciences. The answer to these objections is that any arrangement in space must necessarily be inadequate to the true order of the sciences, both positive and philosophical; since all of them together have their existence in mind or the unextended. A diagram can only serve as an aid to mental conception: it does not directly show forth the real order. This is partly but not fully admitted by Mr. Spencer in relation to his own scheme when he says that a true classification of the sciences ought to be figured in three dimensions, and not on a surface. For not only do his tables, as he himself notes, exclude subjective psychology, which he regards as co-extensive with all the objective sciences and antithetical to them; but, more than this, the use of a model in three dimensions would not enable him to bring it in.

The present adaptation of Comte's scheme to a more metaphysical doctrine—and indeed the original scheme itself—does not seem to be necessarily in rivalry with Mr. Spencer's. When it is recognised that every diagrammatic representation must be inadequate, the two classifications may very well be taken as expressions of different points of view. For philosophical use, Comte's point of view has this advantage. It brings out clearly that the sciences, in their ideal order, form a single organism of knowledge to which each is subservient. Mr. Spencer's scheme, on its side, brings out what is also a perfectly real aspect of science; namely, its tendency to branch into divergent specialties, which arrange themselves like groups

of organisms at the termination of a process of biological evolution. This, however, is a less important aspect for the philosopher. And to keep it primarily in view seems less conducive to the reception of science into the system of general culture.

When the sciences are thought of as organically related to a whole, the advantages of the circular arrangement are easy to see. For this by no means indicates a definitively closed system. On the contrary, it might have served as the least inadequate representation from the time when cosmic science or philosophy first began vaguely to differentiate into particular sciences. New sciences would thus be seen introducing themselves in accordance with that process of "intussusception" by which a biological organism grows, and which Kant regarded as the true process of development for an architectonic system of knowledge. This, and not the direct historical succession of the sciences in agreement with their logical order, has been the real course of intellectual history. The supposition that the logical order of the sciences and the historical order in which they become "positive" are one and the same, is a defect in Comte's classification as it stands; though, as may now be seen, it is unessential to the use of it. There is no difficulty indeed in fixing arbitrarily the time when a science is positively constituted, and thus making the two orders seem to agree; but, if we view the facts impartially, the supposition that they do agree may be easily refuted. Chemistry, for example, is logically prior to Biology; yet it was later to become a coherent body of doctrine. And Psychology, even in its higher department, is an older science than Sociology; which indeed is even now little more than inchoate, so that the definite place assigned to it in the series is still somewhat in advance of the facts. The sciences have not waited for one another, as Comte appears to have imagined, but have started up at intervals as occasion brought them into view; the higher sciences contenting themselves, if the lower were not "ready," with a few approximations to their laws, or in the meantime taking leaps in the dark. And at every stage since Greek science began, there has been some kind of general philosophy in more or less friendly relation with the special sciences.

Finally, it might be contended that something like the arrangement proposed has always been implicit in educated thought. To make out a case, it would only be necessary to point to the etymology of the word "encyclopædia."

# TELEOLOGY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

Οὐκ ἔοικε δ' ἡ φύσις ἐπεισοδιώδης οὖσα ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων, ὥσπερ μοχθηρὰ τραγῳδία.—Arist *Met.* xiv. 3, 1090 b 19.

KANT's treatment of final causes in the *Critique of Judgment* is as classical for modern times as that of Aristotle for antiquity. Thus it is the inevitable starting-point for any new discussion of the topic. Complex as the third *Critique* is in itself, the general position that results from it can be stated in a few words. The human mind necessarily makes use of the conception of an end or "final cause" in its explanation or description of an organism; but this conception has not full theoretical validity. Perhaps an "intuitive intelligence" might be able to view nature as through and through mechanically determined. Apparent teleology, seen especially in organisms, runs out into æsthetic contemplation of nature; but for the speculative reason it has no "constitutive" value. Primarily, the bearing of the idea of end is practical. The mechanical principles, however, which have for nature the highest theoretical warrant, not only cannot now explain, but demonstratively will never be able to explain for any human mind, the simplest process that is distinctively vital. For the sciences of organic life, the conception of final cause will always be a necessity.

Kant's "hard-and-fast" divisions are by his successors laid aside: and this is often supposed to tell in favour of some view subordinating everything to practice. If there is no rigorous demarcation between the "practical" and the "speculative," then, it is straightway assumed, we must declare every explanation to be ultimately practical, the mechanical just as much as the teleological explanation. But why not attempt a precisely opposite correction? If

there are no such hard-and-fast lines, teleological explanations, though starting immediately from our knowledge of our own practical activity, must have a speculative character of their own, no less than mechanical ones. Their degree of theoretical validity remains to be determined. The rigid lines having gone, we can ask which "category," teleology or mechanism, comes nearer to the truth of reality, and what are their other superiorities or inferiorities. We have returned to something more like the position of Aristotle, by whom the teleological account of organisms was regarded as one form of theoretical science, and not as a kind of intruder, though an inevitable one, in the scientific domain.

To appeal finally to the decision of theoretical reason, so far as this can be distinguished from other manifestations of reason, does not mean that we are to ignore systematically the problems suggested by æsthetic or practical views. Such views may start questions to which the speculative reason can give some, though not a perfect, answer. Its answer, by the seeker of speculative truth, must be accepted in the last resort. In metaphysics we must not ask first, what alternatives are theoretically possible, and then decide, in the absence of any other test, for that which conforms to our aspirations. Rather we must ask, whether a view conformable to our aspirations can be consistently thought. If it can, we must still try to adjust our belief exactly to the evidence, and not choose it with a weighted volition that goes beyond.

"Final cause," then, presents itself to us, within a certain range, as a known fact. We have the thought of a modification to be produced in perceptible objects; and the production of that modification takes place after we have thought of it, and somehow in consequence of our idea as a contributory cause. And such cases are not merely sporadic. There is a whole class of events, called "volitions," of which this is the general description. One idea which, through intermediate mental and physical modifications, is at the origin of many actions, is the generalised idea of conserving the organism. The previous existence of this as a directing thought contributes, through what we call "means," to realise the "end;" that is, to maintain the continued existence of the organic system called the body. The view can be further generalised. The working of the body, beneath our voluntary muscular actions, is made up of all sorts of physical and chemical processes: and these, we find, conspire in the absence of

conscious direction to effect what would be our "end" if we had control over them. We can apply the same conception to animal organisms, without necessarily supposing them to possess conscious ends of a generalised kind at all. Further, we can apply it to plants, which we do not even suppose to be conscious in the ordinary meaning of the word, much less to have conscious ends. That is to say: if we were in the place of the lower animal or the plant, and desired to preserve the existence of the system supposed to be our body, we should, if we could, with this end in view, combine the physical and chemical processes exactly as they are combined. Or if, standing outside, we had in our minds as an object of desire the preservation of such an organic system, and had control over its internal processes, we should control them precisely thus. This is summed up by saying that all living organisms, from the highest to the lowest—whatever else they may have —have an "immanent end."

So far teleology seems to be quite scientific. It is merely a generalised statement of facts and events. But can we go deeper? Is this appearance an illusion? Must the ultimate explanation be found in a purely mechanical transmission of motion, capable of being stated according to laws which are not teleological?

Clearly this cannot be the ultimate explanation; and, whatever advance knowledge may make, can never become so. For explanations in terms of mechanism are merely phenomenal: whereas teleological explanations, though these too must not be assumed to be ultimate, take account of something known to us as more than phenomenally real—namely, a process of mind. Even where this cannot strictly be known, they suppose something vaguely in analogy with it. Thus, while they have nothing like the minuteness and accuracy of the mechanical explanations, they have more reality in a metaphysical sense. A mechanical process is ultimately, under analysis, nothing but an observed or inferred co-existence and sequence of appearances, having a certain constancy. Appearances generally are combinations of presented and represented sense-elements which we "project," as portions of our perceived "external world," according to psychological law. We reduce this varied object to "mechanism" by abstraction; that is to say, we bring it to a calculable form by taking away a considerable part even of what is actual or possible appearance to our own minds or to human minds in

general. From this denuded "mechanical" world we can never get back by a rational procedure even to the whole of phenomena; let alone to the mental reality which we observe in ourselves introspectively or infer to exist in others.

The foregoing argument of course implies the idealistic contrast between the phenomena of the object-world, projected in the form of space, and the reality of the mind as known by introspection, for which objects are appearances. If it is said that, at any rate, the appearances indicate something that is not our own mind or the minds of other persons, the reply must be that in no such way as this can the ultimate character of mechanical explanations be defended. For these do not take us to any "ground" beneath mere relations of phenomena. And the phenomena themselves even are regarded not in their fulness, but in extreme abstraction.

Let us, however, setting aside the idealistic criticism for a moment, consider the emergence of organic groups in accordance with Natural Selection. This is sometimes even by men of science called a "mechanical" explanation, though it is really of a more concrete character, and cannot be translated in full into abstract mathematico-physical relations. In any case, it does not resolve the fundamental teleology of organisms, but assumes it. What it gets rid of scientifically is the so-called "external teleology," which imagined organic forms to be explained by the assertion that a quasi-human artificer had adapted them to one another and to the conditions of life. Natural Selection gives a scientific explanation of the origin of species by showing how groups may come to be definitely marked off through elimination of the multitudes of individuals that cannot maintain themselves in competition with individuals better adapted to the given circumstances. But those that are eliminated are also, for the most part, quite capable of maintaining themselves and of leaving offspring if they had fewer competitors. Practically, all are expressions of an "immanent teleology;" but the varying individuals vary in efficiency as in other characters. Wonderful as was the anticipation by Empedocles of natural selection as a general idea, nothing has yet been found in organic nature corresponding to the endless production, which he supposed, of monstrous births, hardly any of which could live at all. If this had turned out to be the order of things, more might have been said for the view that apparent "end" or "final cause" is a merely casual result of something resembling mechanism. But the facts, as

observed, correspond rather to Aristotle's view that the relatively few monstrous births produced indicate some material obstacle, which causes the essentially teleological effort that finds its expression in living things occasionally to miss the mark. Human volition very frequently fails to reach what it aimed at: and yet we do not say that there was no volition; nor do we say, when it hits the mark, that there was in it no preconception of results.

Darwin, of course, never rejected teleology in the sense defended. It merely did not come within his own biological province; belonging rather to that of the physiologist. According to an utterance related in his *Life*, the argument for the reality of final causes sometimes appealed to him; though at other times he seemed to see nothing in it. This is intelligible, since the great effect of his work was to explain in a different manner a whole order of things which the cultivators of natural history had been in the habit of explaining by teleology of an illegitimate kind.

In its foundation, biology still remains the type of a teleological science. This means that it is a mixed science; that although in its whole structure it is phenomenal and objective, it has nevertheless to use, implicitly or explicitly, as a directive idea, something given to it by an elementary psychological observation of the process in volition. In detail, physiology proceeds by tracing the physico-chemical changes that carry on the life of the organism; but without the conception of the organism as an end to itself, kept in being by a set of "functions" working together for their own continuance, there would be no such scientific problem as that of "life." An organism would be merely a portion of the object-world accidentally detached, like a piece of rock for example. To consider its perservation or non-preservation in any special way would be of no interest.

Biology, once formed, reacts powerfully on psychology, which now acquires a much more determinate teleological basis than it would have had if limited to introspection. In fact, so far as the idea of end can be carried through in psychology itself, it owes most of its applicability to biology. To have insisted on the fundamental character of the "organic individual" in psychological science appears to me on reflection to be a definite achievement of recent psychologists. In England it may be assigned to Professors Ward and Stout. Some of their predecessors, as I think they admit, have recognised the

"conative" basis of the science; but undoubtedly considerable development of it was needed to correct a form of "associationism" which would have made teleology issue, as a last result, from laws of mental process intrinsically not teleological. This admitted, however, there is room still for a plea on behalf of the position that something is to be found in mind beyond teleology. There are processes, both of mere association and of thought, that have purely mental laws not reducible to relations of end and means. A higher teleology beyond the psycho-physiological may arise by which they become ends; but ends in the primary meaning of practical interests are not their determinants from the beginning. Speculative interests, if we like to call them so, spring out of a non-teleological mode of mind. Not only pure thought, but mere reverie, may exist, as we say, "for its own sake," and without having been brought to be by adaptation to a desired result. We have risen to the "super-organic," in a sense somewhat different from that of Spencer.

By this association of ideas, which (as if to illustrate the thesis maintained) presented itself unsought, we may go on to the "super-organic" in its meaning of sociology. Here we are brought again to a science which in one department—like biology in its physiological department—in the absence of the idea of end becomes mere chaos. It would not be quite true to say this of psychology; but it is true of historical science. Organic development, conceived as a series of relations to immanent ends, is here fundamental. The phenomena of decadence and reaction do not alter the case, any more than the phenomena of degeneration alter it in biology. This means that we have here again a "mixed" science, with interaction between conceptions belonging to the object and the subject. Our demarcations of the sciences must evidently not be taken in too rigorous a sense.

The teleological idea, as here adopted, seems to be secure against the criticism contained in Prof. Adamson's *Development of Modern Philosophy* (vol. ii. "Principles of Psychology," A. chap. iii.). That criticism is effective against the notion that any use can be made of the idea of a prefigured end towards which the whole process of things is moving; but the idea of end in its "immanent" sense, as applied to the development of the individual or of smaller or larger organic groups, appears to be admitted by Adamson himself, only with some advance in subtlety of statement.

Teleology, according to the view that has been taken, finds expression in the laws of every kind of organic system, from individual organism to species; and in man again from the organic individual through family and tribal groups to cities and nations, and lastly, in an incipient way, to the whole of humanity. Such groups are not mere aggregates, but can have an intelligible end stated for them by a spectator identifying himself in imagination with the group. This end is, at the lowest, self-conservation. As the scale is ascended, it becomes something more: "power" (as Hobbes expressed it), or freedom, or positive happiness in practical or contemplative activity. Such ends arrive at self-consciousness only in the higher organic groups, and only in individuals among those groups.

Can we go further and suppose a single teleological system in which all these systems are included so as to be adapted to one another? This, as Kant showed, can only be done by speculating in terms of an ideal. In thus speculating we go beyond the region of positive science. Yet the whole of organic life on earth, with its whole environment, does somehow form part of one system, whether we call it teleological or not. And the accomplishment of ends by individuals and groups is dependent on the system with its mutual adaptations. As to the nature of this system, the general truth seems to have been first stated by Heraclitus, who declared that the condition of there being a cosmos was strife. The later Greek philosophic schools all adopted this view, putting it in their own manner. Plato's recognition, in conformity with it, that evils can never be expelled from the world, was enforced by his successors with arguments of their own. Evil, said Proclus, must always exist as a condition of the universal harmony, but it must always be kept under. It is scarcely necessary to point out the perfect agreement of the Darwinian "struggle for existence" with this theodicy.

The term "theodicy," adopted by Leibniz, correctly describes the thought of successive generations of Greek thinkers. From an early period, there had been a tendency to bring even what might seem merely physical under the head of "justice" and "injustice." The general conclusion of reflective observers, viewing life as a whole, was that a kind of justice can be seen to run through it, but that this, according to human ideas, is very imperfect. Both in their positive and negative utterances, the Greeks are on this point in agreement with the most pene-

trating of the Hebrews. Only among the Greeks, however, did poetic reflection lead on to a sustained philosophic effort after a solution. Plato, who first stated the problem in its generality, conceived it on the whole as Kant did later. The reign of absolute justice could not be seen if you looked for it directly as a mere observer. The method must be, to set up an ideal and then try whether you can think this as really governing all that happens in the world. The test is that you preserve self-consistency and consistency with the facts; following resolutely where reason leads. Plato's conclusion was that, while actual life, if closely examined, works out far more favourably to the just man than might be thought by a superficial observer, yet a single individual life is not adequate to the full accomplishment of justice. To this end, there must be a permanent individual existence, for which the single life is only one of a series. Over this series absolute justice rules.

By some thinkers the problem raised in the last place was set aside. The teleological order of the system of things, they thought, manifests itself only in relation to such great organic unities as cities and races. It does not take account of the mere individual. Now of course a kind of historical justice is most easily observable over a long time and where a great multitude is considered. Plato himself recognised the provisional value of such a point of view in proposing to consider ideal justice in the city before dealing with it in the citizen. But, as Proclus noted, while the virtues of the whole city are those of the individual "writ large," they are in quality as distinguished from quantity at a greater remove from the ideal. (*Comm. in Remp.*, ed. Kroll, i. 217.) Thus, if we are to try at all to find in the order of the world conformity to our practical and æsthetic demands, we must seek in the destiny of the individual a greater and not a less refinement of justice. A theodicy applying only to races and cities and perhaps families, would not satisfy us if it left the individual in a purely accidental relation to the total organic unity in which he is involved. This had long been an admitted point of view in Greek speculation of a theological cast. And, as Proclus also recognised, justice must not apply merely to man. There must be some shadow of it in relation to the lower animals.

Before we can know how far there is room for imaginations of "something like" this, we must try to determine whether any immortality of the soul is possible. Can the permanence of the individual be maintained on grounds of speculative reason?

The question is obviously not to be settled at once by idealism. For it seems as if, on idealistic principles, individuality might be some temporary phase in an impersonal whole of mind. In order to start as far away as we can from any position that would beg the question and issue in a purely illusory deductive process, let us attempt a dogmatic use of the sceptical result arrived at by Hume in the *Treatise of Human Nature*: namely, that no substance either of matter or of mind need be assumed, but that the finally true realities are the particular "perceptions" into which mind is resolved by analysis. These themselves, as Hume points out expressly (Bk. i. Pt. iv. sect. 5), we have no reason for supposing inextinguishable. For anything that can be asserted *a priori*, they, in common with every object we can imagine, may be "annihilated in a moment."

On this last position Hume remarks that it leaves everything "precisely as before." We may if we like take this in the sense that it is permissible to try to find our way back to a system by any axiom or postulate that seems to offer a foothold; though of course no one can be prevented from electing to remain a pure sceptic, adopting only such practical principles as may be necessary for the conduct of life. Now if the method were chosen of asserting as true anything conceivable on the given supposition, a positive doctrine of immortality might be laid down compatibly even with this complete disaggregation of mind. The existent perceptions *may* not be wholly annihilated; and they *may* continue, after the destruction of a particular organism (itself an illusory appearance), to run together in the same apparent "form of personality." All we need to do is to furnish ourselves with a practical motive and make an assertion agreeable to it. Perhaps this was the meaning of Hume's irony. I confess, however, that I should prefer to remain a pure sceptic. Any axiom that it would seem to me satisfactory to work with must present itself as primarily intellectual.

An axiom of perdurability applied to the elements of mind seems to have this character. Let us, then, posit as first realities the "elementary feelings" of Clifford's "mind-stuff," and declare these to be permanent. From their union minds appear, and into them minds, if they perish as such, are resolved. This view (as follows from what has been already said) does not absolutely preclude continuance of the same form of personality from one life to another; though it does

not in any way suggest it. Rather it suggests that death of the organism is accompanied by final disaggregation of the individual mind. Is the theory itself, however, in the end, thinkable?

Put in the extreme form provisionally adopted, it is not. The best refutation has been furnished by Prof. W. James, who has expressly discussed the question in his *Principles of Psychology*. The conclusive argument is this. If the isolated "elementary feeling" is the true reality, then relations between feelings joined in a consciousness should be explicable from the mere co-existence and succession of the feelings themselves. But such co-existence and succession can take place without bringing on the slightest tendency to permanent relation between the feelings. Let different persons experience side by side and in definite temporal order, feelings which, if thus brought together in one consciousness, would give a total conscious state with related parts: neither their co-existence nor succession will, in the circumstances, produce any association whatever. Thus consciousness, or the form of the individual mind, remains just as unexplained as before. Whatever it may be, it is something that makes a real difference to the feelings said to join themselves together in actual minds. "Laws of association," instead of showing how it emerges from the mere feelings, suppose it already there. The theory so far does not lead us a step further.

Another way of conceiving the doctrine of mind-stuff was slightly developed by me some time ago. Let us suppose the "relations" of Spencer (or indeed of Hume) equally permanent with the feelings related. Cannot the whole real or metaphysical process of things be regarded as an evolution of a "mind-stuff" consisting from the first not of isolated but of related feelings? The difficulty of this seems to be that we still get no nearer to the explanation of the many individual minds. Given a total of mind-stuff as the reality, its evolution would always be that of a single individual. It may be said that this is so; that particular individuals are partially illusory representations of the sole real experience. A view like this has been thought to result from Hegelianism. But on this theory also we need some explanation of apparent individuality.

Logically developed, the theory in this form seems indistinguishable from a Spinozism in which the "attribute of thought" is identified with "absolute subject" (rather than "substance"); the attribute of extension being subordinated.

This too, however, fails to yield an explanation of the individual mind, at least on Spinozistic principles. "That thing," says Spinoza (*Eth.* i. Def. 2), "is called in its kind finite which can be bounded by another of the same nature. For example, a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater. Thus thought is bounded by other thought. (*Sic cogitatio alia cogitatione terminatur.*) But body is not bounded by thought nor thought by body." Now evidently the organism is in this sense a finite thing, being marked off from other bodies. But there is no such relation between the particular mind, which according to Spinoza corresponds to it in the attribute of thought, and other minds. For there is no "boundary" between one mind and another, but each corresponds to the universe. "The soul," as Aristotle said, "is in a manner all things." The bounding of thought by thought, in analogy with a corporeal limit, is intelligible, if at all, only within each mind considered by itself. When Spinoza later speaks of "our mind" as "an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this again by another, and thus to infinity; so that all together constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God" (*Eth.* v. Prop. 40, Schol.), we seem to have arrived at a fundamentally different position, not capable of development from the first. Individuality is asserted as a fact, but has not been deduced.

Perhaps this is inevitable. At any rate, segregation and re-absorption of mind-atoms, and delimitation of infinite thought, alike turn out to be inapplicable analogies from bodies distributed or diffused in space. Reconstitution of the individual mind from the "particular perceptions" into which it was apparently resolved, Hume himself did not think that he had achieved; and the successors on his own line have not further advanced this particular problem. Mill, in his famous definition of consciousness as "a series aware of itself as a series," in effect gave up the attempt; simply asserting individuality in his own manner. But had Hume really disposed of the "immaterial soul?" Is the term henceforth superseded for the metaphysician?

Now it is remarkable that, in the section of the *Treatise* referred to above, he only seems to dispose of it by showing how the logical development of the conception would run into Spinozism. This was meant to frighten the theologians of his time; and it succeeded. But suppose we have no objection to regarding the particular soul as not a created thing, but in

some sense an "eternal mode" of the Substance or Subject that is all. If we are fairly to test the position, we must not take the soul as understood in the Christian Scholastic compromise between a philosophically developed Platonism and the dualistic assumptions required to square with the faith. Some purely philosophical rendering of the doctrine must be sought for. This test, it may be pointed out, Kant as well as Hume failed to apply. Now we find such a purely philosophical rendering in Berkeley; whose theological purpose never caused any deviation in the logic of his thinking. Hume, in his destructive criticism of "personal identity," does not attempt to deal with Berkeley's doctrine of the "notion." Of the importance of this, indeed, Berkeley himself only became fully conscious after his first writing of the *Principles of Human Knowledge;* as is shown by his later insertions. What Hume treats as Berkeley's definitive "theory of knowledge" is the position that we reason by means of "ideas." This theory, however, Berkeley considered adequate only to the object-world. About objects in general, we can reason by particular "ideas," all of which are picturable. The use of these in thinking is made possible by attention to them in a general relation. The constant order that runs through our perceptions, considered in this general aspect, constitutes our external world. By closer attention to the precise conditions of perceptions, in so far as they do not depend on each particular mind, we substitute science for ordinary experience. There must be, however, something to which the external world appears. This is called a "spirit." Of spirits we have no "ideas," but only an absolutely unpicturable "notion," corresponding to no particular perception. Yet, for coherent knowledge, we cannot do without subjects of phenomena. A substance or subject, indicated, it may be, only by a word, must yet be thus indicated because perceptions are—as we now say—related in a consciousness. And, as has been seen, the course of more recent thought has failed to substitute any way of thinking by which we can dispense with such a "notion." For positive psychology, at least in beginning its expositions, the organism may suffice as a "bearer:" but the problems raised by Berkeley and Hume do not find their adequate solution in positive psychology.

Let us, then, adopting the position last cited from Spinoza, try to conceive of the many "spirits" as interacting within a system (called by Spinoza "Dei aeternus et infinitus

intellectus"). These existences ("spirits" or "modes"), according to Berkeley as well as Spinoza, are not limited to a particular time. In fact, immediate experience suggests to us the notion of a subject which goes into latency (as in sleep) and returns from it. Why then should we limit their duration at all? As they are not deducible either from "infinite intellect" on the one side, or from hypothetical elements reached by analysis on the other, the consequence seems to be that the whole of mind must be thought of as always intrinsically pluralised. And, since the "modes" by which it is pluralised are distinct, they too, if we are to retain our general axiom of perdurability, must be regarded as permanent. Thus the whole of mind, that is, of reality, contains in itself many permanently real modes or spirits, without ceasing to be a whole and a system.

Evidently, on the principles of immaterialism, the conditions expressed as space and matter will not enable us to explain the pluralising of mind. The organism is merely one figured portion of the "waking dream" (Berkeley, *Siris*, § 318) which expresses the interaction of the "subjects" composing reality. Its relation to the subject is not properly that of effect to cause, any more than of cause to effect, if we use the terms in their scientific or phenomenal sense: it is that of phenomenon or manifestation to noumenon. The word "cause" indeed was used in the sense of noumenon by Kant himself, after he had formally drawn the distinction. It had been used already in this sense by the Neo-Platonists. Comte proposed to expel it from philosophical or scientific language precisely on account of the tinge of "metaphysics" that clings to it. Still, if a serious effort is made, consistent use of it in the phenomenal sense does not seem difficult to maintain; though occasional relapses into popular language (which is more "metaphysical") ought not to be found very misleading.

Thus we do not seem to need any "substance" except the intangible and unfigured "subject" to which phenomena appear. The ways in which this could go out of existence without diminishing the whole of being, seem to be strictly unknowable. We cannot dogmatically assert that there are no such ways; but we are at least entitled to attempt an ontological theory on the ground of what can be coherently thought. To complete the scale of being, it will no doubt be necessary to suppose, at a lower grade than Berkeley's self-conscious "spirits," not only permanent souls of animals, but

also "monads," as Leibniz called them, corresponding to the things that appear as inorganic. These are not "material substances" in Berkeley's sense. Their real being is an activity analogous to that of the subject. Phenomenally, the rendering of this may be "energy." And, if we are to speculate on this line, the conjecture may be thrown out that the phenomenal rendering of subjective being when its activity becomes latent is "entropy," or unavailable energy. If there is anything that can be wholly set over against soul or mind or spirit, it seems to be a kind of real "not-being," such as the Platonic or Neo-Platonic "matter." Berkeley, in his later speculations, did not reject the thought that there might be a place for this matter of the "incorporealists." If it were to be again introduced, as has sometimes been proposed, its meaning would be that of a descriptive formula expressive of the fact that non-spatial subjects come to present themselves as if set apart from one another, in union with certain bounded groups of phenomena in space. Something very like this is to be found in Kant's space considered as a "form of intuition," within which the subject is necessitated to present phenomena to itself. For within space as a common form, the individual subject associates one group of phenomena (namely, its organism) with itself; inferring the existence of other subjects in association with similar appearances. Kant's spatial "form" is not the same as the empty, objective space called by Plato the recipient of the ideas; and, though it has more points of resemblance to the Neo-Platonic "matter," it is not quite identical with it: but it occupies the same position in the system. A thorough assimilation of any of these doctrines would equally set us free from "parallelism," of the Cartesian type, between "extension" and "thought" conceived as co-ordinate realities. The metaphor suggested, instead of parallel straight lines, would be that of circumference and centre (or, as the Platonists said, the region near the centre); the former representing material objects and the latter intellect. A taste for paradoxical expression might suggest that, according to this view, the two poles of reality are mind or the unextended, and nature or the non-existent.

What the Sophist called the non-existence of nature is, however, like its existence, relative. Actual or possible "natural phenomena" do not themselves constitute a process of real evolution: yet we must suppose a real process to go on through the activities of the subjects to whom are presented

the phases of the cosmic dream. How this process is to be conceived metaphysically is a genuine problem for speculation, though it may admit of no positive solution. A theory worked out by the Orientalist Emile Burnouf (in *La Vie et la Pensée*) was that the same "monads" become successively incarnate in the ascending stages of animal life, till at length they reach the stage of man, to be followed, at the next great geological epoch, by that of "super-man." Another possible view is that the "Ideas of individuals" (in Platonic phrase) do not evolve so as to pass from one specific grade to another, but become by turns manifest in a phenomenal world as the process brings on the grouping of scenery adapted to new actors in the drama. In this case equally, of course, the apparent or physical corresponds to a real or metaphysical process. Either view is consistent with the facts of biological evolution, which refers directly only to the organisms evolved. If indeed the consciousness of the offspring could be explained by deriving it from the consciousness of the parents, the whole would be an affair of positive science, and we should have no need for a metaphysic of heredity. But no such explanation has ever been offered in psychological terms.

Speculation has thus brought us to conceive the possibility that permanent individual subjects may have successive lives through which could be seen, if we knew them, a teleological order resembling that which is manifested in societies to the insight of a philosophic historian. As in the successive generations of a progressive or decadent civilisation, so in the case of the individual, the acquirement or non-acquirement of knowledge and virtue in one life would have its effect on the next. It might even be rendered conceivable that, at a certain elevation in the scale of being, consciousness and memory should go on in some phenomenal world from one life to another. And if the teleological order (as was always assumed in the Platonic myths) is one in which justice prevails, this does not involve any chimerical notion of guilt or merit on the part of the individual towards the universe. All that is done or suffered must be regarded as taking place naturally through the actions and reactions of individuals within the smaller or greater organic groups to which they belong. In the case of man, the largest group may be, as Mill thought, sentient life on earth; but with this each man's connexion is less organic than with Humanity; as again, at the present stage, it is less organic with Humanity than with his own State.

Lastly, the question put by Aristotle arises: whether the unity of the whole is merely in the system, or is something above. In terms of Spinozism: Is there any but a logical distinction between *natura naturans* and *natura naturata?* Or, in terms of Hegelianism: Is there any meaning in talking of Absolute Spirit apart from the finite spirits in which it is manifested? Now under the head of psychology we found that, while determination by "final cause" continues to a certain point, there is a point where, even within our experience, we begin to go beyond it. Intellectual activity may attain a kind of impersonal character in which the relation of end and means begins to disappear; and the mystics claim to go even further. So far as transcendence of teleology is concerned, the mystics and Aristotle—who, it must be remembered, was pre-eminently a teleologist—quite agree. There may exist a state or activity of the individual subject which does not reach out to anything further, but is for that subject the end. If something even better than this has an unchanging existence in that which directs the whole, or contains all, or is all, then there is placed for ever above volition what is finally the end of all desire. All below this may contain an element of will; since even the lowest real existences are moved by a vague "effort" towards some kind of good: but that which the whole, or the highest in it, possesses, it does not need to strive after. A position thus generalised seems to offer the elements of a solution. There are systems of ends, and these are mutually adapted so as to form one system; but this system has no end. There is no future of the universe for which its present state is only a preparation; just as its present state was not the "final cause" of the preceding. The perfection of the whole exists eternally, in a manner of which the mystics may get a glimpse. The whole, while it is a system, is more. The One, which remains, is either superpersonal intellect, containing all subjects, or something beyond intellect. Volition and final cause belong only to the parts and to the flux.

From this it results that there is no evolution of the universe as a whole. There always has been and always will be a phenomenal world. The phenomenal world of science is, in terms of idealism, a conceptual construction representing for thought the groupings of appearances to thinking and perceiving subjects. What is indicated by it is an aggregate of systems analogous to our solar system, in all stages of evolution and dissolution simultaneously. The cyclical pro-

cesses of which we perceive the phases are those of particular systems. In the whole, all orders of mental and physical reality and appearance co-exist. Individual beings alternate between actuality and possibility, whether of perceiving or of arousing perception in others. The whole may be thought as finite. That is to say, what we call the material systems are numerable. They are in "infinite space," in the sense that space as a subjective phantasm is necessarily infinite from the nature of our experience; but the ether in which they are immersed has a measure. Possibilities of undergoing the experience of perceptual motion are determinate in all directions. At a finite, though very great, distance from our place in the universe, there is no longer the possibility of such experiences as are constitutive of our physical world.

Time, being distinctively the form of the subject, is nearer to metaphysical reality than space. It is also, for the imagination, more perplexing. Yet the puzzle regarding infinite past time, insisted on especially by Renouvier, seems to be in the end a puzzle for imagination rather than for thought. The assertion that there is no limit to the series of phenomenal events in the past can be cleared of self-contradiction; and both science and metaphysics seem to require it. The phenomenal law of causal sequence does not allow us to stop anywhere in tracing back one collocation to another by which it was preceded. And, if we suppose a necessary relation between the whole of reality, or the noumenon, and its manifestation, it follows that there must always be phenomena, without limit in the past as in the future. For thought there is here no antinomy. The noumenon manifests itself now as always; and events in time are ever succeeding one another.

The laws of conservation of matter and energy are such as would result from this metaphysical position. And, if the transformation of energy so as to become unavailable,—the "dissipation of energy" as it is called,—expresses the predominant movement under the given conditions of our solar system, no ground has yet been shown for holding it to be more than a provisional formula for a portion of a cycle. "Entropy," or energy rendered unavailable, is not held by physicists to be destroyed: therefore it must be conceived as a reserve from which under other conditions the cycle may renew itself.

This general outline seems at any rate to be scientifically thinkable. The view set against it may be summed up in

the assertion that phenomena are not necessarily, but contingently, related to the noumenon. In short, the production of the universe is to be conceived on the analogy of human volition. This, undoubtedly, would get rid of the trouble for the imagination, though at the expense of a miracle. A very primitive form of imagination is a "mythus" or tale, which starts with "once upon a time." It is an application of this form of discourse when cosmogonic poets or theologians tell of a beginning of the world. But, as we have partly seen, thought leads away from this literally mythological view. A miraculous beginning is imaginable and is defensible by pure formal logic: but if we aim at a thoroughgoing scientific logic also, where are we to stop in tracing back phenomenal effects to causes? And, when we deal with the question metaphysically, how can we be content to attribute that weakness of human nature which displays itself as apparently arbitrary choice, to the reality manifested in the whole system of things? In the human mind itself, at its higher stages, action or mental process seems to flow by a kind of natural necessity. The most plausible ground for indeterminism as regards the human will is the seeming unreason of many (non-impulsive) actions, whether viewed from within or from without. Of course they are not really inconsistent with determinism: but, in viewing the world as a whole, nothing even apparently like them is to be observed. What physical science discovers is the immanent reason of uniform law. To suppose this to have begun from a point of time by an act of choice is to descend to a lower level in seeking what purports to be a philosophical explanation of the order revealed by science.

The view that there is no total process of the world from a temporal beginning to an end, but that there always has been and always will be a world, was held in antiquity by philosophers who had systematically considered the question and who had no mythological position to maintain. Between naturalists and idealists there was here no difference. Earlier than the systematic stage of philosophising, the position had been explicitly stated by Heraclitus and by Parmenides. For the elder thinker, no less than for his immediate successor and opponent, the world was one perdurable whole, not made in the past and not to be destroyed in the future. And, in aphoristic or poetic form, this was connected with the idea of a reality expressing itself in the system of the universe but not exhausted by that system.

Such "transcendence" of the universe by its reality, according to the interpretation of Diels, was admitted even by Heraclitus; though, in comparison with his doctrine of the flux which is the never-ceasing form of all that appears, it received slight expression. Parmenides was the first to lay stress on the noumenon as such. For him, as for Heraclitus, what appears is in flux. He did not deny change as an empirical fact, but tried to give some account of it, not too discordant with that of his predecessor. His Being, though objective, is not the universe as it appears to perception, but is the reality of the visible universe comprehending itself in thought. It is true that he had not arrived at an "intellectualist" theory of knowledge; but the enumeration, in the second part of the poem, of the differences and mixtures in the world, is quite clearly intended to bring out the contrast of phenomenon with reality. This distinction, as subjective criticism arose, led very rapidly to a theory of knowledge more appropriate for its support than the "sensationalist" psychology of all the early thinkers. Thus the Neo-Platonic commentators, as Diels says, if we allow for some shades of expression, did not intrepret Parmenides unhistorically, but had a perfectly correct view of his drift. And Greek thought, while moving from the object to the subject, remained at one in its cosmological assertions. The universe is the perpetual manifestation of Being or Reason, but the manifestation is through unceasing change.

To the decisive assertion of Parmenides that the unity of the world means more than unity of system, a parallel may be found in the Indian philosophy of the Vedanta. Here, however, Being (Brahman or Atman) is primarily, instead of secondarily, subjective. The two philosophies have in common, it must be allowed, the tendency to suppress what they cannot deduce, to call it simply illusion. By later thinkers a more balanced position was attained. Plotinus near the end of ancient philosophy, and Spinoza not long after the new beginning of philosophy in modern Europe, are at bottom free from the "acosmism" sometimes attributed to them. They recognise the variety as well as unity in the world, the metaphysical individual as well as the one essence of the whole. Yet, inheriting as they did a rationalist theory of knowledge, they felt themselves bound to attempt the deduction of what cannot wholly be deduced. The Many as distinguished from the One, the grades of pluralised being from

transcendent reality and unity downwards to bare possibility, cannot be logically arrived at either by a theory of "emanation" or of a "determination" which is "negation." The first, as is now generally admitted, leads to an endless interpolating of mean terms which can never bridge over the original chasm; and the second proceeds from something which for us at least is negative to the details of our positive knowledge. And yet the ontological movement in philosophy has not been a failure. What is needed is correction in method, not abandonment of the problem.

This is the lesson of the experiential philosophy. The ontological problem still exists, and must be conceived as largely as ever: but we must acknowledge that the parts of the whole have to be taken as given. When known, their harmony with the rest may become an object of imaginative thought: but they have first to be brought into view as facts. Thus, for example, teleology and individuality, however they may be metaphysically explained, are facts of experience. A philosopher may in his higher thought rise above the teleological view, as Spinoza did; but this view is not to be effaced. It has indeed something that seems empirical and contingent, as contrasted not only with the "amor Dei intellectualis" but with a mathematical intuition of physical necessity. Between the objects of these it presents itself as intermediate. It determines the topics of mixed sciences. Sometimes it has been sacrificed to the idealistic and sometimes to the mechanical extreme, sometimes perhaps to both: yet, from its appeal to the "common sense" type of mind, it is sure always to return. The strength both of ancient and of modern philosophies deriving from Plato and Aristotle is in having retained the teleological point of view, conceived in a scientific sense, within a highly speculative system, but not at the summit.

THE END.

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